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"WHAT'S REALLY GOING ON?" A STUDY OF
LAWYER AND SCIENTIST INTER-DISCIPLINARY
DISCOURSE

ROBERT J. CONDLIN*

I. THE TwO CULTURES OF L AW AND SCIENCE
In the modern world the int1uence of science is everywhere. "At
every turn," as a leading commentator puts it, "we encounter new
material indicators of [science's] progress: air bags and antilock
brakes, electronic mail, fax machines and bank cards, heart
transplants and laser surgery, genetic screening, in vitro
fertilization, and a burgeoning pharmacopoeia for treating mental
and physical illness." 1 "In just one generation the space program
has expanded the physical frontiers of human experience, while
discoveries in the biological sciences have revolutionized our
ability to manipulate the basic processes of life so as lo fight
infertility, aging, hunger and disease."2 Moreover, individuals use
the lessons of science, sometimes without realizing it, to make most
of the ordinary and basic decisions of everyday life, such as where
and in what to live, what to eat and wear, what household and
consumer products to use, what medicines to take, what type of
work to do, what recreational activities to engage in, and the like.
Similarly, public agencies and large-scale private organizations use

*

Professor of Law. University of Maryland School of Law. Work on this
article was supported by grants from the University of Maryland Foundation, for
which I am grateful. I also owe a special deht of gratitude to my research
assistant, Hollie Paine, with whom discussion about lawyer discourse was
invariably illutninating and always fun.
l. SHEILA JASANOFF, SCIENCE AT THE B AR 2 (1995); :>ee also Howard T.
Markey, Science and Law: The Friendly Enemies, 30 IDEA 13, I5 ( 1989).
2. JASANOFF, :>upra note l, at 2.
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science to make social policy decisions about the allocation of risk,
the distribution of resources, and the structuring of economic
incenti ves and constraints, to determine, among other things, how
to create jobs, prevent environmental degradation, and provide
cost-efiective health care. Additionally, these agencies and
organizations use science to decide what types of technological
innovation and economic arrangements to encourage and nurture,
and whom to blame and someti mes also hold liable for individual
and collective harms. Science informs nearly all of the long and
short term lifestyle and policy choices presented by the modern
world. Our very understanding of that world is mediated through,
if not shaped by, science. One can be ignorant of science, but one
cannot escape it.
Science intersects with law at almost every turn as well. As
Peter Schuck explains:
[T]he law of intellectual property, especially patents, takes its
very content from science, both pure and applied. The law of
evidence often demands scientific support for the use of certain
techniques, such as DNA typing and epidemiology, and for the
drawing of particular inferences from testimony, such as
causation. Medical malpractice cases usually involve (indeed,
they may require) testimony by scientific experts. Antitrust
litigation relies heavily upon technical economic analysis of
product markets. Employment discrimination often looks to
statistical analyses of labor markets for evidence of bias [and so
on, and so forth] ?

In some ways, common law courts have always dealt with
disruptions arising from scientific and technological advances of
one kind or another. 4 However, science and law have become
3. Peter H. Schuck, Multi-Culturalism Redux: Science, Law and Politics. II
YALE L. & POLICY REv. 1, 3-4 n.9 (1993); see also L EON R. KASS, T OWARD A
MORE NATURAL SCIENCE 2 (1985) (listing legal questions raised by new
biomedical technologies, including "the legality and morality of abortion, the
definition of clinical death, the legitimacy of research on fetuses, the morality of
'test-tube babies' and surrogate motherhood, the propriety of sperm banks, the
right to refuse treatment, the rationale for psychosurgery, justice in the distribution
of medical resources, the dangers and benefits of gene splicing, and the use and
abuse of psychoactive drugs"); Jonas Robitscher, Cun Professionals Talk With
Each Other?, 64 J. MED. ASS'N GA. 302. 304 ( 1975) (describing other issues in
which law and science interrelate).
4. See JASANOFF. supra note 1, at 24 (describing how early in the
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pervasively intertwined wilh the advent of the industrial and
electronic revolutions in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. lt
is now routine for social change, particularly the kind calling for
legal regulation, to be augmented, if not brought about, by
scientific and technological change. Science based choices and
problems pervade the most difficult issues of social regulation
facing legislatures and courts. Consequently, law and science are
inevitable bedfellows, whether they want to be or not. Not working
effectively with one another is no longer an option for either
discipline, if it ever was.
Notwithstanding the need to coordinate their efforts, however,
law and science, or more accurately, the practitioners of law and
science, do not get along aU that well with one another, and perhaps
never really have. 5 Part of the difficulty is explained by the fact
that law and lawyers, mostly in the form of personal injury lawyers
and products liability and malpractice litigation, threaten the
economic livelihood of scientists (including doctors), as well as
restrict their ability to control the tenns and conditions of their
work. 6

seventeenth century common law judges were already grappling with cases that
pitted homeowners interests against those of new commercial activities, giving as
examples a "hog-sty," the odor from which "corrupted" the surrounding air, or a
''dye-house." the waste from which polluted a fish pond).
5. This is particularly true for the last thirty years. roughly the period in this
country in which Utere has been a widespread perception of a medical malpractice
crisis. This crisis (or perception) has been responsible for much of the overheated
and vuulent rhetoric on the incompatibility of law and science. See JASANOFF,
supra note 1, at 31-36 (describing the medical malpractice crisis); Kenneth S.
Abraham, Medical Malpractice Reform: A Preliminary Analysis, 36 MD. L. REv.
489. 490-92 ( 1977); Joan M. Gibson and Robert L. Schwartz, Physicians and
Lawyers: Science. Art. and Conflict, 6 AM. J. L. & MED. 173, 173-74 (1980)
(stating that "relations between physicians and lawyers . . . deteriorated into
mutual hostility ... [w]ith the advent in the early 1970s of what was widely
perceived to be a medical malpractice insurance crisis"); Benjamin Naitone,
Medicolegal Education and the Crisis in ln.terprofessional Relations, 8 AM . .1. L.
& MED. 293, 294-98 ( 1982) (describing "the crisis in interprofessional relations").
o. See Erie E. Peacock, Dnr.tors v. Lawyers, 55 No. CAR. MED. J. 41 , 42
( 1994} (describing the "most obvious" reason for the ·'universal condemnation" of
lawyers by physicians as "that lawyers hold a power over physicians that is not
reciprocated"}; Gibson and Schwartz, supra note 5, at 174-75 (describing
defensiveness between doctors and lawyers as ''reinforced by potentially
competing economic interests of the two professions"); Daniel M. Fox, Why

184

RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol.

25

Money and power are the oldest, simplest, and most common
sources of friction between social groups, so no doubt part of the
law-science conflict is explained in this way. But money and
power, by themselves, seem inadequate to account for the level of
antipathy expressed by scientists for lawyers and vice versa. Law's
threat to the income of scientists, while real, is not likely to move
scientists as a group from one economic class to another, and the
explanation based on a lack of control over work suffers from some
of the same difficulties. No professional group has unilateral
control over its work, nor could it hope to in a political and
economic system as multi-faceted, interdependent, and complex as
our own, even if law was not in the picture. It is not the lack of
control per se that is troubling to scientists, so much as it is the
ceding of control to those who are thought not to know what they
are doing. The foundation of scientists' dislike for lawyers starts
with an objection to the way in which control is exercised and to
the people exercising it, rather than an objection to the loss of
control in and of itself. To understand this conflict fully, then, one
must look deeper into the professional cultures of the two
disciplines, to see what it is about each that sets the other off.
It is commonly understood that law and science are different
enterprises, organized around different central values, animated by
different incentives and constraints, constituted by different
analytical and investigative methods and techniques, and driven by
different biases and orientations.7 Perhaps because they are so
Docrors and Lawyers Don't Ger Along,

LEGAL TIMES, Aug. 30, 1993, at 25

(des(.;ribing do(.;tors ' o~jections to lawyers as based on "rising malpractice
insurance premiums," and the "mass of regulations that burden and ... often
demean" do(.;tors and "interfere[] with [their] medi(.;al autonomy").
7. Peter Schuck has described the differences between the two disciplines,
including the extent to which such assertions of difference must be qualified,
organizing his discussion around these themes. See Schuck, supra note 3. at 1429; see also Markey, supra note I , at 14 (describing different approaches taken by
law and science towards t.he same factors). Leon Kass argues the stronger point
that "[s jcience ... is neither in spirit nor in manner friendly to the concerns of
governance or the moral and civic education of human beings and citi1.ens."
KAss, supra note 3, at 4. He continues:
Science fosters and encourages novel ty; political society, governed by
the rule of law, cannot do withour stability. Science reject~ all authority
save the truth, and prefers skepticism ro trust and submission when truth
is unavailing; the political community requires trust in, submission to,
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different, lawyers and scientists complain about one another in
much the same way, with the arguments of each placing a heavy
emphasis on the themes of vulgarity and obtuseness. Scientists
bemoan law's lack of understanding of science, its inability to
separate good science from bad, its demand that scientific findings
be expressed in the language of ce11ainty rather than probability,
and the limited opportunity provided by legal procedures for
keeping decisions provisional or contingent, subject to further
testing and reconsideration in light of new information or
understanding.8 They also object to the adversarial method of
inquiry used by lawyers, with its perceived (by scientists)
preference for "relative" rather than "absolute" truth, and for
"strongO" (i.e.. rhetorically persuasive) rather than "right"
answers.9 Additionally, scientists believe that legal concepts like
"guilt, fault, intention, responsibility, liability, obligation, [and]
uuty," cannot be verified by appeals to scientific 1aw. 10 Karl
Menninger expressed these objections in the language of an earlier
and even reverence for it~ ruling beliefs and practices. Science is
universal and cosmopolitan; the political community is always particular
and exclusive, resting on a distinction between who is in and who is out.
The love of truth and the love of one's own arc not always reconcilable.
!d. But see note 26 infra, for au argumeut that the differences between law and
science can be greatly exaggerated.
K See Schuck, supra note 3, at 25 n.78 (quoting from a scientist's letter to
the author, " the notion of refusing to reconsider a determination that one knows is
wrong would drive scientists even wilder than trotting out the concept of
justice."); see also David Hyman, How T..aw Killed Ethics, 34 PERS. IN BIOLOGY &
MEn. 134 passim ( 1990), for a clearly stated and vividly illustrated taxonomy of
"scientific" objections to legal discourse (i.e., that it is too uncertain, equivocal
and hedged, that it is too inrrusive and hegemonic, t.bat it. is too ad hoc, emotional
and particularistic, and that it is too adversarial and judgmental); Fox. supra note
6, at 25-26 (describi ng similar five-point taxonomy).
9. Gibson and Schwartz, supra note 5, at 176-77, 179.
lO. /d. ; see also KAss. supra note 3, at 4 (stating that "It is one th.ing to hold
nn. trust as rrue that one should honor one's father and mother or that all men are
created equal and endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights; it is
another thing to have to prove it"). The best discussion of the relationship
between the legal adversarial and scientific methods is David Luban, The
Adversary System Exr.use, in THE Goon LAWYER: LAWYERS' RoLES AND
LAWYERs · ETHTCS 83, 94-96 (David Luban ed., 1983); see also Sidney J. Golman.
Medicine and the Law, 12 PARAPLWIA 237, 237-39 (1975) (describing the power
of the adversary advocacy to manipulate emotion, bias, and prejudice to achieve
lawyer goals).
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generation of scientists when he wrote, "[t]he very word of justice
irritates scientists. No surgeon expects to be asked if an operation
for cancer is just or not. No doctor will be reproached on the
grounds that the dose of penicillin he has prescribed is less or more
thanjustice would stipulate." 11
ll. KARL MENNINGER, THE CRIME OF PuNISHMENT 17 (1968); see also
T£MOTHY FERRIS, T HE WHOLE SHEBANG: A STATE-OF-THE-UNIVERSE(S) REPORT

300 ( 1997) ("philosophizing is about as popular among working scientists as is
bird-watching among professional golfers"). Daniel Fox also has several choice
lines for describing scientists' (mostly doctors') objections to law. See Fox, supra
note 6, at 26. It is particularly ironic that law should be criticized at this time in its
history for not understanding science, or for not building bridges between legal
and scientific systems of thought. ln the last two decades, interdisciplinary study
and scholarship in American legal education have grown e1tponentially in
importance. See, e.g., Symposium: Writing Across the Margi11s, .'iJ WASH. & I ,EH
L. REV. 943- 1017 ( 199o) (discussing the question of "what can go wrong?" when
legal scholars look ar. legal subjects from an inter-disciplinary perspective). Law
schools have developed in ways that move heyond the view of law as an
autonomous discipline, and scientists now routinely have appointments on law
facu lties. See Phillip Areeda, Alway.t A Borrower: Law and 01her Disciplines,
DuKE L. J. I 029, I 03R-39 ( 19RR). Many law professors have dual degrees in law
and science, science materials are routinely included in law school course books
and studied in law school courses (e.g., courses in intellectual property,
environmental law, health law, criminal law, and the like), and there arc even
<:ourses and texts designeu to tea<:h lawyers how to use science in law. See, e.g.,
J OHN MONAHAN & LAURENS W ALKER, SOCIAL SCIENCE IN LAW: CASES AND
MATERlALS (2d cd. 1990). Mainstream legal journals routinely publish articles
based on joint legal anu scienti fi~: research and analysis, and some journals are
devoted exclusively to the publication of interdisciplinary law and science
scholarship. See David 0. Brink, Book Review: Reviewing THEORY Al'ID PRACTICE
(Ian Shapiro and Judith Wagner DeCew eds., 1995), 47 J. L. Eouc. 270, 272
(1997). In this, law is pruticipating in UJJ academy wide phenomenon. As Richru·d
Posner notes:
It is no longer easy to distinguish a sociologist from an anthropologist.
or a classicist from either, or a literary theorist from a philosopher, or
even an economist from an evolutionru-y biologist. This fraying of lines
is as advanced in the academic study of law as anywhere, with the result
that the very distinctions among the different fields of interdisciplinary
legal study, such as law and economics and law and literature, are
blurred ....
RICHARD P OSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 472 ( 199.'i). Whatever the effects of these
changes in the academic legal world, however, and it is safe to say that they have
been considerable, the movement for increased interdisciplinary understanuing
and collaboration between law and science has not yet had an optimal effect on the
day to day behavior of legal practitioners and judges. See id. at 98-99 (noting and
bemoaning this fact in responding to Judge Harry &!wards' ~:ritici sm of legal
scholarship for being impractical).
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Lawyers complain just as assiduously about scientists' failure to
understand the fundamental purposes and methods of law.12 The
fam.iliar disjunction, that law pursues justice and science truth,13
while accurate to a degree, conceals a more complex reality which
is easily misunderstood from each direction. As the sociology of
science has taught, "scientific facts are not immanent [sic] in an
objective reality waiting to be discovered by any scientists who
look in the right place. Instead, they are constructed and
validated ... through a ... process ... [that is] shaped by scientific
paradigms, . . . [and these paradigms, in turn,] hold sway for
reasons that may have less to do with their intrinsic merit than with
their suppon of existing social structures, including the scientific
establishment." 14 Moreover, the search for scientific truth "is not
guided solely by [scientists' ] autonomous, spontaneous curiosity.
[It] is [also] constrained and channeled by resources available for
research, which in tum reflect the priorities of politicians,
corporations, foundations, and other sources of funding for
science." 15 Much of the time, therefore, in its data, methods,

12. This is especially true if one includes doctors in the category of scientistS,
though not everyone would. Peter Schuck, for example, concludes that while
" physicians are scientifically trained, they do not approach data in the same
manner a~ do practicing scientist~.'' Schuck, supra note 3, at 20. They tend, he
says (quoting a colleague on the faculty of the Yale School of Medicine) ''to be
much less rigorous; . . . to seek onJy enough data to enable them to be comfortable
with their best clinical judgments." !d. at n.62.
13. Tbis simplified characterization, as Sheila Jasanoff explains, simply
restates the insight:
that fact-finding in the law is always contingent on a particular vision of
(and mechanism for) delivering social justice. Scientific claims, by
contrast ate thought to lac-k such contingency. Although its conclusions
may be speculative. provisional. and subject to modification, science is
ordinarii y seen as set apart from all other social activities by virtue of its
institutionalized procedures for overcoming particularity and context
dependence and its capacity for generating claims of universal validity.
Not surprisingly, then, comparisons between science and the law often
celebrate science's unique commitment t.o systematic testing of
observati ons and its will ingness to submit its conclusions t.o critical
prohing and falsification.
J ASANOFF. supra note I, al 7. For such a celebration of science's umque
properties, sec ROGER G. N EWTON, THE TRUTH OF SCiENCE 201-14 (1997).
14. Schuck. supra note 3, at 15-16.
15. /d. at 16. Richard Lewontin characterizes the view of science a~ "reality
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findings, and even in the extent of its authoritativeness, science is
as contextual, contingent, and controversial as law.
By the same token, lawyers claim, justice is not purely
subjective. While it is true that notions of justice vary with time
and place, the concept also contains an objective component that
remains constant over the same categories. This is because
"fllaw' s legitimacy, at least in the long run, rests in part on its
ability to generate outcomes that ... comport [more or less,] with
the common morality and common sense of the lay community"
being regulated. 16 Ironically, this common morality and common
sense also demand, among other things, that law not deviate
unacceptably from scientific truth, at the peril of being thought
illegitimate if it does. While it may be difficult to determine what
degree of deviation a society will accept as legitimate at any given
moment, this consistency with co1m110n sense requirement, hardwired into the concept of justice, causes scientific and legal truth to
merge in a complicated, but real, way. Legal truth is not identical
to scientific truth, but it also is not wholly at odds with it.
Moreover, legal truth cannot ignore or fly in the face of scientific
truth without losing its claim to legitimacy. Lawyers argue that
scientists do not understand the nature or extent of this
interrelationship, when they criticize law for its failure to take
scientific truth seriously.
Regardless of the fact that justice and truth, in some ways
fundamentally different ends, law and science also differ
principally in the time frames in which they work, and the language
each uses to express its results. Law is usually in more of a hurry
to decide than science. Judges must resolve cases that come before
them on the basis of the best evidence available at the time, even if
that evidence is not wholly adequate by scientific standards. They
do not have the option of waiting until a professional scientific

driven" as "charmingly naive." R.C. Lewontin. Survival of the Nicest, N.Y. REv.
Of BOOKS, Oct. 22, 1998, at 59. Using examples from evolutionary biology, he
explains, "there is no simple and direct ' truth' about how to understand the hisiory
of life on earth. [While] the descriptive facts of evolution are not at issue, . ..
when we move from evolution as narrative to evolution as universal history the
predispositions of ideology come to dominate science." /d.
16. Schuck, supra note 3, at 22.

1999j

LAWYER AND SClENTIST lNTER-DISCIPLINARY DISCOURSE

189

consensus emerges. In making these decisions, judges frequently
will be forced to choose among competing scientific lhcories even
when they are not competent (in scientific terms) to do so, and
when scientists are not ready to do so for them. 17 If this was not
enough, judges also must j ustify their decisions in non-technical
and relatively simple language, so that they may be understood and
applied by people generally, acting without professional help and
with limited resources. Thi s necessarily causes law to draw lines
"and createD categories that force many legal decisions into a
binary mode," where the difference between being in and outside
of the category means everything. 1R
''fTlhis tendency toward categorical reductionism," as Professor
Schuck explains, also "reflects [law's] commitment to the j ury as a

17. Sometimes, in Edward Lazarus' s felicitous phrase, ~ourt:s must " buil[d]
the right house on the wrong land and put it up too quickly." EDWARD LAZARUS,
CLOSED C HAMBERS 371 (1998)(explaining bow "locating the right to abortion in
the due process clause's protection of privacy .. . skewed the tenm of the debate
away from the strongest (and textually supported) pro-choice legal 1.11gumcnts as
well as from what wa~ really at stake socially and morally for women." 1bis
~ould not be helped, LaUirus continues. because "[t]be argument from equality
was not yet developed" at the time Roe v. Wade had to be decided.); see "lso Ruth
B. Ginsburg, Some Thought on AwoMmy and Equality in Rellltion to Roe v.
Wade, 63 No. CAR. L. REv. :l7n (19!l5)(articulating an equality based rationale for
Roe v. Wade). The sixteen year litigation against Dow Coming Corporation over
the safety of silicone breast implants, which may have come to an end with the
Company's agreement to pay the plaintiffs $3.2 billion in settlement of their
chums, is a good example of the different timetables within which law and science
work, often at cross purposes. See Gina Kalata, Deal Without Resolwion. N.Y.
TIMES, July II, 1998, at AI ; see al.~n M A KC IA ANGElL, SCIENCE ON TRIAL: THE
CLASH OF MEDICAL EVIDENCE AND THE LAW IN THE 8 REAST IMPLANT CASE ( 1997).
18. Schuck. supra note 3, at 28. Professor Jasanoff explains funher why
''[t]here is no way for the law to access a domain of facts untouched hy values or
social interests.'' JASANOFP, s upru note I, at 207. As she explains, "I C lourts ...
conduct the bulk of their scientific inquiries 'at the frontiers of .~c ientitic
knowledge,' where claims ru:e unce11ain, contested, and fluid, rather than against a
backdrop of largely senled ' mainstream' knowledge. Instructing courts to take
thei r cues from ... 'good ' scientific methodology . .. a.s opposed to "bad"
scientific practices ... can therefore be deeply misleading. Other forms of
guidance are needed, more realistically attuned to the indetermina~y of scientific
knowledge in the contexts of litigation." /d. at 210; Areeda, supra note II, at
I 036-37 (stating that "few of the theoretical and empirical inquiries deemed
interesting by other disci plines are directly relevant to the law. One has to tease
the relevant concept~ and informati on out of them in order to answer the 4ucstion
posed by the law").
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lay decision-maker.'' 19 Based on populist premises, the legal
culture in this country "enshrines the cognitive and behavioral
standards of ordinary people ... rather than expert sta ndards, as the
test of legally approved conduct."20 The j ury affirms these populist
values by "serving as the voice of corrunon morality, a bulwark of
common liberty, and a decentralized organ of popular
singular
government, . . . reflectfing] the legal culture'
compru® se between professional autonomy . . . aml popular
sovereignty .... " 21 Legal opinions are never likely to be as
nuanced as the realities they seek to shape then, given the need to
decide cases quickly. at the ti me they are presented for decision,
whether the science is in place to support such decisions or not, and
the need to justify such decisions in non-technicaJ terms. Scientists'
criticism of law fails to take this simple reality into account and
strike lawyers as uninformed, and thus, irrelevant.
It should be clear that the issues on which law and science divide
are not easy ones to resolve. They embody timeless and in some
ways intractable problem . and make up what has come to be
known as the "two cultures" debate,22 perhaps the most well known
intellectual fracas in western thought.23 To understand this debate
19.
20.
21.
22.

Schuck, supra note 3, at 29.
/d.

/d.
See f?enerally C.P. SNOW, THE Two CULTURES AND THE SCIENTIFIC

R EVOLUTION ( 1959).

23. In contemporary parlance, !he debate between the humanities and science
is alternately referred to as "the culture wars" or "science wars," depending upon
whether one is a scientist or a humanist. Culture wan; seems right, since the fight
is over the content of the culture. Not everyone agrees that there is a basis for
such a war. For example, Profe~;sor Ja.~anoff argues against what she takes to be
the overly simple characterization of law and sciem.:e as fundamentally different
enterprises, contending instead, that "law and science are in fact mutually
constitutive, ... joincly producli ng] our social and scientific knowledge ...."
JASANOFF, supra note I, at 8. Moreover, she argues. "[a]s formal systems of
inquiry, I they I have several important features ln commo11." /d. For example:
Each tradition claims an authoritative capacity to sift evidence and
derive rational and persuasive conclusions from it. The reliability of
observers (or witnesses) and the credibility of their observations are of
critical concern to both legal and scientific decisionmaking. Unlike
organized religion, neither ~cience nor law owes allegiance to a single
dogmatic authority. In both fields. rules governing the a sessment of
facts occasionally undergo massive shifts- in science through the work
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we need to go back a little in time. At the beginning of the
seventeenth century, "the age of H arvey, Boyle, Newton, and a host
of other thinkers who profoundly influenced the development of
modem science," science rejected the idea of authority based on the
wisdom of the "Ancients."24 Making a semi-clean break with the
analytical method grounded in deductive logic and derived from
Aristotle, 25 science (in the person of propagandists such as Francis
Bacon) insisted instead on an inductive approach to knowledge,
based on the patient accumulation of verifiable facts. 26 Such

of puradigm-tnmsforming pioneers and in law (ordinarily but not
always) through the actions of legislatures. [She might have added
common law courts.] Normal progress within each discipline occurs
through a decentralized, silent revolution brought about by individuals
making decisions at the frontiers of established doctrine in accordance
with their personal understandings of the existing tradition.
!d. at 8-9. Peter Schuck accepts a limited version of this argument, finding
commonalities between t.he cultures of law and science, and t.he differences
hetween the two to be nm a~ pronounced a~ the differences between science and
politics. See Schuck, supra note 3, at 4, 14-29; Richard M. Cooper, Scientists and
Lawyers in the Legal Process, 36 f'ooo DRUG CosM. L.J. 9, 19 ( 1981)
(analogizing cross-examination to peer review); Gibson and Schwartz, supra note
5, at 180 (describing how "the physician, like the lawyer, is involved in
presl.Tiptive and value-laden acts of dedsion-making" in deciding what to do for
particular patients).
24. CULTURES IN CONFLICT: PERSPECTIVES ON THE SNOW-LEAVIS
CONTROVERSY 56 (David K. Cornelius & Edwin St. Vincent eds., 1964); see also
JACOB BRONOWSKI, THE COMMON SENSE OF SCIENCE 15-20 (1978) (describing the
founding of t.he British Royal Society of Science in the 1660s, and the scientific
revolution of the seventeenth cenn~ry).
25. See BRONOWSKI, supra nme 24, at 26-40 {describing how the 17th century
reformers, particularly Newton, combined ancient and modem technique more
than they replaced the fanner with the latter, and how that is the distinctive beauty
of scientific advancement).
26. See CULTURES IN CONFLICT, supra note 24, at 56; KAss, supra note 3. at 2
(arguing that "Francis Bacon and Rene Descartes" are t.he "great founders" of
"modern science"). Stephen Jay Gould puts the matter nicely when he describes
science as ·'t.he art of the empirically soluble," and a good scientist as "a person
with the horse sense to discern the largest answerable question-and to shun
useless issues that sound bigger.'' in his comment on Edwards v. Aguillard, 482
U.S. 578 (1987), the Louisiana "creation science" case, pointing out in the process
how Justice ScaUa does not understand evolutionary biology. Stephen Jay Gould,
Justice Scalia's Misunderstanding, 5 CaNST. COMMENTARY 1, 4, 6-7 (1988); see
also FERRIS, supra note I I at 205 (stating that "Unlike philosophy, physics seldom
proceeds by hunting down sweeping answers to big questions. Most often it
involves poking around at specitic issues which .~eem to promise some intellectual
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"empirical" study was superior to "literary" (or "philosophic")
alternatives, Bacon and others claimed.27 So that, when the
investigation of factual matters is involved, scientific methods
should be used instead of these alternatives. With the issue so
joined, science found, and finds, it difficult to mesh its way of
thinking with a broad range of other systems of disciplinary
(including most famously, but not limited to, religious) thought.
or practical reward ... ."). Perris's description of science and scientific method
would be hard to improve on for clarity and eloquence:
Science is not a stat.ic body of dogma, to stray from which is to risk
having one's epaulets stripped offin a ceremony of banishment from r.he
scientitic community. It is a self-correcting system of inquiry, in which
errors-of which there are, of course, plenty-are sooner or later
detected by experiment or by more careful analysis. Science is also a
"bottom-up" system, in which grand pronouncements arc arrived at not
in an overarching, sui generis fashion but by building up inferences from
many small cases. As a result, science, while it can be exasperatingly
detailed, is also pliant. Scientific findings, even the most imposing ones,
customarily stumble into the world fraught with blunders that have to be
worked out before they really begin to fly. They lack the satisfying,
thunderclap certitude of religious and pseudoscientific dicta that admit
to no error. But they are alive, and the withering of one branch of a
theory does not necessarily mean that the theory as a whole is doomed.
Jd. at 13-14. Leon Kass describes scientific method in this way:
The pursuit of knowledge in our time differs radically from the Socratic
pursuit of wisdom. When we say 'knowledge.' we mean scientific
knowledge. The paradigm of our knowing, aped by the other sciences. is
mathematical physics. a science that took its beginnings in the
seventeenth cenrury, in explicit opposition to ordinary experience and to
speculative philosophy. Most radically, it redefmed what it means to
know something, in terms of the standards of certainty and clarity
possessed by symbolic mathematics and through the rigorous application
of a universal method. Explicitly antipbilosophical in its spirit, it rejects
as unworthy of itS attention all questions that it cannot treat methodically
and 'objectively,' and confines its attention to those problems that
permit a scientific approach and solution . . .. [In science! rolpinions
about good and bad, justice and injustice, virtue and vice have no
cognitive status and are not subject to rational inquiry ....
KAss, supra note 3; st:t: also NEWTON, supra note 13, at 9-22, 119-23 (describing
d1e scientific method). For a "rhetoric of science" perspective on Bacon's new
vision of science and the role of the Royal Society in propagating it, see ALAN G.
GROSS, THE RHETORIC OF SCIENCE 164-72 (1996). For an argument that science
does not involve being checked by the "unrelenting angel of reality," and
characterizing such a view as "charmingly naive," using evolutionary biology as
an example, see Lewootin, supra note 15, at 59-63.
27. See, e.g, CULTURES IN CONFLICT, supra note 24, at 56.
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There have been many noteworthy moments in this now three
hundred-year-old debate. A famous example is the exchange
between Matthew Arnold and Thomas Huxley at the end of the
nineteenth century over the relative merits of science versus
humanities instruction in the British Public School curriculum
highlights this debate. 28 And many celebrated thinkers and writers
have taken part, from Will iam Wordsworth, Thomas Love
Peacock, John Ruskin, John Ciardi, Maxwell Anderson, Archibald
MacLeish, George Orwell, Erich Fromm, E.M. Forster, and D.H.
Lawrence, and others, on the side of literature or philosophy, to
Stuart Chase, John Baker, Bertrand Russell, Aldous Huxley, H.G .
Wells, and Jacob Bronowski, among others, on the side of science.
But perhaps the most famous moment, and the one which gives the
debate its name, is the ''Two Cultures" exchange between C.P.
Snow and F.R. Leavis at Cambridge University in the early
1960s. 29 Snow led off with his 1959 Rede Lecture, "The Two
Cultures and the Scientific Revolution,"30 and Leavis responded
with his 1962 Richmond Lecture, "Two Cultures? The Significance
of C.P. Snow." 31 The lectures provoked a set of spirited responses,
mostly in literary journals and magazines, from partisans on each
side, resulting in a sort of intellectual food fight. 32 Today, the
lectures and their responses read a little like quaint period pieces,
peculiar in the extent to which they use adjectives rather than nouns
and verbs to carry the brunt of their arguments; yet in the early
1960s they created a major stir in intellectual and academic circles
on both sides of the Atlantic. They also illustrate, however, perhaps
better than anything else, the difficulties involved in reconciling
scientific and non-scientific ways of looking at the world.

28. See THOMAS HENRY HUXLEY, Science and Ct~lture, in COLLECTED ESSAYS
134 (1 898)(Vol. ill, Science and Ed11cation); MATIHEW ARNOLD, Literature und
Science, in THE WORKS OF MATIHEW ARNOLD 317 (1903-04) (Vol. IV, Discourses
in America).
29. See generally SNOW, st~pra note 22; P.R. LEA VIS, Two CULTURES? T HE
SIGNIFICANCE OFC.P. SNOW ( 1962).
30. See generally SNOW, supra not.e 22.
3 1. See generally LEA VIS, s11pra note 29.
32. See, e.g. , Martin Green, A Uterary Defense of the "Two CuLtures," 24
KENYON REv. 731 (1962); Lionel Trilling, Science, Literature & Culture: A
Comment on the Leavis-Snow Controversy, 33 COMMENTARY 461 (1962).
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ln substance, if not in tone, much of what Snow and Leavis bad
to say, directly or by implication, about cold war politics, the
relative merits of socialism versus democracy (or of living in
Russia versus living in the United States), the place and prestige of
science in British culture and British education, High Table
conversation at Cambridge, the extent to which literary intellectuals
are "natural luddites" in matters of science but not vice versa, the
possibility of effectuating the Hegelian dream of reason taking over
the management of the world, and the like, even though related to
33
points in the present discussion, may safely be put to one side. So
too with the lectures' boisterous ad hominem style. Even by
today's standards, Snow and Leavis appeared to really go at one
another, often looking a little like two pigs wrestling in the mud,
with each getting dirty, but each also seeming to enjoy it (perhaps
34
Leavis a little more than Snow). Anyone worried about the tone
of contemporary academic discourse has only to read the "Two
Cultures"35 debate to feel confident that development in the field of
academic manners has been linear and progressive.
Snow argued that the thinking world was divided into two
camps, the scientific and the literary (or what today might be called
philosophical), each of which was grounded in a different set of
values and beliefs, organized knowledge in a different way, and
proceeded by means of different methods of investigation and
analysis. 36 He claimed that the inhabitants of these two camps
lived in what amounted to different "cultures," and that between
the two cultures there existed "a gulf of mutual incomprehensionsometimes . . . hostility and dislike, but most of all a lack of
understanding.'.J7 Culture, for Snow, described a set of "common
attitudes, common standards and patterns of behavior, [and]

11. See generaLly SNOW, supra note 22; LEA VIS, supra note 29.
34. The popular view is that Leavis was d1e nasty one. jealous of Snow and
his social success in the Oxbridge environment, particularly in relation to Lea.vis'
comparative. lack of such success, see IAN MACKILLOP, F.R. LEAvts: A LiFE IN
CRITICISM ( 1997), but Snow takes a lot of gratuitous cheap shots at literary types
in the Rede lecture, before Leavis responds, or even decides that he is going to
respond.
35. See generally SNOW, supra note 22; LHA VIS, supra note 29.
36. See SNOW, supra note 22, at 4.
37. ld. at 4.
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common approaches and assumptions," shared by members of a
social group, which cut "surprisingly wide and deep," across "other
mental patterns, such as those of religion or politics or class."38 As
he states in a frequently repeated phrase, "[w]ithout thinking about
it, Lmembers of a culturel respond alike. That is what a culture
means."39 One could quibble with this definition; for example,
Matthew Arnold thought that culture "was the best that has been
said and thought in the world,'AO and Martin Green claimed that the
term culture had "fifty meanings.'' 41 But Snow's definition seems
to have identified something true and timeless in the concept.
Scientific culture, for Snow and kindred spirits, 42 was marked
mostly by an optimism about the possibility of improving the
human social condition. 43 The middle decades of the twentieth
century, when Snow wrote, were a particularly productive period
for science, so much so that it seemed to many at the time that there
were no limits on what science could be made to do. Such a view

38. Jd. at 10. H~:: thought, for example, that Russian and American scientists
cvuld join together to prevent their respective countries from taking the cold war
to u destructive conclusion. See SNOW. supra note 22, at 39-42. He believed that
scientists would feel more allegiance to the culture of science than to their
respective nation states. Sec id.
39. /d. at 11.
40. ARNOLD, supra note 28, at 322.
41. See Green, supra note 32, at 735.
42. See Bertrand Russell, Science as a11 Element in Culrure - 11, 1 NEW
STATESMA.'1234, 234 ( 191 3).
43. See SNow, supra note 22. at 6-8. This is not to say that Snow thought that
all scientists were optimistic. Some. Mahhus for example, would be difficult to
describe in upbeat terms; however just that he thought science as a discipline was
that way, and with good reason. Science had made numerous and obvious
improvements in the human condition, from eliminating disease to relieving many
of Lhc most onerous burdens of work, and while these improvements often brought
their own new sets of difficulLics with them, Snow chose to focus on the harms
that had been eliminated rather lhwl the harms that bad been introduced.
"Overly optimistic" was Snow's way of describing traditional intellectuals'
criticism of the scientific culture. but this may itself be an optimistic way of
paraphrasing the criticism. See id. at 6-8. Traditionali~ts probably wouJd have
used arrogance rather than optimism to characr.eri7.e their objections to scientists in
many instances. Snow's paraphrase bas a self-serving quality about it that
indicates be did not understand fully what his critics were 11aying, or the intensity
of their feelings. This is a telling objection for Snow, since he claimed to be part
of both the scientific and litera.ry cultures.
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was unduly upbeat as subsequent events have shown, but at the
time it was a widely shared view. While acknowledging that the
individual human condition was lonely and tragic ("you live 60 to
70 years, and then you die alone"), 44 Snow felt that there was a
"moral trap" in this insight, and that scientists as a group were less
likely than non-scientists to fall into the trap. 45 In Snow's words:
[Scientists] see no reason why, just because the individual
condition is tragic, so must the social condition be. Each of us
is solitary: each of us dies alone: all right, that' s a fate against
which we can't struggle- but there is plenty in our condition
which is not fate, and against which we are less than human
46
unless we do struggle.

Rather than sit back, complacently resigned to humanity's tragic
condition, "scientists . . . are inclined to be impatient to see if
something can be done: and inclined to think that it can be done,
• ' s proved o therw1se.
. n47
unti•} It
Snow acknowledged that this optimism sometimes led scientists
to "regard the other culture's social attitudes as [too quiescent, and
thus morally] contemptible," but he criticized this view as "too
48
The fact that he reported the view at all, however,
facile."
su~jecting it to only a mild rebuke, suggests, as Lionel Trilling has
noted, that he thought "[the view was] essentially ... right."49
Snow admitted that in individual cases, literary, or what he also
sometimes called "traditional," intellectuals could be as progressive
and optimistic as anyone, but scientists as a group were this way by
inclination and training. 50 They had, as he put it, "the future in
their bones,.. . [whereas] the traditional culture responds by
wishing that the future did not exist." 51 Here too, Snow may have
been overly influenced by contingent external events. Many
literary intellectuals, to his mind, had been unduly sympathetic to,
or at least insufficiently critical of, the rise of fascism and national
44. SNOW, supra note 22, at 7.
45. See id.
46. /d .
47. !d.

48. /d. at 8.
49. Trilling, supra note 32, at 465.
50. See SNOW, supra note 22, at 5-6.
51. !d. at 11-12.
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socialism in the first half of the twentieth century. 52 As he put it,
"nine out of ten of those who have dominated literary sensibility in
our time [were] ... not only politically silly, but politically
wicked . . . . [T]he influence of all they represent [brought]
Auschwitz that much nearer." 53
The other distinctive characteristic of the scientific culture,
identified by Snow, but described with more eloquence by Bertrand
Russell earlier in the century, has to do with the special properties
of the "scientific habit of mind. " 54 "The kernel of the scientific
outlook,"
as
Russell
described
it,
is
a
"refusal to regard [one's] own desires, tastes, and interests as
affording a key to the understanding of the world." 55 In Russell's
words:
The scientific attitude of mind involves a sweeping away of all
other desires in the interest of the desire Lo know-it involves
suppression of hopes and fears, loves and hates, and the whole
subjective emotional life, until [one) becomes subdued to the
material , able to see it frankly, without preconceptions, withouL
bias, without any wish except to see it as it is, and without any
belief that what it is must be determined by some relation,
positive or negative to what [oneJ should like it to he, or whal
[one) can easily imagine it to be.5

Lest one think Russell decidedly unmodern, or a little
thickheaded about the role of the observer in constructing the
content of scientific observation, it should be added that he also
wrote:
Human beings cannot . . . wholly transcend human nature;
something subjective, if only the interest that determines the
direction of our attention, must remain in all our thought. But
science comes nearer to objectivity than any other human
pursuit, and gives us, therefore, the closest contact and the most
intimate relation with the outer world that it is possible to

52. See id. at 8.
53. !d.
54. Bertrand Russell, Science as an Element in Culture- I, l NEW STATESMAN
202,202 (1913).
55. See Russell, Science as an Element in Culture - 11, supra note 42, at 235.

56. ld.
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achieve.-n
As a consequence, "science ... represents, though as yet only in a
nascent condition, a higher stage of evolution than any prescientific thought or imagination, and, like every approach to selftranscendence, it brings with it a rich reward in increase of scope
and breadth and comprehension."58
There is a good deal of self-servi ng, chest-thumping, and
tendentiousness in this way of putti ng things, of course, and few
would use Russell's words verbatim today. Scientists understand
the influence of context, circumstance, ideological commitment,
self-interest, and the like (including pettiness, venality, jealously,
arrogance, spite),59 in shaping the content of scientific discovery
better now than they did at the time Russell wrote. This is due, in
major part, to the work of historians, philosophers, sociologists,
and rhetoricians of science. In a post-Kuhnian world we are all
social constructivists to some extent.6(1 Yet, Russell's view is not
57. ld. at 236.
58. /d.; see also FERRIS, supra note II, at 205 (describing how Herman
Helmholtz's prediction that humans would gain ''intellectual mastery over nature"
has "pretty much come true, and in a remarkably brief period of time. Physicists
today can accurately predict the outcome of every fundamental (meaning simple)
process in the known universe ....").
59. For discussions, see generally JAMES W ATSON, TH H DOUfiLF. HELIX
(1968); ROBERT K. MERTON, THE SOCIOLOGY OF SCIENCE 2H6-324 ( 1973); DAVID
HULL, SCIENCE AS A PROCESS: AN EVOLI.ITIONi\HY A CCOU NT OF THE SOCIAL AND
CONCEPTUAL D EVELOPMENT OF SCIENCE (1988); GROSS, supra note 26, at 54-62;
NEWTON, supra note 13, at 22 1.
60. See, e.g., PETER GALISON AND DAVID J. STUMP. eds., THE DISUNITY or
SCIENCE ( 1996); GROSS, supra note 26; JASANOFF, supra note I; DAVTD OLDROYD,

THE ARCH OF KNOWLEDGE: AN INTRODUCTORY STUDY or niE HISTORY OF THE
PHILOSOPHY AND METHODOLOGY OF SCIENCE (1986); but see Steven Weinberg,
The Revolution that Didn 't Happen, N.Y. REv. B OOKS, Oct. 8, 1998, at 48, 50
(criticizing Thomas Kuhn's claim that paradigms governing successive periods of
normal science arc incommensurable, and arguing instead for a view of scientific
discovery as cumulative, moving toward the uncovering of permanent truths ''out
there," giving ex.amples from the physical sciences); see also Letter from Richard
C. Strohman, Emeritus Professor, Un iversity of California at Berkeley, to New
York Review of Book!> (undated. responding to The Revol11tion rhar Didn 't
Huppen echoing Weinberg's claim that a paradigm shift does not involve the
replacement of an old paradigm with a new one, but that instead. " the normal
outcome has been the coexistence of the old with the new." giving examples from
the biological and behavioral sciences) (on file with the author).
In the process of criticizing those who see science as merely invented or
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all that different from Snow's,r; 1 and many noteworthy scientists in
the present day espouse a version of the same view. 62 While
contemporary beliefs may be more nuanced and variegated than
RusseJI 's,63 it is fair to say that many scientists believe that the
intellectual disciplines are organized in a hierarchy, with science
located at the top. 64 They view scientific understanding and
determined by ideological forces, Bernard Williams has described the social
constructivist view as carefully as anyone. He states:
the [view) is ... that science is a complex social activity, and the fact
that some branch of science at a given time settles on ce11ain theories or
models rather than others is not an outcome straightfo1wardly
detennined by perceptions of the world. but rather by scientists' habits
and practices, including their ways of selecting and interpreting
observations. This is not an abstract philosophical point; it is the
conclusion of detailed historical studies.
Bernard Williams, The End nf Explantuion, N.Y. REV. OF BooKs, Nov. 19, l99R,
at 40, 41-42. Por an excellent recent discussion of these issues, see JAN GOLINSKI,
MAKING NATURAL KNOWLEDGE: CONSTRUCT!VISM AND THE HISTORY OF SCIENCE

( 1998).
61. "The scientific edifice of the physical world ... [is] in its intellectual
depth, complexity, and ruticulation, the most beautiful and the most wonderful
collective work of the mind of mru1." SNOW, supra note 22, atl5.
62. See, e.g.. FERRIS. supra note 11, at 204 (stating that ·'physics . . . stands as
a living monument to what many esteem as t.he paramount intellecrual
achievement of the twentieth ceorury"); Newton, supra note 13, at 222 (expressing
the "hope that the present cynical and nihilistic state of our cultUre is a transitional
one, and tha.t in the future it will be replaced by a more positive outlook, with the
values of science in a central position"); John P. Wiley, Jr., l'hennmena,
Commems &. Notes: Two Cultures- Never the Twain. Shall Meet'!, SMITHSONIAN
MAG., Oct. 1997, at 22 (explaining that "the most original, most exciting work of
the mind these days is being done hy scientists, and if anyone should be included
in the ranks of the intellectuals, they should"); Edward 0. Wilson, The Coherence
nf Knnwledge, HARV. MAG., July-Aug. l99R, at 5R (describing how the
"borderland disciplines'' of cognitive neuroscience, behavioral genetics,
evolutionary biology, environmental sciences, and the like have begun to
understand human nature objectively by "weav[ing) a skein of cause-and-effect
explanations from brain to mind to culture," and in the process "approach[ing) if
not attain[ingj the grail of scholarship, and fulfill[ing] the dreams of the
enlightenment'').
63. See Peter Galison, lntrodllc:tiun: The Context of Disunily, in THE DISt:NlTY
OF ScmNCE. supra note 60, at l (a catalogue ru1d bdef description of several
modern variations).
64. Many also believe that there is a hierarchy within science. See, e.g.,
FERRIS. supra note 11, at 204 (describing physics as having a pre-eminent role in
science, and as the "quintessential science"); NeWTON, supra nme 13, at 54
(stating that "physics is regarded as the most advanced of rhe sciences"). For
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method a<> a purer and more advanced form of understanding and
method than philosophically based equivalents, even if they also
believe that one must be careful about where, and with whom, one
expresses this view. 65 While ravaged somewhat by the passage of
time, and the work of the meta-critics of science, the "science as
first among equals" view is a major source of the tension between
science and law in the present day .66
Scientists' confidence in their intellectual primacy of place can
be traced in principal part to the belief that they are the only
academics who work in the pursuit of objective truth. They are
67
philosophical realists, whether self-consciously so or not, whose
data consists of an external, physical world independent of human
sense perception and language based description. This physical
world has the singular advantage of staying put from interpretive
moment to interpretive moment, and from interpretive era to
interpretive era, so that all scientists in a given field, whenever and
wherever they work, in a real but not literal sense, participate in the
same intellectual investigation. In this view, for example, Einstein,
Hubble, Newton, Kepler, Galileo, Copernicus, Ptolemy, and others
all looked out onto the same universe(s) and worked on the same
problems, improving upon one another's work and causing
some this is because the natural world is "seen as composed of objects belonging
to one of a sequence of levels," existing in a kind of "hierarchical ontology." John
Dupre, Metaphysical Disorder and Scientific Disunity, in THE DISUNITY OF
SCIENCE, supra note 60, at 103; accord NEWTON, supra note 13, at 61-64 (stating
that "the relation bet ween general and local theories implies the existence of a
~ertain hierarchical relationship between scientific disciplines").
65. See Peter Galison, Introduction: The Context of Disunity, i.n THE DISUNITY
OF ScrENCE, supra note 60, at I.
66. /d.
67. See GROSS, supra note 26, for an explanation and cntJque of why
scientists are metaphysical realists; see also Gibson and Schwartz, supra note 5. at

178-79 (arguing that "while physicians-as-scientists dwell largely in the realm of
physics . .. lawyers inhabit the world of nomos"). Even those associated with the
so-called "Strong Program" in the sociology of science, which stresses the
importance of social factors in the formation and acceptance of scientitic theories,
reject metaphysical idealism and insist that a sociological account of science must
presuppose the interactions of science with an independem physical reality. See,
e.g., BARRY BARNES, DAVID BLOOR & JOHN HENRY, SCIENTIFIC KNOWI.F.D(;F.: A
SociOLOGICAL ANALYSIS 1, 32 (1996). As Thomas Nagel explains, all anempts to
argue against a reality independent of us founder on the need to place ourselves in
the world SO ordered. THOMAS NAGEl., THH LAST Wcnm 13-35 ( 199R).
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scientific understanding to grow cumulatively in the process.6K
Similarly, each generation of scientists in whatever field, standing
on the shoulders of the generations before it, moves scientific
understanding closer to some notion of objective truth, some t1nal
explanation of how the physical universe, or whatever is the subject
of their study, works. Final understanding, or objective truth, is the
holy grail of science.
In more philosophical modes of inquiry, however, including that
used by law, truth is made more than discovered. Truth is
temporary, contingent, provisional and partial. It is the truth of
language and ideas, constructed in different ways hy different
groups at ditierent times, and not found pre-existing in nature.
There are many reasons for this, but ultimately they reduce to the
fact that Jaw operates in a social, not physical, world. 69 Because
"the [social] past cannot be recovered," as Richard Posner explains,
"it [is] difficult to verify or falsify hypotheses about it .... [This
means that] there are ... a large number of legal cases in which the
question of what happened is indeterminate, and must be resolved
by a decision on who shall bear the burden of producing evidence
70
or of persuading the trier of fact.'' This problem is exacerbated by
the fact that law places a "heavy but largely unremarked reliance on

68. See STEPHEN HA WKlNG, A BRIEF HISTORY OF TIME 1- 13 (1988). This list
might even include the "little old lady at the back of the room," who suggested to
Russell that "it's turtles all the way down." !d. at l. Using our understanding of
the origins of the universe as an example, Steven Weinberg describes how the
process of the cumulative development of understanding in science works. See
Steven Weinberg, Before the Big Bang, N.Y. REv. OF BooKS, June 12, 1997, at
I 6-20 (describing the cumulative development of "big-bang" cosmology); see also
NEWTON, supra note 13, at 210 (stating that "[s]cience does make progress."). For
a "rhetorical" pen;pective on the same story, see GRoss, supra note 26, at 98-128.
Because it is cumulative, and about data which does not move, scientilic
understanding is different from philosophical understanding. For example, Kant is
not so much an improvement on Aristotle as an alternative to him, but Einstein i s
an improvement on Newton (at least for astronomers, and they are the only ones
likely to need either view). See HAWKING, supra, at 10 (arguing that "we still use
Newton's theory for all practical purposes because the difference between its
predictions and those of general relativity is very small in the situations we
normally deal with").
69. See. e.g., RICHARD POSNER, Ti m PROBLEMS OF JURJSPRUDENCE 204-206
(1990).
70. !d.
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being able to determine counterfactual . . . causes and
consequences."71 This is a particularly difficult pro~.:ess when the
question to be answered is why something was done rather Lhan
what was done, as is often the case in law. As if this was not
enough, in the American legal system, truth is also in competition
with many other goals, "such as economy, preserving certain
confidences, fostering certai n activities, [and] protecting
constitutional norms."12
As Judge Posner explains further:
... neither the fact that lawyers, like scientists, use induction,
nor the intriguing suggestion that scientists, like lawyers, are
judgmental rather than mechanical in their use of induction ...
makes [legal fact f1nding] scientific in an interesting sense.
What is missing from law are penetrating and rigorous theories,
counterintuitive hypolhcscs that are falsifiable but not
falsified, ... precise instrumentation, an exact vocabulary, a
clear separation of positive and normative inqulry,
quantification of data, credible controlled experiments, rigorous
~talistical inference. useful technological by-products, dramatic
interventions with measurable consequences, and above all and
subsuming most of Lhc previous points, objectively testable and continually retested - hypotheses .... [L]aw is closer Lo
theology and to metaphysics than to science. Lawyers are not
only quick hut unashamed to make emphatic assertions on
matters of fact ... without attempting. desiring, or even hcing
73
willing to subject those assertions loan empirical test.

Practices deeply woven into the fabric of Jaw may place even the
aspiration of systematic, disinterested factual inquiry beyond law's
reach .74 In short, fact inquiry in law usually will be more contextspecific than timeless, more discontinuous than cumulative. And
scientist~ see the pursuit of objective truth as more developmentally

71. /d.
72. /d. For a representative re!.:cnl example and discussion of how courts
halance the concern for finding, truth against other considerations, see Jaffee v.
Nt>dmnnd, 5 18 U.S. I, 14 ( 1996) (4uoling Trammel v. U nited States, 445 U.S. 40,
50 ( IIJKO), quoting Elkins v. United Stales, 364 U.S. 234 ( 1960) (Frankfurter, J.,
dtssenting ) (recognizing a patient-psychotherapist privilege in Rule 501 of the
1-ederal Rules of Evidcn!.:e as a "publk good transcending the nonnally dominant
principle of utilizing all rational means for ascertaini ng the truth.')).
73. POSNER. supra note 69. at 69-70.
74. See id. at 70.
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advanced than the pursuit of relative truth, or partial truth, or truth
good enough for the situation.
This belief in the existence of a kind of disciplinary hierarchy,
with science at the top, makes it more difficult for scientists to
accept legal rules and methods of proceeding when they clash with
scientific alternatives. A less advanced system of inquiry should
defer to a more advanced one on matters of common application,
everything else equal, scientists believe, and this means that on
matters having to do with the investigation of e mpirical fact, for
example, law should defer to science. Scie ntists can understand
that law would sometimes get factual truth wrong. Evidence can be
confusing, correct interpretations can be elusive, and charlatans can
be as rhetorically gifted as geniuses. However, for a system of
regulation, with the power to deprive people of their liberty and
property, to work with facts il knows to be false (or could know if
iL Lhoughl about it correctly), and investigative methods it knows to
be imperfect (when better methods are available), is seen as
indefensible, especially to persons trained to regard truth as the
overriding end of work. Scientists simply cannot understand how it
could ever be better, or even fairer, for a legal system to be
unconcerned with, ignorant of, or oblivious to factual truth.
The cultural tension between law and science is also exacerbated
by the self-contained and exclusivist nature of disciplinary thought.
All intellectual disciplines analyze data from different vantage
points, originate in different starting-point insights, use different
analytical methods, work with different basic theory, concepts and
vocabularies, and identify the nature of the problems to be solved
in different ways. It is not that disciplinary thought, by its nature,
is hostile to other ways of thinking about data, but j ust that
disciplinary systems aspire to completeness. They try to take
account of, and explain, the data of the particular universe with
which they are concerned, and when they cannot do this, they see
themselves as not yet fuQ y developed . Given their mutual
aspirations to completeness, therefore, it is not surprising that
science and law do not reach out to, or interlock with, one another
conceptually. Because they are equally self-contained bodies of
thought, there is no reason for either to look to anything beyond
itself to explain the universe over which it rules. If they meshed to
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any substantial degree, it is more likely that they were parts of the
same disciplinary system to begin with, and not separate bodies of
thought.
The cultural divide between law and science seems defimtional,
and thus a permanent feature of the landscape. Legal systems will
always need to act more quickly, and explain decisions more
simply, than science would prefer, so that law and science will
always be relegated to some sort of oil and water relationship. If
the two systems cannot be linked conceptually, however, perhaps
they can cross-pollinate, so to speak, in practitioner discourse. If
lawyers and scientists could learn to talk with one another across
disciplinary boundaries, explaining themselves and their methods
as they work, the two systems of thought might be able to work out
satisfactory ad hoc accommodations to one another's concerns in
the process of resolving individual problems.
The cultural
dimension of the law/science problem has been analyzed
extensively, but this inter-professional communication corollary
has not.75
In the next section I will take up this topic,76 using a case study

75. There is a large literature on professional (particularly legal) education,
which in recent years has included the study of professional communication
practices within its scope, but for the most part this work is limited to the study of
professionals' communication with clients and adversaries. Rarely is interdisciplinary professional communication the focus. But see Naitone, supra note 5,
at 312-15 (describing a model course on "interdisciplinary cooperation"). One
exception occurs in the literature comparing instructional methods from one
professional educational system with instru<.:tional methods from another,
including inter-disciplinary professional education. The clinical movement in
legal education, for example, owes mu<.:h of its success to arguments based on the
success of the clinical method in medical education. I discuss tlus Literature in
Robert J. Condlin, Learning From Colleague~: A Case Study in the Relationship
Between "Academic" wuJ "Ecological" Clinical Legal Education, 3 CLIN. L.
REv. 337, 346-49 (1997).
76. I wi.ll not be interested in related issues (about which a lot has been
written) such as the way in whlch the legal world view swallows up other
perspectives. forcing all who would use the legal system ro transform their
problems into legal problems, and relive and solve those prohlems in terms of
legal words, ideas, categories, outcomes, and the like; and the equally complicated
and important topic of the effectiveness of lawyer communication in conversations
with non-professionals such as client~. See, e.g., DoUGLAS E. RosENTHAL,
LAWYER AND CLIENT: WHO'S IN CHARGE'! ( 1974); Alex J. Hurder, Negotiatint< the
Lawyer-Cliem Relationship: A Search fnr Equality and Collaboration, 44 BUFF.
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of lawyers and scientists talking with one another about a
complicated inter-disciplinary problem. In the process, I hope to
identify some of the possibilities and difficulties presented by a
"communication" remedy to the law/science incompatibility
77
problern.
I should reiterate, the need for law and science (and a fortiori
lawyers and scientists) to work together is important for several
reasons. When law and science do not coordinate law is denied the
benefits of the different insights, theories and methods science
brings to bear on the complicated problems citizens bring to courts,
agencies, legislatures, and law offices in the modern day. As a
result, legal resolutions are less intelligent, less stable, and less
relevant.
This failure to incorporate science, accurately
understood, into legal resolutions also undercuts the legitimacy of
those resolutions. When judges, legislators and lawyers make
inescapably fact-based decisions based on blatantly or
demonstrably mistaken understandings of empiri<.:al fact, or
misapplications of scientific theory and method, it is difficult for
those who recognize the mistakes to take such decisions seriously,
and to abide by them. Just the opposite, scientifically sophisticated
observers are more likely to criticize law as vulgar or unintelligent,
L. REv. 71 (1996); Austin Saral & William L.F. Festiner, Lawyers and ugai
Consciousness: Law Talk in the Divorce Lawyer's Office, 98 YALE L.J. 1663
(1989); William Simon, Visions of Practice in Lexal Thought, 36 STAN. L. REv.
469 (1984); Richard Wasserstrom, Lawyers as Professionals: Some Moral Issues,
5 HUMAN RrGHTS I (1975); Lucie E. White, SubordiTUZtion, Rhetorical Survival
Skills, and Sunday Shoes: Notes on the Hearing of Mrs. G., 38 BUFF. L. REV. 1
(1990).
77. I will focus mostly on lawyers in my analysis of the case study. This is
not the only perspective one could take, or necessarily the most important one, but
it is the perspective I know best and the one about which I have the most to say.
Someone coming at the case from a different background, or a different set of
experiences, could more productively examine it from another angle and perhaps
someone will. Opportunities ro use the lessons of such an analysis abound. See,
e.g., Symposium 2000, a joint convocation of the American Bar Association's
Section on Science and Technology and the American Association for the
Advancement of Science, to be held at the University of California at Berkeley in
lhe year 2000. Described by its sponsors as "expected to generate ... a series of
'white papers' addressing models for collaboration between law and science,
educational materials and a series of quadrennial programs to foster ongoing
discussion of legal-technological issues." Scott F. Partridge, New Col.laborations
of Law and Science in New Millennium, NAT'LL.J., Aug. 3, 199X, at C 12.
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and to encourage others to ignore its pronouncements.
scenario does not bode well for either law or science.

Such a
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II. THE lNTER-DISCTPLINARY CONFERENCE ON TOXIC TORTS
My interest in lawyer-scientist communication in general, and
this article in particular, grew out of an opportunity recently
provided to observe lawyers and scientists talking with one another
about their respective disciplines at a conference on toxic torts. 78
The conference, entitled "Lessons From A Civil Action:
Environmental Torts and the Woburn Litigation,"79 was based on
one of the most famous law-science lawsuits of recent years, the
leukemia cluster litigation against W.R. Grace & Co. ("Grace"),
and Beatrice Foods Co. ("Beatrice"), by a group of residents of
Woburn, Massachusetts. 80 The sponsors of the conference81

78. Toxic torts appears to be a recently created substantive su bdivision within
the field of tOits and a new category of litigation for personal injury practice. See
Robett F. Blomquist, An Introduction to America11 Toxic Tort Law: Three
Overarching Metaphors and Three Sources of Law, 26 V AL. U. L. RHv . 795, 796
(1992). It is also the area of law where couns have drawn the most criticism for
their misuse of science. See JASANOJ-r, supra note I, at 114; see also CARL F.
CRANOR, REGULATING TOXIC SUBSTANCES: A PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE AND THE
L AW 49-82 (1993) (analyzing challenges presented by scientific evidence in toxic
tort cases to present evidentiary procedures used in law); PETER W. HUBER,
GAILEo's REVENGE 192-213 (1991 ) (criticizing the legal system's methods for
investigating scientific queBtions in mass tort cases); JASru'IOFF, supra note l, at

116-37 (describing the difficulties created for the legal system by toxic tort cases);
PETER 1-1. S CHUC K, AGENT ORANGE ON T RIAL: MASS T OXIC D ISASTERS IN THE
COUt<TS n ( 19!l6) (citing key early liter.tturc on toxic torts litigation); JACK B.
WEINSTEI N, INDfVIDUAL J USTICE IN MAss TORT LITIGATION 20-37, 126-54 (1995)
(discussing substantive and procedural strategies for judicial management of mass
ton cases). The literature on toxic tort:; is rich and extensive, but the focus of this
article is lawyer-scientist communication. not toxic Lorts. While my interest in
lawyer-scientist communication developed only recently, my interest in lawyer
communication generally has been longstanding. See. e.g., Roben J. Condlin,
Socrates' New Clothes: Substituting Persuasion for Learning in Clinical Practice
Jnstmction, 40 MD. L. REv. 223 (1981) [hereinafter Socrates' New Clothes];
Robert J. Condlin. "Cases un Both Sides": Patterns of Argument in Legal
Dispute-Negotiation, 44 Mo. L. REv. 65, (1985) [hereinafter Cases on Both
Sides]; Condlin, supra note 75.
79. The conference title took its name from a National Book Critics Circle
Award winning book about the Woburn lawsuit. See JONATHAN HARR, A Crv£L
ACTION (1995).
MO. Por al l pans of the case, see generally Anderson v. Cryuvw:. Inc .• 96 FRD
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brought together key participants in the lawsuit - clients, lawyers
and scientists alike - several years after the case had concluded, to
discuss what, on reflection, had been learned from the litigation
now that most of the information on its effects was likely to be in.82
The underlying case itself was prompted by an outbreak of
leukemia in Woburn, Massachusetts, during the nineteen-sixties
and seventies. 83 Studies eventually linked the outbreak to city well
water contaminated by industrial chemicals, principally
trichloroethylene and tetrachloroethylene. 84 Thirty-three plaintiffs
from eight families, including five administrators of the estates of
children who died allegedly as a result of being exposed to the
431 (D. Mass. 1983) (motion to dismiss): Anderson v. W.R. Grace & Co., 628 F.
Supp. 1219 (D. Mass.. 1986) (motion for summary judgment); Anderson v.
Cryovac, Inc., 862 F.2d 910 (1st Cir. 1988) (appeal on withheld hydro-geologica.!
study); Anderson v. Beatrice Foods Co., 127 FRD 1 (D. Mass 1989) (post-trial
discovery sanctions dispute on remand); Anderson v. Beatrice Foods Co., 129
FRD 394 (D. Mass. 1989) (discovery sanctions dispute continued); Anderson. v.
Beatrice Foods Co. , 900 F.2d 388 (1st Cir. 1990) (appeal on meri tS); Anderson v.
BeaJrice Foods Co., 498 U.S. 891 (1990) (denying certification); American Mut.
Liab. Ins. Co. v. Reatrice Companies, Inc., 924 F. Supp. 1:\61 (N.D. Ill. 19<:/fi)
(subsequent insurance litigation). My description of the facts of the case is taken
principally from the district court's opinion on the defendant~' motion for
summary judgment. See Anderson, 628 F. Supp. at 1219.
81. The Cuoferem:e, the l997 Ward, Kershaw and Minton Environmental
Symposium, was sponsored by the Environmental Law Program of the University
of Maryland School of Law, and held on April 11, 1997, at Westminster Hall, in
Baltimore, Maryland. See 1997 Ward, Kershaw & Minton Environmental
Symposium, Lessons from A Civil Action: Enviror~mental Torts and the Wobum
Litigation. Baltimore. Md. (Apr. II, 1997) (transcripts on file with author)
[hereinafter Symposium]. Westminster Hall has an interesting history in its own
right Formerly a Presbyterian church. it sits on a nineteenth century graveyard
housing the remains (or at least the gravesites), of Edgar Allen Poe, James
McHenry. a participant in the Constitutional Convention of 1787 and signer of the
Constitution, James Buchanan, President of the Bank of the United States in
Baltimore at the time of McCulloch v. Mmyland, and a number of major figures in
the American Revolutionary War. See generally MARY ELLEN HAYWARD & R.
KF.NT LANCASTER, BALTIMORE'S WESTMINSTER CEMETERY & WEiSTMINSTt:-:R
PKESBYTHRIAN CHIJRCH: A GIJillf' em THE MARKERS AND BURIALS 1775-1943 )-]1
( 19~4). It also contains some rare examples of funerary architecture hy Robert
Mills and Maximilian Godefroy, two important nineteenth century architects. See
id. The building, properly deconsecrated and retrofitted with a high-tech interior,
is now a pan of the University of Maryland School of Law.
82. See Symposium, supra note 81.
83. See HARR. supra note 79, at 81.
K4. See id. at 7 K.
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chemicals, ftled a wrongful death and conscious pain and suffering
action against Grace and Beatrice in federal district court in Boston
in May of 1982, claiming that the chemicals contaminating the city
wells had come from Grace and Beatrice plants. 85 Thus began
what the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit would
eventually call a "litigatory trek of unusual length and
complexity ."86
While pre-trial proceedings were uncommonly protracted and
contentious, the most difficult management problems in the case
had to do with trial. As Judge Walter Skinner, the district judge
assigned to the case, told the lawyers, "I've been trying to picture
what this trial is going to look like .... You've got thirty-three
plaintiffs, and to submit all thirty-three of these causation and
damage issues in one trial may be unbelievably cumbersome. It's
very complicated."87 To solve the problem, on the eve of trial and
after the jury had been empanelled, Judge Skinner decided to
trifurcate the case, that is, to separate the trial into three distinct
phases. 88 The first would be the "waterworks" phase in which the
issue would be whether Grace and Beatrice wells had contaminated
the City wells.119 Next, the medical causation phase in which the

85. The acrual claims were a good deal more varied:
Of the 33 plaintiffs in this acti on, five [werej administrators Lof the
esrates] of minors who died of leukemia al legedly caused by exposure to
the chemicals. They Lbrought] suit for wrongful death and conscious
pain and suffering. Sixteen of the 28 living plaintiffs Lwerej members of
the decedents' immediate families. These plaintiffs [sought] to recover
for the emotional distress caused by witnessing the decedents' deaths.
Three of the living plai.ntiffs also contracted leukemia ... and [were]
either in remission or treatment for the disease at the time of the lawsuit.
The 25 non-leukemic plaintiffs al lege[d] that exposure to the
contaminated water caused a variety of illnesses ... and damage[d) their
bodily systems. All of the living plaintiffs [sought] to recover for their
illnesses and other damage, [for the] increased risk of developing future
illness, and for ~;:motional distress. Six of the plaintiff families still
reside[d] in the area above lhe allegedly contaminated water, [and they
sought] injunctive relief under a nuisance theory.
Anderson, 628 F. Supp. at 1222.
86. Anderson v . Beatrice Foods Co., 91Xl P.2d 388, 390 (1st Cir. 1990).
87. HARR, supra note 79, at 285.
88. See id. at 286-87.
XC1. See id. at 2X7 .
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issue would be whether the chemicals in the wells had made the
plaintiffs sick and killed the chlldren,90 and finally the "damages"
phase, in which the issue would be, in Judge Skinner's words,
"[h]ow much is that worth? How much compensation do you give
somebody for the loss of a child?"91 If the defendants' chemicals
did not contaminate the City water supply, the court reasoned, there
was no need to take up the issues of medical causation or
damages. 92
In the waterworks phase of the case the plaintiffs ended up
93
winning "half a loaf," as one commentator puts it. The jury found
the evidence insufficient to conclude that chemicals from the
Beatrice plant had leached through the soil and into the City
drinking water, but did find Grace responsible for contaminating
the City wells. 94 The district court entered a judgment in Beatrice's
favor, and the plaintiffs appealed. 95 While this appeal was pending,
the plaintiffs learned that Beatrice had withheld an important
hydro-geological report requested during discovery, and moved to
set aside the judgment on that basis.96 The district cowt denied this
motion, plaintiffs appealed, and that appeal was consolidated with
the original appeal on the merits.97
The First Circuit affirmed the judgment on the merits in favor of
Beatrice, but remanded the appeal from the denial of the motion to
set aside the judgment, for a determination of whether Beatrice bad
knowingly or intentionally concealed the hydro-geological report. 98
On remand, after an extensive evidentiary hearing described by one
commentator as "longer than most major trials,"99 the district cou1t

90. See id.
91. /d.
92. See id..
93. Robert F. Blomquist, Bottomless Pit: Toxic Trials, The American Legal
Prof ession. and Popular Perceptions of the Law, 81 CORNELL L. REv. 953. 968
(1996).
94. See Anderson v. Cryovac, 862 F.2d 910, 914-15, 915 n.2 (lstCir. 1988).
95. See id. at914-15.
96. Seeid. at922.
97. See Anderson v . Beatrice Foods Co., 900 P.2d 3H8, 390 (I st Cir. 1990).
98. See Cryovac, 862 F.2d at 9 13-22.
99. Blomquist, supra note 93, at 974. The hearing took two months. twentysix witnesses were examined, and 236 exhibits totalling almost three thousand
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concluded that "[w]hile the Report might well have been very
helpful to the plaintiffs in establishing the transport of chemicals
from the [defendants' plant] to [the] wells, ... concealment of the
Report . . . did not constitute substantial interference with the
[plaintiffs'] preparation of [the] .. . casc." 100 The district court then
recommended that its earlier denial of the motion to set aside the
101
verdict be sustained, and the First Circuit agreed.
Following
their loss in the waterworks phase of the case, about nine years
after the lawsuit had begun, Grace settled the case with the
plaintiffs for eight million dollars. 102
pages were introduced. See id.
100. Anderson v. Beatrice Foods Co., 129 FRD 394,401 -402 (D. Mass. 1989).
This is the decision that incensed AR, one of the lawyer panelists whose
comments are discussed in the next section, and was the basis for his charge r:h at
Beatrice's lawyer had "cheated" and gotten away with it because both he and the
judge had attended Harvard Law School, and "Boston is a Harvard town." AR,
Panel Discussion at the 1997 Ward, Kershaw & Minton Environmental
Symposium, Baltimore, MD (Apr. 11 , 1997) (transcript on tile with author); infra
note 165.
101. See Anderson v. Beatrice Foods Co., 900 F.2d 388, 396 ( 1st Cir. 1990).
The Supreme Court later denied certiorari in the case. See Anderson v. BeaLrice
Foods Co., 498 U.S. 891 (1990).
102. Each plaintiff received $375,000 in cash at the. time of the approval of the
settlement agreement and another payment of $80,000 in cash five years later. See
HARR, supra note 79. at 453-54. There was a dispute over the legitimacy of some
litigation expenses. resulting in the retmn of additional money-either $80,000 or
$20,000, it is not clear from the book- to the two sets of plaintiffs willing to
accept it. See id. The extravagance of r:he plaintiffs' lead attorney in preparing
and trying the case is one of the main themes in most accounts of the case. See id.
The lawyer-panelists at the Conference characterized this amount as the high
water mark for per capita plaintiff payoffs in toxic tort litigation in the United
States. See Symposium, supra note 81 . Professor Jasanoff suggests that the figu re
is this high because the plaintiffs were allowed to present the expert resrimony of
"clinical ecologists" to the jury, and the jury was intluenced by this testimony.
JASANOFF, supra note l, at 132-33. Later courts, she asserts, have been much less
hospitable to such testimony, finding "clinical ecology" not a board certitied
specialty, and not identifiable wi th any set of established standards of practice or
hody of knowledge. See id.
Some of the plaintiffs questioned whether the settlement amount was as large as
it could have been if the plaintiffs had been represented more competently, and at
least one plaintiff criticize<! the settlement for its emphasis on money. See HARR,
supra note 79, at 452. This plaintiff was reported to have said that "she wasn' t
after money, that what she wanted was for J. Peter Grace to come to her front door
and apologize." ld. The parish priest who helped organize the plaintiffs was
"bullshit mad," as he later put it, when he beard about the selllemenl, thinking that
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The Woburn case is important for many reasons. To begin with,
the case was one of the first multi- causal, multi-victim, toxic-tort
cases brought against major corporate defendants, tried before a
jmy, at least in part. Such cases often settle because they are
usually thought to be too expensive and too risky to try, for
different reasons, by both plaintiffs and defendants. Therefore,
Woburn remains a principal training ground for lawyers on both
sides of the toxic tort litigation field on the difficulties inherent in
full blown adjudication, to a lay jury, of cases based on
complicated, and controversial, scientific evidence. The case is
also important as a lesson in the limit~ of the law and lawyers to
prevent or undo the harms occasioned by the negligent, and
sometimes reckless use of science in the modern state. As much
money as the Woburn plaintiffs spent,103 and as well as they did
104
comparatively,
no one involved in the lawsuit is likely to
describe the outcome as making anyone whole. 105 In addition, as

"taking Grace's money without a full disclosure by the company, or any
expressions of atoneme.nt. cheapened everything." !d. On the other hand, lleveral
plaintiffs expressed the conviction that "they had set out to teach corporate
America a lesson, and they had succeeded.'' !d. Like all plaintiff groups, this one
was of several minds on most of the issues surrounding the proper determination
of means and ends in the litigalion.
There is some evidence that the plaintiffs could have had more money if their
lawyers had not been overly optimistic in placing a value on the case. See id. at
233-63. The author of A Civil Action traces lhis misjudgment to the influence of a
Harvard Law professor who entered the case once it was underway. and convinced
the lawyers that they were aiming too low. See id. He is described in the book,
perhaps semi-affectionately, as "billion dollar Charlie," and has an entire chapter
named after him. !d. The plaintiffs' lawyers also passed on the opportunity to
settle with Beatrice, deciding to take the case to the jury instead, only to take
nothing when the jury found for Beatrice in the waterworks phase of the case. See
Richard Bernstein, OfTra[?edy and Truth: Caught in a ugal Tangle, N.Y. DMES,
Sept. 13, 1995, at C 17.
There is much more that is noteworthy in this American popular literature
version of Bleak House. see Blomquist, supra note 93, at 954 (describing the
characters in the story as "Dickensian"), but this article is about the lawyerscientist colloquy the Woburn litigation provoked, not the litigat.ion in its own
right. For those interested in the full story, Jonathan Harr's book, for all of its
controversial judgment calls about what happened, makes for a great read See
generally HARR, supra. note 79.
103. See HAKK, supra note 79, at 453; supra note 102.
I04. See supra note I02.
105. For the varying views on the efficacy of the settlement, see supra note

2 12

RUTGERS COMPUTER

& TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL

fVol. 25

pure narrative, the case had more of the qualities of high drama
than most fiction. It was a David and Goliath story of sorts, played
out by larger than life characters living on the edge. 106 The stakes
were life and death, and the state (mostly in the form of the district
j udge who tried the case), loomed ominously in the background,
sometimes intervening, not always in an impartial manner.107 It is
the sort of story that makes for a good novel, and it has, 108 a good
102.
106. Even though the plaintiffs were outspent by almost three to one over the
course of the litigation, they spent $2.6 million themselves (much of it wastefully
by all accounts). See HARR, supra note 79, at 453. lf the David and Goliat h
metaphor describes relative rather than absolute disadvantage, then it fits the
Woburn case. But it is important to note that $2.6 million is a long way from
slingshots. The lead attorney for the plaintiffs is sometimes depicted as a
beleaguered champion of good against evil, a lone wolf trying to buck the
establishment and send a message to corporate America that it will be held
accountable for its poisons. See Bernstein, supra note I 02. During the end stages
of the protracted negotiation with Grace, for example, he is quoted as saying, "this
[is] a political case. If it [was] just a personal injury case, it would have been
settled long ago:· HARR, supra note 79, at 417.
107. A complaint that the judge was biased could be expected from the
plaintiffs' lawyers, considering that they lost on a number of important procedural
rulings. See, e.g., HARR, supra note 79, at 464 (quoting plaintiffs ' lawyer as
" beginning to thlnk the fu is in"). But both the chrorucler of the Woburn case,
and reviewers of his book, seem to agree. See id. at 287 (describing how Judge
Skinner's management order overtly favored the defendants); Blomquist, supra
note 93, at 971 (describing how "Judge Skinner's approach to the practical
cumbersomeness of the case unfairly prejudiced the plaintiffs"), and 976 (stating
that "[i]t is clear that Judge Skinner's ... thlnly described favoritism towards
[Beatri ce's lawyer] bad a tremendous impact on the outcome of the case");
Bernstein, supra note 102 (describing Judge Skinner as ·•a judge whose exercise of
authority ... is not always easy to understand"); bur see Frederick P. Gabriel, Hi.f
Life After 'A Civil Action,. , NAT. L.J., Dec. !:\, 1997, at A26 (describing the book's
portrayal of Judge Skinner as "very narrow." The author was a plaintift:~· lawyer
in the Woburn litigation). In an interview for an Art.~ & Entertainment Network
documentary several years later, Judge Skinner acknowledged that there was " no
question that [hisj patience ran out" with the plaintiffs' lead lawyer. American
Jusrice: A Civil Action (A&E Network television broadcast, Dec. 30, 1998)
(transcript on file with author).
108. See H ARR, mpra note 79; see Blomquist, supra note 93, at 985 (stating
that "In my view, it [the Harr book] is analogous to a novel."). As Professor
BlomquiSt point~ out, the Harr book belongs more accurately to the new literary
genre of "faction," that is, "fiction which is based on and combined with fact."
J .A. CUDDON. A DICTIONARY OF LITERARY TERMS AND LITERARY THEORy 505506 ( 199 J ). For a discussion, see Blomquist, supra note 93, at 984-85 (finding the
book a "significant" example of popular Ame.rican literature "on at least three
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television documentary, and it has several times, 109 and a good
movie that is now out with John Travolta in the lead lawyer role. 110
Moreover, as the topic of an inter-disciplinary conference on law
and science, it was a natural.
The one-day conference consisted of three formal panel
presentations, each followed by an audience question and answer
session.111 The first panel described the clients' perspective on the
lawsuit. 112 The principal named plaintiff in the litigation, generally
agreed to be the person most responsible for call ing attention to the
contaminated water problem in the first instance, and a Woburn
parish priest who helped her to organize the plaintiff class and
convince federal and state regulatory agencies to take the problem
seriously, were among the panelists.
The second panel described the lawyers' perspective. 113 It
included three attorneys experienced at toxic tort litigation, two of
whom had participated in the lawsuit, and one of whom had read
the book. The first was the director, at the time of the lawsuit, of
one of the largest and most influential plaintiff, public-interest
11 4
litigation law fnms in the country.
The second was a partner in a
major, big-city law firm specializing in large-scale personal injury

different levels"). As Professor Blomquist explains. it is ''a window on the
emerging cultural obsession with the American tort system,'' brilliantly depicting
" how 'big money' lalks and everyone else walks" in American civil justice. !d. at
985. ll also is "full of riveting and humorous references to lay perceptions of the
pomposity of the law, lawyers and legal institutions," providing "an iut.rigulng
view of how laypersons often regard the law." !d. Alld finally, its "highlywrought satirical and political characterization . . . delicately and indirectly
ridicules, censures, and derides the egotistical and money-grubbing world of the
'big shot' trial lawyer," in a fashion ' 'reminiscent of George Orwell's ... Animal
Farm," and Tom Wolfe's Bonfire ofih.e Vanith!S. Id. at 987 (emphasis added).
109. See, e.g., 60 Minutes (CBS television broadcast, Mar. 2, 1986) (transcript
on tile with author); American Justice: A Civil Action, supra note I 07; A CiviL
Action: In Pursuit of Justice (Coun TV Network television broadca~t. Jan. 8,
1999) (transcript on file with author).
1 10. See Gabriel, supra note 107. at l (reporting that "Mass. plaintiff's lawyer
will be played by John Travolta in movie"); Bernstein, supra note 102, at Cl7
(quoting dustjacket of the book).
111. See Symposium, supra note 81.
112. See id.
113. See id.
1 14. See id.
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litigation, including toxic torts, for plaintiffs.
The third was a
partner in another major, big-city law fmn representing corporate
defendants, including some of the most powerful corporations in
the country, in toxic torts litigation.116 The third panel provided the
scientists' perspective, and included environmental and public
health professors from two major Boston area universities, each of
whom had been retained as an expert by the plaintiffs in the
Woburn case. 117
All of the lawyer and scientist panelists were highly regarded.
Each was a major figure in his (the lone women scientist dropped
out on the day of the conference) particular field. Each had written
extensively about the generic issues involved in the lawsuit, and
one of the scientists had even produced original research data for
the Woburn case based on an innovative new theory for proving
causal relationship. 118 Each bad an appointment at a major research
university or, in the case of the lawyers, was a well-known
instructor in national continuing education programs. Each had
well defined and sophisticated views on the substantive and
methodological jssues in the "two cultures" debate, and four of the
five had participated in the Woburn litigation in one capacity or
another. It was a blue-chip, or gold-plated, panel of experts in any
sense of the term. The audience wa'S almost equally expert,
containing as it did, scientists and lawyers of considerab.le repute in
their own right, many of whom had worked on cases or project'5
raising issues similar to those in the Woburn litigation.
The conference discussions provide particularly attractive data
for the study of lawyer-scientist interaction, not only because they
examined such interaction explicitly, but also because they
modeled it, or tried to, at the same time. The participants in the
conference, panelists and audience members alike, were engaged in
the very behavior that they also were attempting to analyze, giving
an observer an independent vantage point, free from the

1 15. See id.
116. See id.
117. See id.
11 K. This study was later pubUshed. See S. Lagakos et al., An Analysis u.f
Contaminared Well Water and Health Effects in Woburn, Massachusetts, 81 J.
AM ER. STAT. ASS'N 583 (1986).
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weaknesses latent or explicit in the speakers' espoused theories,
from which to judge the efficacy of what they said. One can
compare the panelists espoused views with how they acted, to
determine what to believe about the possibilities and limits of
lawyer/scientist cooperation. It also helps that all of the conference
panelists, and several members of the audience, were experienced
at inter-disciplinary cooperation, most having worked with
members of the other profession in a wide variety of law related
activities (e.g., drafting legislation, commenting on administrative
rules, testifying i11 court, and the like). Each of the panelists also
was generally regarded as very good at this process. At several
instances during the course of their respective presentations, for
example, panelists commented favorably on the sophistication of
the other panelists' understandings of the issues under discussion,
and excepted them explicitly from the criticisms then being made
of the other profession. The conference participants, panelists and
audience members alike, were aware of the obstacles to
lawyer/scientist cooperation, and were committed to finding ways
to make the process work. As a group, they believed in the
possibility of inter-disciplinary work, and thought that none of the
difficulties encountered in producing it were insum1ountable. In
short, the conference participants were an ideal group for maki11g
the process of inter-disciplinary cooperation work. 119
III. LA WYERS AND SCIENTISTS IN CONVERSATION

A number of times duri ng the conference, the lawyers and
scientists in attendance, both on the panels and in the audience,
1 19. Sometimes panelist remarks contained hyperbole, caricature, and
overdrawn illustrations. See Symposium, supra note 81. The pressures of
speaking to a discerning and presumptively critical (at least part of it - from each
group's perspective) audience may have caused some speakers to state their cases
in more certain and grander terms than they wou ld have used if speaking privately
with colleagues. But this propensity for overstatement. it turns out. may have
heuristic benefits as well. I will suggest later, for example. that overstatement in
professional discourse is not always limited to public speech-making. but also
occurs i.n professional talk generally directed to outsiders, that is, those not
socialized in the language. ideas, and values of the speaker's profession. If this
suggestion is correct, the larger than life qualities of some of the conference
pa.rticipants' statements may present lawyer-scientist communication pattems in
sharper than normal relief, making such patterns easier to identify and study.
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joined issue, or almost joined issue, over major substantive
questions in the "two cultures" debate. 120 In this section 1 will
reproduce and analyze one extended example of such a
discussion. 121 In analyzing this discussion I will sometimes
comment on the substantive issue under consideration (i.e., the role
of uncertainty in law and science), only because it is not possible to
talk about what the panelists said without talking about what they
said, so to speak. But my primary focus will be on bow the
panelists analyzed the issue of uncertainty, not with whether they
got the analysis right. The uncertainty issue is one of the most
difficult in the intersection of law and science, and it is not realistic
to expect to resolve it, or even give it an adequate airing, in this
article. But it is possible to determine whether the manner in which
the speakers discussed the issue made their conversations more
productive, and made each side's position clearer to the other.
A.

The "Uncertainty" Exchange

The following discussion is taken from a question-and-answer
session following the formal presentations by the three members of
the lawyers' panel. 122 The panelists had been asked to comment
generally on what they thought were the most significant lessons to
be learned from the Woburn litigation. The ftrst panelist ("AR"),
was the only one who had participated in the Woburn case directly.
He began his presentation with a kind of "only in America" point,
extolling the "wonders of a civil justice system" which allows a
dispute like Woburn to be resolved in a court, on the basis of law,
rather than in the streets, on the basis of force, as it would have

l20. See Symposium, supra note 81.
l21. The conference was videotaped and the exchanges reproduced here are
verbatim transcriptions from that tape. I will identify the participants in each
excerpt hy their initials, but wiJJ not name them. Confidentiality was not promised
to the panelists, the conference was open to the public, was advertised widely, and
a program of the proceedings listing the speakers is readily available. Those
interested in learning names have plenty of options through which to do so. For
my purposes, however, names add noU1ing to the analysis. For a brief summary of
the Conference, see Maureen O ' Doherty, 1997 Symposium- Lessons From A
Civil Action: Environmental Torts and the Woburn Litigation. E NVIRONMENTAL
LAW ATMARYLAND, Summer-Falll997. at8.
122. See Symposium. supra note 8l.
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been in some "third world country." 123 He then spent a few
minutes making a plea for the defeat of tort reform proposals in
124
When he turned his
Congress, seemingly as a matter of habit.
attention to the Woburn case, he praised the outcome as a "bonanza
recovery" for the plaintiffs, notwithstanding that two plaintiff
representatives from the previous panel had excoriated the
outcome, the lawyers who produced it, as well as AR's assumption
that money was the best standard for measuring success. 125 He also
described one of the scientists on the next panel as the finest expert
in the country working on the problem of proving a linkage
between exposure to toxic material and harm, and characterized the
Wobum case as a kind of modern day "To Kill a Mockingbird"
story, in which the lawyers involved showed how it was still
possible to do both well and good in the practice of law . 126 He
concluded by speculating about who would play his part in the
127
He was charming (or inSltfferable, depending upon
movie.
whom one asked) throughout.
The second panelist ("RS"), described himself as an advisor to
the plaintiffs' lawyers in the Woburn case, but not a direct
participant in the case itself. His remarks, particularly those about
the relationship between law and science, were perhaps the most
provocative of any made by the panelists. He described four
categories of lessons to be learned from Woburn: ethics, politics,
science, and psychology. 128 The ethics lesson was a reprise of the
well known point that choosing one's clients is as much of an
ethical issue as deciding how to conduct a representation, and that,
everything else being equal, one ought to choose clients who are
completely (or perhaps mostly) in the right. 129 The political
significance of Woburn lay in the fact that it was the tirst major
123. AR, Panel Discussion ar the 1997 Ward, Kershaw and Minton
Environmental Symposium (Apr. 11 , 1997) (transcript on tile with author).
124. Su id.
125. See supra note 102, for a description of the differences between the

plaintiffs' and lawyers' views on the settlement.
126. See AR, Panel Discussion, supra note 123.
127. See id.
12H. SeeRS Panel Discussion, infra note 143.
129. For a thoughtful and sophisticated defense of this view, see Simon, supra
note 76.
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effort by toxic torts plaintiffs to litigate, rather than scule a lawsuit
based on complicated scientific evidence, against well financed
corporate defendants.130 He agreed with AR that the outwme of
the case was the high water mark in plaintiff's success stories for
such litigation to date. The science lesson in Woburn was about the
nature of "uncertainty" in law and science. 13 1 This was the most
interesting of RS 's four points, and probably the impetus for the
discussion set out below. Since I reproduce this discussion
verbati m. r will not summarize RS 's point here. RS' s final lesson,
about the psychology of Wohum, wa<; a provocative defense of the
right. even the need, for plaintiffs' lawyers to take control of
complicated and messy cases such as Wobum away from their
clients when all of the parties do not agree on either optimal
outcome, or preferred strategy.132 This claim appeared designed to
respond to a member of the earlier client panel, who had criticized
the plaintiffs' lawyers for not taking the principle of clie nt control
more seriously.
The third and final speaker ("BB"), was the only member of the
lawyers' panel who customarily represe nted defendants, and who,
except for reading the Civil Action book, had no connection with
the Woburn case. Undersumdably, his views on what could be
learned from the litigation were different from those of his copanelists. He started with a series of small, discontinuous, practical
points about strategic choices involved in tort representation
generally, elaborating on each for a paragraph or two, without
developing any in great detail. rn Many of these points had the
potential to be controversial, particularly those describing the way
in which the legal system ''distorts" stories by translating them into
legal terminology and legal categories, but BB ' s cryptic treatment
of the points gave a listener very little with which to contend. 134
130. St'e RS. Panel Discussion, infra note 141.
13 1. See id.
132. Under different circumstances RS's "psychology" lesson would be worth
ex ploring. but given this article' s focus on law-science interaction, I wi ll put it to
the ~ide.
133. See BB. Panel Discus ion at the I~7 Ward, Kershaw ami Minton
Environmental Symposium (Apr. II , IY97)(transcript on ftlc wi th uulhor).
134. See id. There was one exception. 88 made the unfortunate decision, as it
turned out. to respond w AR' ~ w nunen ts about tort refom1. Both RS and AR
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Like RS, BB also raised the uncertainty issue, asking at one point,
"How much certainty should the law require?" but unlike RS, he
did not offer an answer to the question, or suggest ways in which
one could go about arriving at an answer. L35 He was the last of the
panelists to speak.
Almost immediately upon the conclusion of the panelists'
remarks a scientist in the audience asked what appeared to be a
heartfelt and sympathetic question about the legal system ' s stance
toward uncertainty. 136
This question provoked a somewhat
remarkable set of responses from the lawyer-panelists, and those
responses are set out verbatim below. 137 This exchange between
the audience member and the lawyer-panelists provides an
extended look into the way lawyers explain themselves, and the
legal system, to a scientist confused about the law's response to a
prohlem central to both disciplines. 138
Since the scientist's question was probably provoked, or at least
encouraged, by the comments about uncertainty RS made during
his panel presentation, I will begin with those comments. 139 Then, I
will set out the scientist 's question, followed by the panelists'
responses. 140 Finally , I will discuss the comments of another
membe r of the audience, also a scientist and on the next panel,
made during the course of the discussion of uncertainty. 14 1 Though
the entire exchange is quite long, lasting almost fifteen minutes at
the conference, I will reproduce it in its entirety, analyzing it as I
go. I do this because it is difficult to understand any single subset
of the discussion without being aware of all that was said.

interrupted his presentation at the moment he did this (AR and RS had nol bec::n
intemJpted), to rebut the comments immediately, and to ask a series of
tendentiously phrased "socratic" (i.e. rhetorical) questions based on plainLiff
horror stories. See id. BB did not ge.t back to the Woburn topic for another seven
minutes, one-quarter of the length of time it took him to make Ius entire
pre~entation .

See id.

135. See BB, Panel Discussion, infra pp. 236-37.
136. See Sci, Panel Discussion, infra pp. 229-30.
137. See inji·a pp. 232-33,236-37,243-45.250-51,253-54.
138. See id.
139. St:t: infra pp. 220-22.
140. See infra pp. 229-30,232-33,236-37. 243-45.250-51.253-54.
l41. See infra p. 257.
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About halfway through his panel presentation, RS made the
following statement about the relationship between legal and
scientific proof, and the role of certainty in each. 142
RS:
(01) ... Now there's obviously an enormous difference
(02) between legal and scientific proof. Right. I think
(03) that goes without saying. And there's been an ongoing
(04) debate about how much proof is necessary. I'm not going
(05) to argue that point to you, only to point out that there
(06) are significant differences. T think the major
(07) philosophical thing I want to point out to you, though,
(08) .is this: that the notion that legal and scientific proof
(09) are very different ... ami this is something DO La
(10) scientist on the next panel] ... is in and of itself
(11) based on a misconception that I think almost everybody
( 12) shares. And that misconception is that science provides
(13) a kind of scientific or accounting certainty that really
(14) it doesn't provide. That people would like to bel ieve,
(15) doctors would like to believe, scientists would like to
( 16) believe, and the rest of us would believe that science
(17) involves certainty. Now, how do we know th il' is not
(18) true? I think must people believe that the two
(19) great leading ... among the two great scientific minds
(20) in our time are Stephen Hawking and probably Doctor
(21) Feynman. Stephen Hawking said in the introduction to
(22) his book that all physicists of any knowledge at all
(23) believe that there are two principles that govern
(24) twentieth-century physics. The first are the principles
(25) of large forces, general relativity and gravity, and the
142. To make it easier to follow my analysis of t.he speakers' comments, I will
number the lines of each of the excerpts. The excerptS a.re verhatim transcriptions
of what each speaker said. ungrammaticalities and all. I belong to the ''NonMalcolmite" school of excerpting and quoting. I believe rhat anything represented
as speaker comment should be speaker comment, and nothing else. See Masson v.
New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 501 U.S. 496, 502 (1991) (litigating the uccuracy of
quotations attributed to plaintiff by a writer for defendant magazine, who
reproduced what were described as actual conversations from unrccordcd notes).
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(26) other set of principles are those of quantum mechanics,
(27) small particles, and how they interact. And then
(28) Hawking goes on to say that every physicist, after
(29) recognizing it, also recognizes that these two theories
(30) are inherently inconsistent, and that one of them is
(31) wrong. Now that's sort of a shocking comment because
(32) it's so inconsistent with what most of us think of
(33) science. Science tells us how things are done, and we
(34) really know the answers. Now these points are important
(35) because in the legal question of how much certainty is
(36) needed, there tends to be a belief that, oh, if it's not
(37) written right there, that it's been proven somebody's
(38) found it, then it's not scientifically proven. Now
(39) what's wrong with that thinking? What's wrong with the
(40) idea that science is really more certain? Well, the
(41) answer is that when you go to the doctor, those of you
(42) that go to the doctor every day, many of the things that
(43) the doctor does are not scientifically proven. There's
(44) limited information about the effect of the drug,
(45) limited information about you, and limited information
(46) about how it might or might not work, and judgments are
(47) made. There's no proof as to what'll happen. Some
(48) doctors will telJ you that the medical method that's
(49) most used is like this: the patient comes in on the
(50) first day and says that they have a condition. The
(51) doctor's never seen it before, and the doctor looks very
(52) serious, and says hlm11, this is a very unusual condition,
(53) aah, have you ever had it before? The patient says,
(54) "Yes I did. When I had it the doctor told me to do X,
(55) Y, and Z." And the doctor says, " Well, if it worked
(56) before it would be a very good principle to try that
(57) again. It's not known to hurt anybody and why don't you
(58) do that." And of course the next time the patient comes
(59) in with this problem the doctor says, "Well, that's a
(60) fairly rare condition, it's not written about much in
(61) the articles, but in the past if you do X, Y, and Z,
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(62) it's been shown to have some positive effect." And by
(63) the third time, of course, it's a well known condition.
(64) O.K. How does this kind of uncertainty play in toxic
(65) cases? [RS then shifts to a discussion of the difficulties in
using epidemiological evidence to prove cancer.] 143
RS says a number of things here that could cause a listener to
wonder about the depth of his understanding of science, or the
precision with which he uses language. In fact, concerns of this
son may have been the principal reason for the discussion that
followed the panel presentations. RS starts out by seeming to
contradict himself. He asserts both that Lhe differences between
legal and scientific proof are "obvious," and "cnormous," 144 and
that this view is "based on a misconception." 14s
The
misconception, as it turns out, does not have anything 10 do with
the relationship between legal and scientific proof. but with the
fact, as RS understands it, that "almost everybody." (everyone
other than RS?) believes that "science provides a kind of scientific
or accounting cenainty." 146 This lack of connection between the
two parts of RS 's statement could confuse a listener, but even if
not. RS 's statement is a needlessly confusing way to put what is
probably not a very controversial point. More importantly, there is
a kind of arrogance in the way he states his point that could
antagonize as well. Many first rate minds have thought about the
relationship between legal and scientific proof over the years, and
there is not much likelihood that. RS has discovered something
these thinkers have missed. Claims to having a lock on the one,
true understanding of any subject do not have a good track
record- they tend to be made more by mystics and charlatans than
by geniuses- and in making such a claim, RS runs the risk of
having his listeners think either that he cannot be taken literally, or
that he is a little megalomaniacal. This loaded use of language
continues in RS 's description of the rnisconueplion point- that

143. R.S., Panel Discussion ut the 1997 Ward. Kershaw and Minton
Enviromnental Symposium (Apr. II, 1997) (transcript on file with aulhor).
144. See RS , Panel Discu!'!;ion, supra p. 220, at lines 01-03.
I45. /d. at lines 09-10.
146. ld. at lines 12- 13.
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science provides "accounting" [i.e., mathematical] certainty. 147
"Science" is a somewhat unspecific category as discussed here.
For RS ' s purposes, there is not so much something called science
as there are subject-matter fields of science, many of which differ
from one another as much as science generally differs from law. t4R
In some of these fields, facts are sometimes known with what
might legitimately be called certainty, at least in the ordinary
language sense of that term, even though such conclusions may be
no more than probability predictions with a very high likelihood of
being true. 149 RS ' s casualness about such distinctions may have
served as a kind of warning to members of the audience about
difficulties to come.
Next, RS gets to the heart of his complaint by accusing scientists
of indulging in a kind of willful self-deception, of believing "that
science involves certainty" when it does not. 150 It is not clear why
he thinks this is true, and he fails to explain his reasons. However,
this is a fairly serious charge, not that far removed from accusing
scientists of being dishonest, at least with themselves, or perhaps
even being manipulative in encouraging, or not dissuading, others
from believing what scientists know to be fa lse. RS may not have
intended to make such an accusation, but it is a reasonable
interpretation of his comments, and from my conversations with
conference participants, some listeners gave the comments this
interpretation. RS' s proof for this claiml5l, seems to consist of a
paraphrase of Stephen Hawking's description of the well known
problem of reconciling general relativity and quantum

147. See id. at line 12.
148. See, e.g., KARIN KNORR CETINA, The Care of the Self and Blind Variation:
The Disunity of Two Leading Sciences, in THE DISUNITY OF SCIENCE, supra note
60, at 287 (discussing the "different kinds of empiricism" to be found in different
fields of science, using high-energy physics and molt:cular biology as examples).
149. BB uses one of the most common examples of such a prediction in h.is
discussion of the uncertainty topic, when he points out that, while only a
probability. we are ''pretty certain that the earth revolves around the sun and not
vice versa, as people used to think." See BB, Panel Discussion, infra p. 237, at
lines 23-26.
150. RS, Panel Discussion, supra p. 220, at lines 16-17.
151. See id. at lines 16-17 (responding to the "[H] ow do we know this ... "
question.).
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mechanics, 152 and an anecdote about medical diagnostic technique.
152. RS's comment probably refers to HAWKING, Sl4pra note 68, at 11-12.
Compare Hawking's statement of the point with RS's paraphrase. Hawking says:
Today scientists describe the universe in temts of two basic partial
theories-the general theory of relativity and quantum mechanics ....
The general theory of relativity describes the force of gravity and the
large-scale structure of the universe . . . . Quantum mechanics. on the
other hand, deals with phenomena on extremely small scales ....
Unfortunately, however, these two theories are known to be inconsistent
with each other-they cannot both be correct. One of the major
endeavors in physics today ... is the search for a new theory that will
incorporate them both-a quantum theory of gravity. We do not yet
have such a the.ory, and we may still be a long way from having one, but
we do already know many of the properties that it must have. And .. .
we already know a fair amount about the predictions a quantum theory
of gravity must make.
!d.

RS uses the inconsistency between general relativity and quantum mechanics to
establish that science must be "wrong" in some fundamental sense, and thus not
worthy of any special respect. See RS, Panel Discussion, supra p. 221, at line 31.
Science, be argues, does not provide "certainty" anymore than other fields of
knowledge, and this means that we should not trust scientific knowledge to any
greater extent than we would trust knowledge generally. See id. at lines 12-14.
Hawking, on the other hand, makes the point that general relativity and quantum
mechanics, by themselves, are not so much wrong as incomplete, that they lack an
overarching framework that would "incorporate them both," and he expresses
confidence that such a "fmal unified theory'' might be possible. HAWKING, supra
note 68, at 11 -12. A final unified theory might modify relativity and quantum
mechanics rather than reject them, or it might not, but it would build upon them in
either case. See id. In this sense, Hawking illustrates how science is different
from other types of disciplines- how in science understanding develops
cumulatively rather than in ad hoc, self-contained, or episodic fashion-and how
this might entitle it to a special kind of respect. See supra notes 54 & 55, and
accompanying text. For another description of the cumulative development of
understanding in science, see Weinberg, supra note 68, at 20 (stating "At least
within the last century, no . .. major theory that became the consensus view of
physicists or astronomers-in the way that the big bang theory has-has ever
turned out to be simply wrong. Our theories have often turned out to be valid only
in a more limited context than we had thought, or valid for reasons that we had not
understood. But they are not simply wrong .... "). Weinberg also points out how
scientists have "generally been able to dodge [the) problem [ofreconciling general
relativity and quantum mechanics] because gravitation and quantum mechanics
are almost never both important in the same context .... It is only in the very
early universe that gravitation and quantum mechanics were both important [and
thus, also in the! . .. famous theorems of Roger Penrose and Stephen Hawking
[which! use General Relativity to show that there must have been a definite
beginning to the un.iverse ...." /d.; see also STEPHEN HA WKJNG AND ROGER
PENROSE, THE NATIJRE OF SPACE AND TIME (1996)(1994 Newton Institute debate
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His reference to Hawking seems more for the authority value of
Hawking's name than for the substance of what Hawking said,
which is not described in any detail. 153 Even more so with the
reference to Richard Feynman, who is mentioned only by name. 154
It does not follow from the fact that there is no grand unified
theory in physics, for example, that all science-based predictions
are indeterminate. Many fields are not affected strongly by the lack
of a grand unitied theory .155 lt also does not follow that either
relativity or quantum mechanics must be "wrong," as RS says, in
some robust sense of that term. 156 Fine tuning of one or the other
theory may be all that is needed. It is not clear why RS would want
to get into this issue in the first place. He may not intend his words
to be taken literally, but think what a strange thing it is for a
member of a profession whose stock in trade is language, not to
want to have his words taken literally, especially when speaking

at Cambridge between Hawking and Penrose over whether it is possible to
combine quantum field theory with general relativity to produce a theory of
quantum gravity; what scientists often refer to as the "Einstein-Bohr debate").
RS's example bas significance, in other words, because his undemanding of the
problem comes from Hawking. Yet his use of Hawking is explained only by the
claim that "most people believe that the two great leading ... scientific minds in
our time are Stephen Hawking and probably Doctor Peynman." While Hawking
and Feynman are clearly giant.~ of twentieth century science, the concept of a
"leading scientific mind," by itself, being authoritative is problematic by science's
own standards. LAN HACKTNG, The Disuniries of Science, in THE DISUNITY OF
SCIENCE, supra note 60, at 69 (arguing that "(t)hroughout most of our century,
regimes and practices of experimentation and instrumentation have been mon;:
powerful as a source of unity among diverse sciences than have grand unified
theories.")
153. See HAWKING supra note 152. For a clear but sophisticated discussion of
Hawking's contributions to solving the paradoxes of "cosmogony." that is, the
study of the origins of the universe. see FERRis, supra note ll , at 249-54.
154. See RS, Panel Discussion, supra p. 220, at lines 20-21.
155. Even if a grd.IId unified theory (or GUT) were to be developed, it would
still not provide a complete theory of the universe since GUT's do not take gravity
into account The possibility of a GUT itself, however, seems "all but dead" since
the concession in 1989 by Howard Ge.orgi, the Harvard physicist who coproduced
SU(5), the only GUT to make a prediction that could be tested, that "[i]t does not
seem likely that the simple version of SU(5) has been implemented by nature."
FERRIS, supra note 11, at 218, quoting Howard Georgi. postscript to A Unified
Tlwory of Elementary Particles and Forces, in PARTICLE PHYSICS IN THE COSMOS
(Richard A. Carrigan Jr. and W. Peter Trower, eds. 1989).
156. RS, Panel Discussion, supra p. 221, at lines 27-3 1.
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with other professionals not trained in law.
RS 's basic point seems to be that knowledge in science is based
on interpretive judgments about patterns and associations in data,
just like knowledge in other fields of study. Such a conclusion
suggests that science does not have some sort of special or unique
access to a world of absolute truth. 157 This is not a startling
conclusion, of course, and it is one that the scientists in the
audience would agree with. In fact, several of the scientists said
something similar many times over during the course of the
proceedings. The difficulty with RS's point then, is not in what it
says but in the way in which it is said. RS seems to see himself as
debunking science, puncturing an over-inflated balloon and
bringing it down to earth. But his principal evidence to illustrate
that scientists are just 1ike the rest of us is a joke. That is he tells an
extended story about a doctor who, when he or she is unable to
diagnose a patient's condition, appropriates the patient's selfdiagnosis as her or his own (not really, since a110ther doctor
suggested the idea to the patient),158 and then reifies it as a
diagnostic category. 159 The doctor is presented as somewhat of a
phony, passing off a home remedy as expert insight, 160 either
oblivious to what be or she is doing, or not concerned about it. If
the doctor is seen as a proxy for scientists generally, as RS seems to
intend, the criticism is then made global. RS tweaks science's nose
in a sense, saying "Ahah, caught you. You don't know any more
than the rest of us, and don' t pretend that you do." The irony in
this, if that is what RS is doing, is that science is faulted for failing
to meet expectations that are never explained as anything more than
popular (mis)conceptions of what science does. Science is hoisted

157. Judge Posner makes a similar point. See PosNER, supra note 69, at 65,
n.38 (stating that "the sense in which such refuted scientific theories as the
Euclidean theory of space or Newton's laws of motion are 'false' is a rather
special one; for most purposes, including most technological purposes, they are
true (' true enough')."); see also Weinberg. supra note 68, at 20 (stating that " Our
theories have often turned out to be valid only in a more limited context than we
bad thought, or valid for reasons that we had not understood. But they are not
simply wrong").
ISR. SeeRS, Panel Discussion supra p. 221, at tines 39-45.
159. See id. at pp. 22 1-22, lines 46-62.
160. Like the proverbial snake-oil salesman.
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on RS's non-scientific petard. 161
Why RS would frame the issue of uncertainty in terms of an
almost rhetoricaJ question, 162 is bard to understand. If one wants to
establish credibility with an audience of scientists, taking up
rhetorical questions and depicting scientific inquiry in cardboard
cutout terms seems the wrong way to proceed. lt could be expected
to provoke a defensive or dismissive reaction more than a
sympathetic or inlerested one. RS' s statement looks a little like the
advocacy stratagem of overstating a point to provoke a "How can
you say that?" type of question from a listener (usually a judge),
which one is then prepared to answer with a string of pre-planned
and more measured arguments. 163 But why RS would want to

161. If RS <.lic.l not intend to ridicule science, and I assume that he did not, it is
difficult to determine why be spoke as be did. Perhaps he had been put upon
recenlly (or often) by scientists in conversation, or felt oppressed by the
enthusiastic claims scientists can sometimes make, and was repaying the favor in
kind. For such an enthusiastic claim see. Edward Wilson's "preliminary
definition" of human nature.
Human nature is not the genes, which prescribe it. It is not the cultural
universals, such as the incest taboos and tites of passage- they are the
products of human nature. Rather. human nature is the epigenetic rules,
the inherited irregularities of mental development. These rule~ are the
genetic biases in the way our senses perceive the world, the symbolic
coding by which we represent the world, the options we open to
ourselves. and the responses we find easiest and most rewarding
psychologically to make.
Wilson, supra note 69, at 5t{.
Or, perhaps RS was just insecure about being a lawyer in a room full of
scientists. There was a time when the law journals were filled with breast-beating
articles bemoaning Ute lack of a distinctive legal subject matter and method, and
questioning the legitimacy of law's place in the academy. See, e.g .. Areeda, supra
note 11, at I 031 (stating lhat "we now wonder whether 'law' is anything other
than a combination of economics, philosophy, political science, statistics,
semantics, and ol11er disciplines"). These concerns destroyed the confidence of
many lawyers for inter-disciplinary collaboration. See id. at 1038 (arguing that
"this recognition has created a crisis of confidence in what law teachers do").
162. That is, whether uncertainty exists in science.
163. The ~trategy is ha~ed on the belief that a judge (or anyone), is persuaded
more readily when engaged in conversation and thinking along wilh Ute speaker,
than when being lectured. It is a version of the Aristotelian idea of enthymematic
argument. See C. PERELMAN & L. 0LBRECHTS-TYTECA, THE NEW RHETORIC: A
TREATISE ON ARGUJ'..IENTATION 230, 234 (1969). Enthymeme is Aristotle's term
for the syllogism of rhetoric. See ARISTOTLE, RHETORIC, I, I, 1355(A); II, 22.
1395(8).
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persuade scientists of his take on their work, rather than learn their
views of what they do, or why he would think of his conference
presentation as analogous to a courtroom argument, is difficult to
discern.
RS 's comments are also notable for what they omit. He does not
seem curious about what the scientists in the audience can tell him
about uncertainty, or qualify the expression of what, on his own
terms, is a controversial view. Nor does he express doubt,
hesitation, or humility in analyzing a complicated subject outside
his area of expertise. If, as it seems, he compensates for his lack of
substantive command by putting things in stronger than warranted
language, he risks reinforcing a common stereotype among
scientists and others about law and lawyers, that in law it is how
one argues and not what one argues that counts. Yet RS seems
unaware of this risk, or the extent to which his manner of speaking
could trigger it. His comments could lead the scientists in the
audience to conclude that there is not m uch to be gained from an
extended discussion with him, 164 about the intersection of law and
science. However, that dues nut happen. At the close of the panel
presentations, and after an unrelated question to AR about his use
of the term "judgment," 165 a scientist member of the audience asked
164. Or lawyers generally, since RS was thought to be scientifically
sophisticated for a lawyer.
165. See AR. Panel Discussion at the 1997 Ward, Kershaw and Minton
Environmental Symposium (Apr. 11. 1997) (transcript on file with author). After
describing what he meant by the term "judgment," AR used the bulk of this fu·st
panelist response in the question and answer session to make what seemed to be an
unprovoked attack on the Beatrice lawyer in the Woburn case. See id. AR
charged that the lawyer bad "cheated" in the case by willfully withholding
information properly requested in discovery, and that the presiding judge had
failed to sanction the lawyer for this cheating out of a sense of loyalty to a fellow
Harvard Law School graduate. See id. This should not. surprise anyone, AR
asserted, because " Boston is a Harvard town." /d. AR also is a Harvard Law
School graduate. The Beatrice lawyer was not present at the conference to offer
another view, I:IIId none of those who were present seemed privy to all of the facts
so as to be able to present the other side. A scientist memher of the next panel was
so offended by the attack that he asked during lunch whether AR · s remarks were
"libelous" and whether he should tell the Beatrice lawyer about them. The story
of the discovery incident, as told in the Civil Action book, could be interpreted as
an instance of cheating, but this is not its most obvious interpretation, or perhaps
even its most likely. On the other hand, Professor Blomquist seems to read the
book's account in this way. "Judge Skinner routinely favored [the Beatrice
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the following question which led to a discussion that took the
remainder of the question and answer period.
Sci:
(01) I am from the staff of a scientifi.c association , and T'd
(02) like to discuss one of the things that our members, or
(03) some of our members, think about and talk about, and I
(04) think are truly somewhat troubled about philosophically,
(05) and I'll let any of the panelists address it. And that
(06) is the issue of uncertainty in science. RS is
(07) absolutely right. Science is a constantly growing
(08) process, and the information we have tomorrow, next
(09) week, or next decade may make us realize that what we
(10) knew yesterday, last week, or ten years ago was wrong.
(11) Or, it confirms us even further in our belief that what
(12) we thought or said at the time, indeed, we even have
(13) stronger evidence for it today. Scientists are very
( 14) comfortable with this uncertainty. It's one of the
(15) things that makes science exciting actually, that
(16) there's always a new discovery, or else it would be
(17) fairly boring. But it is a problem when we get into
(18) a courtroom where a decision can't wait ten years. A
(19) decision has to be made now. And we're somewhat puzzled
(20) about the philosophy of how you deal with this
(21) uncertainty. After all, I think, there seems to be some
(22) general agreement about the case that we're discussing
(23) today, that these companies and some of these chemicals
(24) they used, they disposed of them in an irresponsible
(25) way. They got into the water system, they contaminated
(26) it. There's less certainty about whether those
(27) substances cause leukemia. Indeed, many very
(28) distinguished scientists, as l read the book, think it
(29) does not cause leukemia [here, RS tries briefly to
lawyer] throughout the long course of the litigation apparently due to law school
ties and prior acquaintance." Blomqujst, supra note 93, at 971-72. He cites, as an
example, the judge's finding Lhal the Lawyer was nol Lo blame for failing to turn
over key documents jn wscovery. See id.
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(30) interrupt, saying "let me give you some comments ... ,"
(31) but the questioner continues on, speaking over him],
(32) and in ten years we may find that there was, indeed,
(33) something going on in that city, but it's something we
(34) haven't dreamed of yet. For example, ten years ago we
(35) did not dream that women got breast cancer, not because
(36) of something they ate, or bad luck, but because of a
(37) gene that they inherited from their mother, or father,
(3R) they were fated to have that. How do you wrestle with
(39) this, and I . .. I ... I, this uncertainty. I'd just
(40) like you to comment on it. Hi6
One of the first things one notices about thi s statement is that it
asks a genuine question. It does not criticize the panelists' views
un uncertainty, contest a lawyer' s right to speak about uncertainty
in science, or try Lo sneak in an unflattering comparison of law with
science, sub silentio, Hi? under the guise uf asking a question. 168
Some issues remain unclear. For instance, dues the speaker want to
know how lawyers and judges reach their conclusions when they
are in doubt, how they control the emotional dissonance having to
make such decisions, how the legal system justifies decisions made
on the basis of less than full information, what mechanisms the
system has for correcting error once discovered, or all of the above.
Nonetheless, one issue is clear: The speaker is curious, not
combative. While she is puzzled about the legal community's
response to the uncertainty problem, she is not critical of it, at least
not publicly, and not yet.L 69
The questioner also understands that law is different from
science, that "a [legalj decision can't wait ten years," and that
courts must act even when they are not clear about what to do. t?o
Because of this, she suggests, ever so slightly, that science may
166. St:i, Panel Dist:ussion at Lhe 1997 Ward, Kershaw and Minton
Environmental Symposium (Apr. II , 1997) (transcript on file wiU1 auU10r).
167. See BLACK'S L AW DICTIONARY 1428 (6th ed. 1990) (defining sub silcmtio
as " [u}nder silence; without any notice being taken.").
16tt In their generic form, these latter moves are perhaps more prevalent than
genuine questioning in conterence discussion sessions.
169. Sci, supra p. 229, at lines 04, 18.
170. !d. at line 18.
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have an easier time a<.:commodating uncertainty lhan law. 17 1
Scientists are not tied to external timetables and can wrut ten years
to announce their results if need be. 172 More importantly, though,
scientists are energized by Lmcertainty. Uncertainty makes new
discoveries possible, and new discoveries make science "exciting,"
prevent it from becoming "boring," and keep it "constantly
growing."m Scientists are not bothered by uncertainty, they are
"comfortable" with it, because it is an essential part of their
174
work.
The situation may not be the same in law, but rather than
pre-judge, the speaker asks, in effect, "Is tbis so?" 175 Her inquiry is
fair-minded and generous. lt is framed in open-ended tenllS,
thereby leaving the panel ists free to select and respond to those
aspects of the question about which they have most to say. 176 The
panelists should be grateful for so friendly a question , and mn with
it.
RS was the first panelist to respond.

171. See id. at lines 13- 17.
172. This is Lrue, at least, in theory. Re~t:arch .\,'TUIJL~. promotion~, salary
increases, aod other such factors often innuence Lhe speed with which even
scientific work is done. The point in the text however. is that scientisls do not. and
given the. peer review process, cannot announce conclusions until they can defend
them as tJue.. If this means they must wait for the results of research to come in,
then they must wait. Judges hold themse.lves to a less strict standard of truth. and
a timetable driven more by external needs than the results of fact investigation.
For anyone who has ever worked on constmction projects, tllis might be described
as a "close enough. nail it." standard.
173. Sci , Panel Discus.~ion, supra p. 229, at lines 07, 14, 16. It i.~ interesting
that the audience questioner descrihes her position as agreeing with RS 's. See id.
at lines 06, 07. RS had said only that science is not certain, that it changes its
mind. See RS, Panel Discu~sion, supra pp. 220-22. He had not characterized this
as a positive trait-one that made science exciting, or kept it constantly growingbut just as one that made science the same as other fields of srudy. See id.
174. Sci, Panel Discussion, supra p. 229, at lim: 13- 14. This may be anolher
difference between science and law. It is hard to think of lawyers and judges
being excited about learning that the background legal rules have just changed.
175. See id. The audience questioner was experienced at dealing with law aod
lawyers, as the "when we get into a courtroom" reference indicates. !d. at lines
17-1X. Attempts to explain law's stance on uncertainty to her were unsatisfactory
until then as she explained later. It is to her credit that she remained optimistic
about the prospects of getting an answer to her question, and this optimism comes
across in her tone.
I 76. In effect, the question says "discuss uncertainty in law."
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RS:
(66) Let me try to give you two quick ones. I can tell you
(67) that I think the problems with uncertainty are based on
(68) two kinds of misconceptions. One, BB alluded to very
(69) correctly [in his panel presentation] , when he said
(70) lawyers, when they do legal scientific research, like to
(71) look up legal cases, like the law detennined that
(72) Bendectin didn' t cause this, or asbestos cause that, and
(73) so the law has this kind of pretending certainty. So
(74) for instance, the best example for those of you who
(75) aren't practicing is, in every state there i.s a
(76) formulation that goes something like ''to a reasonable
(77) degree of medical certainty, do you think ... " And
(78) every doctor that I've ever known says, "aaaahh ...
(79) they didn't teach me that in medical school, what does
(80) that mean?" And most lawyers will tell you that the
(81) answer is, "well ... just think like a doctor and, say
(82) if you were making a decision as a doctor, don't put on
(83) any other hat, what's your best opinion, what's your
(84 ) best guess as a doctor, what would you do?'' Because as I
(85) indicated in my talk, the doctors many times don't make
(86) purely decisions based on science. So one problem is
(87) that the lawyers have problems with this idea of
(88) certainty, they want to think that there's a higher
(89) degree of certainty. Now the other problem is that the
(90) scientists ... I want to take issue with what you [the
(9 1) q uestioner] said. I don't think scientists . ..
(92) they're split about uncertainty. Now let me tell you
(93) how they're split. Scientists, when the doors close,
(94) all recognize the uncertainty that you recognize. But
(95) publicly, they like to take the position that there is a
(96) higher degree of certainty [BB, another lawyer panelist,
(97) interrupts here to add, "and especially in the
(98) courtroom, which is another way this information get5
(99) distorted when it gets into court"] . Doctors like to
( 100) pretend that everything they do is scientific. They
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(101) like to pretend that they understand statistics when
(102) most doctors don' t have a clue about statistics, and
(1 03) what the various concepts mean. So the problem is that
(104) the scientists are kind of split as to how they feel
(105) about certainty. Now that further reproduces itself in
(106) the philosophy of science where there's sort of a big
(107) split. When you look at the philosophy of sdence
(108) there's two sorts of major trends, the majority
(109) twentieth century trend which says that science is
( I I0) somewhat subje<.:Li ve, you know, and not reproducible.
( Ill ) That's right. You frown [directed at the audience
(112) questioner], because Karl Popper, in the philosophy
( L13) field, the philosophers think that Karl Popper and the
( 114) reproducibility theory is kind of a joke. The problem is
(115) that the idea appeals very much to scientists because it
(116) makes it sound like what they do is certain, and !hey
(117) cling to Karl Popper's notion that science is this kind
( I 18) of absolute certainty, and you can prove it. Whereas
(11 9) the philosophers don't. So if you go into the
( 120) philosophy of science department in any school you will
(121) say, the people who believe in uncertainty would be
( 122) people who are primarily philosophers, and the people
(123) who believe more in certainty will be primarily
(124) scientists, and my view is that it's not because
( 125) scientists really produce certainty, but because it's a
( 126) more flattering view of what science is, and it's more
(127) appealing to Ihcm. 177
There is enough in RS 's response to provoke almost everyone,
but perhaps the best place to begin is with what the response does
not do. For all that he says, and it is considerable, RS never
answers the audience member's question. Rather than describe
how judges and lawyers decide what to do when they are uncertain,
explain how legal de<.:isions based on incomplete or inaccurate

177. RS, Panel Discussion at the 1997 Ward, Kershaw and Minton
Environmental Symposium (Apr. II , 1997) (transcript on file with author).
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information could still be legitimate, or respond to some other such
interpretation of the speaker's question, RS uses the occasion of the
question to elaborate on his earlier description of the misconception
of certainty problem in science.178 Either he is preoccupied with
the belief that scientists pretend to know more than they do, or he
thinks that the speaker somehow has defended thjs practice in her
question.
RS begins by criticizing lawyers for having a "kind of pretending
certainty,'" when making legal claims about scienti fic matters, but
never says what he means by that interesting, though rar from selfev ident, phrase. 179 Do lawyers engage in conscious prcteo e, or are
they fooled themselves? Do they have legitimate reasons to
pretend, or is pretending a self-aggrandizing move? ls everyone in
the legal system in on the pretense, or just judges (or lawyers)? In
what forum is the pretense most commonly expressed. judicial
decisions, conversations with clients, witness testimony, arguments
to courts, bar association speeches, aU of the above, or what? RS's
principal example of " pretending certainty," taken from the law of
evidence. is the "rca onahle degree of medical (scientific)
certainty" standard which governs the presentation of expert
testimony to courts. 180 11 is not clear, however, how this standard
181
The ''degree of certainty"
supports a claim about legal pretense.
expression is admittedly borderline oxymoronic. There are not
degrees of certainty; something is either certain or uncertain. On
the other hand, there are degrees of probability, which is what Jaw
and RS no doubr have in mind. 182 It is also a little vague with

178. RS. Panel Disc ussion. supra pp. 232-33.
179. /d. at line 73.
11!0. /d. at lines 7 3, 76.
181. He uses the example of "legal cases·· as authority in tlispules involving
complicated science issues. /d. at line 71. The Bendeclin case is given as an
example. See Dauben v. Merrell Dow Phannaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
The case is not, by itsel f, evidence of pretense. Lawyt:rs who failed to consult or
understand science materials in /)rmhert or similar lawsuits may be guilty of
shoddy work., even malpractice, hut unless they also hold themselves out as
science expens, they are not guilty of pretending to be anything other than what
they are.
I K2. The most famou~ ··uegree or' example is the expression "exactly the
same... There arc not degree~ of sameness, something either is the same as
something else (in which cu~c ''the same" suffices), or it is not. Such expressions
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respect to the issue of whose understanding of reasonableness
controls. Yet a vague, oxymoronic expression, by itself, is not
evidence of pretense, principally because it does not communicate
any single clear meaning, pretended or otherwise. RS's attempts to
clarify the expression through a series of paraphrases, "think like a
doctor," give "your best opinion," or "your best guess," say "what
would you do," not only do not resolve the vagueness problem,
they add to it. 183
In the second and more extensive part of his comments, RS
leaves law behind and takes on scientists. Here, he is not just
confusing, he is combative. As before, RS seems set on making a
pre-planned point rather than responding to what was asked. His
main point is that scientistc; are dishonest with respect to the issue
of uncettainty. In private, "when the doors close," scientists admit
that their work is filled with uncertainty, but when they go public,
so to speak, all doubt is gone. 184 Then, they are as authoritarian and
as dogmatic as anyone. 185 RS describes this point as taking issue
with the speaker, but it is hard to see how. The speaker asked a
question about uncertainty in law, and to the extent that she said
anything about uncertainty in science, it was only to say that
uncertainty is what makes science exciting. RS may hear her
question as a defense of scientific deception, but if so, it is hard to
see how that is a result of anything she said. RS seems primed to
argue more than to respond, and the questioner appears simply to
be in the wrong place at the wrong time. She has become RS 's
proxy for his beliefs about scientists.

are not troublesome in day-to-day conversation. but lawyers and scientists ought to
he more careful with words. The oxymoronic quality of the "degree of certainty"
expression was noted by DO, a sciemjsr on the next panel. For more than one
could want to know ahout the "reasonable degree of medical certainty" evidentiary
standard, see Jeff L Lewin, The Genesis and Evolution of Legal Uncertainty
About "Reasonable Medir.al Certainty," 57 Mn. L. R EV. 380 (1998).
183. RS, Panel Discussions, supra p. 232. at lines 80-84. For example, is it an
opinion, a guess. or a personal preference, lhut is sought?
184. /d. at line 93.
185. See id. at lines IJ3-IJ5. Paul Meier has described this as "aggrandizement,"
that is, the tendency of expertS to give definitive rather than qualified answers. to
de-emphasize the importance of other schools of thought, and to exaggerate the
significance of their own inferences. See Paul Meier, Damned /Jars and Expert
Witnesses, 81 J. AMER. STAT. Ass'N 273 ( IIJXo).
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RS 's argument against scientists consists of a gratuitous slam
that "doctors don't have a clue about statistics;"'Rc. a personal libel
187
that "philosophers think Karl Popper ... is a kind ofjoke;" some
amateur psychologizing that scientists believe in the certainty of
188
science "because it's a more flattering view of what science is;"
and a breathless oversimplification of twentieth century philosophy
of science as "science is somewhat subjective, you know, not
It is not surprising that the questioner is
reproducible. " 189
somewhat dismayed . It is reasonable to feel at least a little upset
when called narcissistic, duplicitous, and the unwitting captive of a
philosophically bankrupt view . 190 She also might wonder why RS
is trying so bard to re-direct her attention from Jaw to science, why
he chooses to chaJlenge her question rather than engage it, why he
resorts to gratuitous ridicule and ad hominem attack, why he
summarizes a complicated body of scholarship in terms so
oversimplified as to be impossible to confront, and why he
tiJibusters by taking four minutes to respond to what had the
potential to be the beginning of an extended conversation about the
role of uncertainty in law. These patterns will appear time and time
again, in one form or another, in most of the excerpts reproduced in
this discussion.
BB was the next to respond to the speaker's question. He spoke
immediately after R S had finished and before the questioner from
the audience was given a chance to respond.
BB:
(01) Scientists, by and large, have not been very ret1ective
(02) about what makes their work scientific, what it is
(03) that constitutes scientific validity. Most scientists
(04) get into some, I don' t want to say narrow specialty, but
(05) they get into their field ami they sort of develop a

186. RS, Panel Discussion, supra p. 233, at lines 101-102.
187. !d. at lines 111- 13. For a be Iter understanding of the treatment of Popper,
see NEWTON. supra note 13, at 156-58.
188. RS, Panel Discussion, supra p. 233, at lines 124-25.
189. /d. at p. 233. lines I 03- 11 . For a more nuanced description of the various
schools of thought within the philosophy of science, see Galison, supra note 60, at
I.
190. SeeRS. Panel Discussion, suprn p. 233, at lines 111-26.
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(06) sense of what goes on in that field, and they'll
(07) look at something and they'll say, "Well, that's valid
(08) because that's what we nonna1ly do." And then they'll
(09) look at something and say it isn't because it's not
(1 0) what we normally do. And they don't really give much
(11) thought to the philosophical basis, the logical basis,
(12) for what makes something valid or not. So scientists
(13) in some ways are the worst people to consult about the
(14) philosophy of science. While agreeing with what RS says
(15) about there being some intrinsic uncertainty, I think
(16) the important point to bear in mind is that philosophers
(17) of science, and scientists who have been reflective
(18) about this, will tell you that there are some things
(19) more certain than others. You know, we don't expect to
(20) wake up tomorrow and find that the world is flat. Are
(21) we absolutely certain that the earth is a globe, a sort
(22) of a pear-shaped globe? Well, yeah, we're pretty darn
(23) ce1tain about that. Are we pretty certain that the
(24) earth revolves around the sun and not vice versa, as
(25) people use-d to think? Yeah, we're pretty dam certain
(26) about that. Are we absolutely certain? No, because
(27) nothing in science is absolutely certain. But there are
(28) certainly degrees of certainty, and what we ought to
(29) require of scientific evidence is that it be cet1ain
(30) enough for the legal policy purposes at issue in a case. 191
BB a1so fails to answer the speaker's question about the role of
uncertainty in law, and in his own way, continues RS's assault on
science. He makes three points: (!)because scientists are not very
reflective about what they do "[they] are the worst people to
consult" about "scientific validity"; (2)there are degrees of
certainty in science, with some scientific conclusions being more
certain than others ; and (3)the legal system does not demand proof
of absolute certainty from scientific evidence, just proof that is

191. BB, Panel Discussion at the 1997 Ward, Kershaw and Minton
Environmental Symposium (Apr. I I, 1997) (transcript on file with author).
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"certain enough." 192 Each of these points could cause the scientists
in the audience to doubt BB 's responsiveness, his willingness or
perhaps ability to confront the difficult question about uncertainty
in law and his understand ing of science.
BB 's first point, a criticism of scientists as expert witnesses, has
two parts. The first says that most scientists are not self-conscious
about how they do science, that they do not think about the
193
''logical" or "philosophical basis" of science, as BB puts it.
This
is a fairly feisty way to put what, in fact, may not be a very telling
point, even if true. In one sense, all professionals are not routinely
194
self-conscious about the philosophical basis of their work.
On
the contrary, such self-consciousness may even he a necessary
condition for good performance, even for lawyers. Take, for
example, the lawyer-panelists' comments in the excerpts
reproduced here. If these remarks are representative, and there is
no reason to believe they are not, lawyers tum out to be not very
good people to consult about the role of uncertainty in law. 195 For
example, while RS, BB, and AR may be fine lawyers overall,
among the best nationally in their fields, throughout this uiscussion
they never explain how law makes its peace with uncertainty in the
legal u~.:cisio n process. They discuss uncertainty generally, anti its
rok in science, but they never do the same for uncertainty in law,
even after being asked. lt is not likely that they lack interest in the
topic or are unwilling to discuss it. They committed to such a
discussion implicitly whe n they agreed to participate in the
conference and professed their interest in the topic many times over
during the course of the proceedings. Like the scientists they
criticize, however, these lawyer-panelist-. may be so socialized into

192. BB, Panel Discussion. supra pp. 236-37, at lines 01-02, I:1- 14,26-30.
193. BB, Panel Discussion, supra p. 2:17, at line 11.
194. In fact., whole bodies of scholarship have been built upon the assumption
that this is true. For example, ~ce lhe cognitive dissonance based work of Chris
Argyris and Donald Schon, who~c central analytical move is to point out
incon~ i~tencies becween what people ~ay they want to do. and what they do, what
Argyris and Schon call the inconsistency between "espoused theory," and "theory
in u~e." CHRIS ARGYRIS & DONALD SCHON, THEORY lN PRACTICe: INCKt-:ASlNO
PKOI'bSSIONAL EFFECTIVENESS ( 1974).
195. Simply substitute lawyers for scientists in BB's statement atlim:s 12- 14.
See BB, Panel Discussion. supra p. 237, at lines 12-14.
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their professional practice that it is difficult, if not impossible, for
them to step outside of that practice and describe it in terms that
someone not so immersed can understand. The problem may not
be with scientists or lawyers per se, but with the way professionals
are trained to think about and operate in a professional role. If BB
does not see the problem in these more general terms, there is some
question about whether he can help analyze and resolve it.
BB 's second point is his logical leap from the idea that scientists
are not self-conscious about their work, to the conclusion that they
are "the worst" people to consult on issues of scientific validity. 196
Scientists form opinions on the validity of work, he asserts, based
on whether the work looks like "what [scientists] normally do." 197
Nevertheless, he continues, they cannot give any more than a "take
my word for it" kind of reason when asked to explain why the
conclusions they reach are credible. 198 This leaves courts with the
unsatisfying choice of either delegating scientific fact-finding to
scientists, or rejecting testimony which may be tme. Like many of
the panelist responses during the question and answer session, there
is a grain of truth in what BB says. Unfortunately, the problem of
getting scientists to explain conclusions in sufficient detaH may
have as much to do with the way scientists are questioned about
validity judgmentc; as it does with the way they make those
judgment<~ in the first instance.
Scientists are not a special case when it comes to explaining
expert judgment. Most experts are not self-conscious about the
way in which they work, largely because thinking about how one
peti'onns complicated work while simultaJleously performing it,
slows work to a crawl and often makes it less productive. A
homely but ea<>ily understood example will illustrate this idea. A
golf swing is made up of many individual pieces, re4uiriug the
sequenced coordination of different parts of the body.199 Yet, for a
swing to be successful it must be understood as a single, simple
movement. The individual parts are practiced separately as the
196. ld. at lines 13· 14.
197. /d. at lines 07-10.
198. ld. at lines 03-t2.
199. To keep the analogy to science in the forefront, think of a golfer's swing
as her or his "method" for doing golf.
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swing is learned, but gradually they blend into one connected,
cohesive movement as the swing is put together and made
automatic over time. Once the swing is mastered, a golfer is no
longer conscious of its individual parts each time he or she swings
a club. This does not mean that a golfer cannot explain the swing if
questioned about it. Yet, it does mean that unless a questioner
knows something about bow a golf swing is constructed, and is
able to go more than half-way in drawing the golfer out, the
golfer's description will likely be too cryptic for some listeners to
understand and will strike others as gibberish. It should not be
surprising, then, that the same thing would be true about the more
complicated phenomenon of scientists explaining science. Getting
experts to understand and explain the tacit knowledge on which
their judgments are based is a difficult task, for which no simple
solution exists. It does seem clear, though, that asking someone
who is not an expert to explain the judgment process does not move
us closer to a solution. Who but someone who has actually done
science could know fully what is involved in the process when it is
done well?2 0<) Suggesting that scientists are not good people to ask

200. BB's comments may have inadve1tently rubbed a longstanding wound.
Many s<.:icntists doubt the ability of the meta-critics (historians, philosophers.
sociologists, and rhetoricians) of science to understand science accurately and to
evaluate it fairly. See, e.g., the following expression of that sentiment in Max
Perutz, "The Pioneer Defended," Review of GERALD A. OEISON. THE PRIVATE
SCIENCE OF LOUIS PASTEUR, in N.Y. REv. OF BOOKS, Dec. 21. 1995, at 54. 58.
According to Perutz:
. . . it is now a couunonplace among historians and sociologists of
science that science, no less t11an any other form of culture, depends on
rhetorical skills. I have known scientists who possessed great rhetorical
skills which failed to conceal the shallowness of their research from
their peers. On the other hand, Alexander Heming's lectures put
everyone to sleep, while his discovery of penicillin made rum one of thjs
century's most famous scientists. Good research needs no rhetoric, only
clarity. The entire approach emphasizing "relative" truth seems to me a
piece of humbug masquerading as an academic discipline; it pretends
that its practitioners can set themselves up as judges over scientists
whose science they fail to understand.
/d. ai 54, 5R; see also NEWTON, supra note 13, at 29-44 (discussing the "hubris of
.~ociologists"); Weinberg, supra note 68, at 20 (stating that scientific "consensus is
forced on us by nature itself, not by some orthooox scientific establi.shmem; as
Rees says, ·Philosophers of science would be surprised at how many astronomers
are eager rather than reluctant to join a revolutionary bandwagon,"' quoting
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about science, without more, strikes most scientists as a strange
thing to say.
BB's third point, that there are degrees of certainty in science,
that nothing is "absolutely certain,"201 is no doubt correct if one
defmes certainty to mean some probability of being true. A
probability of anything can be strong or weak. While this is
different from the meaning given the term "certain" in ordinary
language-usually "inevitable," "not to be doubted," "fixed," or
"deftnite,"202- it is not different enough to be worth quibbling
about. 203 88 's use of flat world and geocentric orbit examples may
he another matter? 04 The simplemindedness of these examples
may he a little insulting given the sophisti.cation of the audience
and may cause some of his listeners to wonder how deep his
knowledge of science truly runs. BB sounds a little like a nonlawyer trying to demonstrate a command of First Amendment
doctrine by saying that there is no constitutional right to shout fire
in a crowded theater. 205 The point is true enough if properly

MARTIN REES, BEFORE THE BEGINNING: O UR UNIVERSE AND OTHERS ( 1997));

Richard Lewontin, 'Higher Superstitinn': All Exclzan.ge, N.Y. REv. OF BOOKS,
Dec. 3, 1998, at 59.
Richard Lewontin writes:
I share ... the belief that to write sensibly about science in-the-large one
must be e ngaged daily in doing science in-the-small. As science is done,
at least in biology, it is a social activity in which professors, professional
visitors. postdoctoral fellows, and graduate students are in constant
interaction in a shared physical and intellectual space. A loss of contact
with this activity means, however hard one may try. the loss of contact
with the present state of a science and the loss of the material basis on
which science can be evaluated. People who stop doing science must
soon stop talking about it.
Lewontin, supra at 59. Compare the sharper comment by Niels Bohr. "It is
hopeless to have any kind of understanding between scientists and philosophers
directly. All that philosophers have ever written is pure drivel." ABRAHAJ\.1 PAIS,
NIELS BOHR' S TIMES IN PHYSICS, PHILOSOPHY, AND POLITY 421 (1991).
201. See BB, Panel Discussion, supra p. 237, at lines 25-28.
2 02 . I THE SHORTER OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONAKY 307 (Jd. ed. 1973).
203. Earlier I disputed the idea that there could be "degrees of' certainty, sec
supra note 182, and while I still think that view is correct., it is only u defini tional
point and thus not worth pressing. There are serious problems with BB's
statement even giving him his definition of certainty.
204. BB. Panel Discussion. supra p. 237, at lines 19-23.
205. Use of the adjective "crowded" is the most ohvious give away. As is well
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understood, but someone truly knowledgeable in First Amendment
doctrines would likely not use such a hackneyed illustration. These
problems notwithstanding, this is the least controversial of BB' s
three points.
BB 's attempt to clarify the reasonable degree of certainty
standard for scientific testimony is another matter. The reasonable
certainty standard, as we have seen,206 is frustrating to scientists
and doctors. lt is not something they study in graduate or medical
school, and as an ordinary language expression, it is difficult to
parse. BB attempts to solve these problems by paraphrasing the
standard, presumably to put it in clearer language. Evidence is
reasonably certain, he says, when it is "certain enough for the legal
policy purposes at issue in a case.''207 However, this paraphrase
does not seem to improve much upon the original articulation of
lhe standard, and it may make it worse. For example, bow much
evidence is enough? What are legal policy purposes? When is
something certain enough? These questions may have precise
answers to BB (and other lawyers who work in the field) , because
he has read dozens of cases (or more) applying the standard, and
has seen what quantities and kinds of evidence courts accept as
adequate.
He can describe a spectrum of expert scientific
testimony and say where on that spectrum any present testimony
would fit. Yet, this paraphrase, and others like it, is insider
shorthand, and like all such shorthand, it is unintelligible to those
who are not insiders no matter how expert or sophisticated they
otherwise might be. To say that testimony must be certain enough
is another way of saying "certain" according to the judgment of an
known among constiwtional law professors, Justice Holmes' original phrase
referred only to a theater, and made no mention of how many patrons were in
attendance. See Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919). "The most
stringent protection of free speech would not protect a man in falsely shouting fire
in a theater and causing a panic." /d. at 52. The expression seems to bear
repeating every now and then, as even Justices of the Supreme Coutt have been
known to get it wrong. See, e.g., R.A.V. v. City of Sl. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 399
(1992) (reasoning that " ... the Court has held that the individual who falsely
shouts 'tire· in a crowded theater may not claim the protection of the First
AmendmenL"). ''Crowded theater" is probably a better way to make Holmes'
point, of course, but it is not the way Holmes madt: it.
206. See supra note 182 and accompanying text.
207. BB. Panel Discussion. supra p. 237, at lines 29-30.
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expert lawyer working in the field, but that is just what scientists
are not.
While only bali as long as RS 's comments, and expressed in
more temperate language, BB 's remarks have many of the same
qualities. Like RS, he fails to answer the speaker's question,
criticizes science rather than explains law, discusses science in
overdrawn and slightly caricalured terms, and speaks with
confidence and assurance where tentativeness and qualification
would have been more appropriate? 08 He looks more like a person
preaching to the choir than someone carrying on a conversation
with critics. He gives no indication that he understands the truly
different perspective of his scientist questioner, and makes no effort
to enter into her world.
When BB finished, AR responded, speaking over RS who had
begun to make additional comments, again before the questioner
from the audience was given a chance to speak.
AR:
(01) I'd like to add one more thing on this question. First
(02) of all, first, the person who asked the question is in a
(03) position where getting the answer right, I think, is
(04) really important because you [to the person who asked
(05) the question] work in this area. You've got a project
(06) that's involved in this subject, and I an1 concerned that
(07) the question that you asked, I think, reflects a
(08) misunderstanding of the intersection between law and
(09) science in the courtroom, and it's I think really
(1 0) important, particularly for the project you're
(11) working on [At this point another member of the
(12) audience, who was also a scientist and a participant on
( 13) the next panel, rose to ask a question. He began by
(14) saying "lf r may ... ,"but AR continued to speak over
(15) him.], and let me say what I think that is. ln the
( 16) courtroom the goal is to find out what happened in a
(17) particular event. The role of the scientist is to come

208. This is all the more remarkable given rhe fact that he fol lows RS in
responding and thus has had more time to think about whar to say.
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( 18) and offer an opinion. The role of the jury or the judge
(19) is not to decide i[f] the scientist, on a scientific
(20) basis, [is] right or wrong. That would require us to do
(21) something that only scientists could do. Their job is
(22) to decide whether or not the scientist' s expression of
(23) that opinion is credible or not credible. If it's
(24) credible, they accept it. Lf it's not credible, they
(25) don't. Now the scientist who comes to the courtroom
(26) comes with the varying degrees of certainty that BB
(27) talked about. Is the world flat or is the world round?
(28) There 's a lot more certainty to that than the question,
(29) does trichlorethylene cause leukemia? But in my
(30) judgment, both of those reach 5 1%, both of those are at
(3 1) that level, and I've got an expert here in the room who
(32) can testify to that. And that expert is going to go up
(33) against another expert who's going to say, " Yes, I think
(34) it's certain that the world is round and not flat, but I
(35) don 't think that it's 51% likely, and they're going to
(36) point to vari ous scientific evidence to suppott it. The
(37) only criteria that the law lays down for those
(38) scientists is that when they make their j udgment, and
(39) that's what it is, a j udgment, that they do it using a
(40) scientific methodology. You can' t say " l had a dream
(41) that trichlorethylene causes leukemia, and that's the
(42) basis for my opinion." You can't say "I think the world
(43) is round because I had a dream." You have to have some
(44) scientific evidence. You have to marshal it in a
(45) scientific way. You have to use the scientific
(46) methodology. But in the last analysis it's judgment.
(47) All the court is doing is providing a forum for
(48) scientifically reliable and methodologically sound
(49) judgments to be expressed. That's it. They let the
(50) decision-maker decide. And if you're fru strated because
(51) sometimes the j ury may conclude that the credible
(52) scientist is the one whose position is actually wrong,
(53) ask yourself this question: "How many auto accident
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(54) cases are decided on the basis of whether or not the
(55) light was red or green, and an eyewitness says it was
(56) red, and it was actually green?" It happens all the
(57) time. It's inherent in the nature of the process.
(58) People view something and they see it wrong. We
(59) shouldn't be more upset because a scientist may be wrong
(60) in testifying to it and a jury believes him. Scientists
(61) have been testifying in courts and they've been wrong a
(62) Iot.'09
AR responds differently from the first two panelists. He does
not criticize science directly, challenge the accuracy of the
questioner's preconceptions, or question Sci's capacity for selfretlection, at least not explicitly. Instead, he tries to answer the
audience member's question about uncertainty in law by explaining
how legal decision making is different from doing science. In the
end, however, AR he does not appear to be any more helpful than
his more overtly adversarial colleagues. His remarks are confusing
on key points and perhaps a little condescending. They signal that
he might not be completely trustworthy, deprecate the importance
of the uncertainty issue itself, and in the end may also beg the
question.
AR begins by stating that it is important that the questioner "get
the answer right," since she is working on a "project that's involved
in this subject."210 This is a confusing thing to say. He may be
speaking indirectly to RS and BB, suggesting that they have not
gotten the answer right and that he, AR, will correct what they have
said. If so, RS and BB might legitimately take offense at this.
Alternatively, he may be speaking directly to the questioner, saying
that it is important that she get the answer right, but why he would
think she needed to be reminded of this is not at all clear. For
example, when would one not try to get the answer right? The
questioner may also have thought it a little ironic that a lawyer
would lecture a scientist on the importance of accuracy , given the
subject of the discussion, and see AR's response as just another,

209. AR, Panel Discussion at the 1997 Ward, Kershaw and Minton
Environmental Symposium (Apr. 11, 1997) (transcript on tile with author).
210. !d. at pp. 243, lines 03-06.
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albeit more sophisticated, example of how lawyers attack when
they are confronted.
AR next characterizes the speaker's question as based on a
"misunderstanding," though he does not identify what the speaker
has misunderstood .211 The que~>tioner asked only that the panelists
discuss the role of uncertainty in law, without expressing or even
suggesting a view about how law should accommodate uncertainty.
To correct the speaker's alleged misunderstanding, however, AR
explains the nature of the courtroom process. The overall goal "in
the courtroom," he says, is to "find out what happened in a
particular event."212 Scientists offer "opinions" toward that end,
judges and juries decide whether the scientists' opinions are
"credible," and courts "accept" the opinions when they are
"credible.''213 Yet, this description could raise more questions in
the audience member's mind than it answers.
For example, why does the legal system submit the analysis of
experts to non-experts for review and evaluation? This confuses
many scientists because to them it does not make much sense.
How could a person judge the accuracy of something he or she ctid
not understand? Scientists try to tind out what happened as much
as judges, yet they do not authorize someone who knows nothing
about science to approve or reject their conclusions. If scientific
inquiry is scientific inquiry, whoever does it, why does law use
such an unscientific method? Second, how does a court determine
when a scientist's opinion is credible? Is it whenever the opinion is
sincerely held? If so, why would a court care about sincerity?
What does sincerity have to do with accuracy? Or is it whenever
the opinion is worthy of being believed? If so, how does a court
tell when an opinion is worth believing without first determining if
2 14
it is correct, something AR claims only scientists can do.
Finally, what does it mean to say that a court accepts a scientist's
opinion as credible? Does the court conduct an independent
investigation by engaging in science itself so to speak, before
passing judgment on the opinion, or does it simply ratify the
211. See id. at p. 243, lines 05-09.
212. /d. at p. 243-44, lines 15-17.
211 ld. at p. 244, lines 17-18,21-25.
214. See id. at l.ines I R-21 .
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opinion, delegating the fact-findi ng task to the scientist in the
process?215 To the extent that there is a misunderstanding present,
it seems to be more AR' s than the questioner's.
AR then describes the task of credibility assessment in more
detaiL
Experts testify for and against particular scientific
conclusions, he says, based on j udgments they make about relevant
evidence, and such testimony is credible to the extent it is based on
reliable scientific methodology.216 AR is not explicit about what
makes a methodology scientifically rel iable, but he does offer some
indirect hints. For example, science must be based on real data. A
scientist cannot say "T had a dream . . . and that's the basis for my
opinion." 217 While no one would dispute this, the risk in this
illustration is that it em:ourages scientists to think that wurts treat
all scientific testimony as credible as long as it is based on some
sort of data and that the only thing a scientist cannot do in court is
make up evidence. This reinforces the widespread concern among
scientists that courts do not distinguish between good and bad
science, that all they do is distinguish between blatantly
incompetent backs and the rest of the pack. On this view, legal
decision-making about science is seen as a kind of a black box
process in which all but the most blatant etTors go unnoticed and
uncorrected.
AR also explains the process of assessing credibility in terms of
the burden of persuasion. While there are degrees of certainty, he
says, repeating BB's flat world example, a 51% chance of
something being true is enough for a court to conclude that

215. For an interesting exchange on this question, framed as whether fact
finders are to be educated by or defer to experts, see Ronald J. Allen & Joseph S.
Miller. The Comman Law The01y of Experts: Deference or Educarion, 87 Nw. U.
L. REv. 1131 , 1131 (1993): Edward 1. Imwin.kelried, The Educational
Significance of the Syllogistic Stmcture of Expert Testimony, 87 Nw. U. L. REv.
1148 (1993); Richard A. Epstein, Judici.al Control Over F:xpe11 Testimony: Of
Deference and Education, 87 Nw. U. L. REv. 1156 (1993); Paul R. Ri ce. Experr
Testimony: A Debate Between Logic or Tradition Rather Th.an Ber:ween. neference
or F'-liucation, 87 Nw. U. L. REV. 1166 (1993); Richard Lempert, Experts, Storie.~,
and lnfomwtion, 87 Nw. U. L. Rt:v. 1169 ( 1993); and Ronald L. Carlson, In
f)ejense of a Constitutional The01y of F:xperts, X7 Nw. U. L. REv. II X2 ( 1993).
216. See AR, Panel Discussion, p. 244, allincs 36-40, 46-49.
217. !d. allines 40-42.
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testimony is credible.218 Presumably, this is intended to describe
the minimally acceptable case under a preponderance of the
evidence standard, but if the questioner (and scientists in the
audience generally), does not already understand this standard,
which seems to be the case, AR's statement raises additional
concerns. For example, how does the legal system determine
whether the probability of something being true can be measured to
within one or two percentage points? Why is a fifty-one percent
chance of something being true strong enough? Does AR mean to
suggest that the evidence for the world being round is as
convincing as the evidence for trichlorethylene causing leukemia,
or that he might be able to convince a court of that conclusion, or
what's worse, would try? 219 If yes, is anything else he says
believable? If no, does he unwittingly demonstrate how lawyers
argue almost automatically for debatable, self-interested
propositions by equating them with basic truths? Finally, is AR
saying that he could get an expert to testify that there was not a
51% chance of the world being round?220 If so, is this insulting?
Does it reinforce the widely held stereotype that lawyers do not
respect scientists or scientific findings, because they believe
scientists will testify to anything as long as they are paid well
enough?
These are questions about how the legal system, through
lawyers, investigates scientific facts and a<;certains scientific truths.
Such questions ask for justification or explanati.on, not more
elaborate description, of how the legal system works.
Unfortunately, AR offers only the latter. In the end, he takes the
legal world view as a given, and conducts his part of the
conversation as if the questioner and everyone else in the audience
accepted the intellectual premises underlying that view. He needs
to explain why credibility is enough of a standard for accepting
scientific testimony as true and not merely describe how the
credibility of particular statements is established. The questioner is
a scientist, not a lawyer. She comes to the topic from a different

218. See id. at lines 25-40.
219. " ... both of those reach 51%." /d. at line 30.
220. See id. at Unes 29-32.

1999)

LAWYER AND SCIENTIST lNTER-DlSCIPLINARY DISCOURSE

249

perspective, accustomed to using different methodologies, pursuing
different intellectual goals, and holding herself to different
analytical standards. She does not begin committed to the legal
world view, and this is one of the strengths she brings to the
conversation. To tacitly demand that she carry on the conversation
as if she were a lawyer, accepting what lawyers accept, is to
destroy the very possibility of inter-disciplinary learning.
AR's last point is a kind of "everyone does it" justification for
not being concerned about the risk of error in legal fact-finding.
Non-scientist witnesses routinely make factual mistakes in
testifying, getting the color of the traffic lights wrong and making
other similar mistakes. 221 AR asserts that "[i]t happens all the
time.'m2 Cases are regularly decided on the basis of such errors
and nothing can be done about it. Error is "inherent in the nature of
the process .... We shouldn't be more upset because a scientist
may be wrong ... ,"223 and be adds, "[s]cientists ... have been
224
wrong a lot. "
To take the last point flrst, it is not clear how AR
knows that scientists have been wrong a lot. Determining whether
science is right or wrong, by AR's own admission, is not something
judges and juries can do. They simply decide whether testimony is
credible, whether it is arrived at through the use of reliable
scientific methods. 225 If only scientists can tell whether science is
right or wrong,226 and AR is not a scientist, one wonders how he is
able to come to this conclusion.
Conceding that scientists have been "wrong a lot," it is still not
clear how the existence of error in non-scientific testimony justifies
or excuses error by scientists. With eyewitness accounts, there is
often no way to tell whether testimony is accurate. The eyewitness
may have been the only one present, there may be no physical
evidence to corroborate or undercut the testimony, and there are no
reliable standards for deciding when an eyewitness is telling the

221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.

See id. at p. 245, lines 53-57.
!d. at lines 56-57.
!d. at lines 57-59.
!d. at lines 60-62.
See id. at p. 244, lines 20-23, 36-40.
See id. at lines 18-21.
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truth. 227 In science, most of these conditions can be reversed.
Science is rarely done in private; other investigators abound, data
on which scientific judgments are based is invariably public and
plentiful, and there are well established standards such as
publication, peer review, falsification, and replication for
conducting scientific inquiry . The legal system may have to
tolerate eyewitness error for reasons rooted in democratic and
constitutional theory. Citizens have a right to provide and receive
testimony by virtue of their status as citizens, wholly irrespective of
their skill at observation, powers of recall, or facility at testifying.
There is, however, no equivalent claim to be made for expert
scientific testimony. The latter is justified to the extent that it
contributes to the court's effort to understand what really happened.
When such testimony is inaccurate, it does not make such a
contribution. With scientific testimony, getting it right is the whole
ball game. AR's assurance that there is no need to worry because
non-scientists regularly make mistakes is not comforting.
When AR finished, BB made some additional comments, again,
before the speaker from the audience was given a chance to
respond .
BB:
(3 1) In exploring whether or not the scientist is wrong,
(32) whether it be in front of the court where you're seeking
(33) to withhold the evidence, or in front of the jury, one
(34) of the areas that you want to explore is whether or not
(35) the scientist went about reaching the conclusion in the
(36) way that scientists normaUy go about reaching
(37) conclusions, and I think AR essentially agrees with me
(38) about that. Which means that you are going to be
(39) calling upon non-scientists to assess scientific

227. See Olin G. Wellborn, Demeanor, 76 CORNELL L. REv. 1075 (199 1);
Jeremy A. Blumenthal, A Wipe of rhe Hands, A Lick of the Lip:;: The Validity uf
/)emeannr r:vidence in Assessing Witness Credibility, 72 Nco. L. REv. 1157
( 1993). The problem of eyewitness distortion is exaccrbatc<.l by law's use of an
adversarial method of witness examination. See JASANOFF, supru note 1, at 52-55
(stating that ''Critics . . . worry that lhe nonepistomological determinants of
credibility may carry the greatest weight with lay juries and judges.").
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(40) validity. There is no way of avoiding that issue. And,
(41) if you are a lawyer defending a case like this, and you
(42) think that something isn't scientifically valid, I don't
(43) think there is any way that you can competently tell the
(44) story to the jury of why it isn ' t valid unless you've
(45) figured it out for yourself. You can't just rely on
(46) telling the story through your own experts. You have to
(47) know how to cross-examine the plaintiffs' expert, in my
(4!5) case, or the defense expert if you're trying to keep
(49) defense testimony out. And 1 further think, especially
(50) in light of Daubert, 22H where we have an increased focus
(51) on whether or not science is really scientific,
(52) plai ntiffs' lawyers need to understand their cases
(53) better too. 229
Here BB makes the point that lawyers must understand the
science behind the scientific evidence they offer if they are to make
effective use of such evidence and cross-examine the other side ' s
230
attempts to rebut it.
This is one of BB 's favo rite points, as he
makes it several times during his panel presentation and his
response to questions. Unlike AR, however, he recognizes that
courts m ust evaluate the accw·acy of sc ientific evidence before
deciding how much weight to g ive it. 231 As he says, "There is no
way of avoiding that issue. " 232 He also seems to understand that
methodology does not exist disembodied from result, in science or
in any other field, and that it is not possible to separate form f rom
content in any non-reductionist way. Reduced to its essentials then,
BB's statement says, in effect , that one cannot possibly help
another understand something if one does not already understand it
oneself. Sometimes an unknowing remark inadvertently triggers a
new insight or produces a new level of understanding, but for the
most part only understanding begets understanding. While not

228. See Daubert, supra note 181.
229. BB, Panel Discussion at the 1997 Ward, Kershaw and Minton
Environmental Symposium (Apr. 11 , 1997) (transcript on file with author).
230. See id. at p. 251, lines 40-49.
231. See id. at pp. 250-51, lines 38-45.
232. ld. at line 40.

252

RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 25

controversial, this is an important point and one well worth making.
Lawyers, particularly trial lawyers, tend to be too confident of their
ability to criticize complicated bodies of substantive knowledge
after having studied them for only a brief period of time, 233 and
anything which tempers this propensity to believe in the possibility
of instant expertise is all for the good.
Yet, the most salient feature of BB' s comment is the extent to
which it has broken all contact with the speaker's original question
about uncertainty in law. The lawyers on the panel have spoken for
a little over nine minutes since the uncertainty question was first
asked, and yet not only have they not answered the question, they
have not even begun to answer it. Moreover, during all of this time
the speaker has not been given a chance to clarify her question, to
press for an answer, nor allowed to participate in the conversation
in any other way. The lawyers have used the nine minutes to
deliver a lecture to the speaker and the scientists in the audience
about the lack of certainty in science. Now, on the occasio n of
answering further, BB extends his comments to lawyers ac; well ,
making a point which, while important in the abstract, says nothing
at all about uncertainty , in either science or law . While no doubt
intended to be helpful, these responses had to be discouraging to
anyone listening and interested in the uncertainty topic.
Collectively, they teach the speaker and others who plan to ask
questions, that if the lawyers have no ready response, the
questioners must be prepared to wait through an extended set of
didactic comments not likely to be helpful, paying close attention
in the hope that something informative will be said, before having
the opportunity to speak again. The message in RS, BB , and AR 's
comments is that lawyers t1libuster (or think out loud, if one
prefers) when they do not know the answer to a question or do not
want to answer it, and that a questioner must be prepared to wait
233. This is a longstanding problem, as Howard Lesnick reminds me. See, e.g.,
the exchange in the Gnrgias in which Socrates notes that "orators.. (read, lawyers)
know nothing about the fields in which they seek to exert influence, often in
contention with true experts. See Plato, Gorgias 459(c), (W.D. Woodhead
translation), in PLATO: THE COLLECTED DIALOGUES 229, 242 (Edith Hamilton &
Huntington Cairns eds., J961). Gorgias responds: "But is nul this a gn:at comfort,
Socrates, to be able without learning any other arts but this one [i.e., on1tory) to
prove in no way inferior to specialists ... /d.
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through the filibuster. This is an exhausting way to converse of
course and faced with such a prospect, it is not surprising that many
give up on the effort, concluding that it is not worth the return.
RS then made some additional comments, again before the
speaker in the audience was given the chance to respond.
RS :
( 128) Let me just say one thing, ... cause I think one
(129) thing .. . people talked about the policy ... in the
(130) Woburn case that was certain individuals against Grace,
( 13 1) it's not to settle the policy answer of whether TCE
( 132) caused cancer, or whether their wells were contaminated.
(133) It's to resolve a dispute between human beings and
(134) other, whether they ' re corporations or other people, and
(135) I think. you know ... for those of you that are
( 136) lawyers, remember the first day of law school how they
(1 37) say to you, "Are you a citizen of Maryland?" And the
(138) answer you were taught was, "Well, it depends on for
(139) what purposes. I might be for estate tax purposes, but
(140) not for voting purposes. I might be for a driver's
(141) license but not for certain other purposes. And so when
( 142) you look at ... people seem to be all excited about
(143) the use of science, but they forget, as lawyers realize,
(144) that say, in the simplest example, in the OJ. Simpson
( 145) case, the question in the <.:riminal case was not whether
( 146) or not he murdered her. It's whether the state, in that
( 147) case, proved beyond a reasonable doubt that he did. And
( 148) similarly, in the civil case, a dispute between two
( 149) people, whether another group proved by another
(150) standard, more likely than not, that they did . Neither
( 151) one is an attempt to ultimately resolve a factu al
(152) question. They' re attempts to resolve different kinds
( 153) of disputes, and that's something that we have to
(154) resolve as lawyers. And it's ... you know, that
( 155) scientists want to get all excited. This is the answer
( 156) to the scientific question. It isn't. It resolves the
( 157) question, and the facts have to be before it. And aU
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(158) the facts determine how you resolve that dispute. 234
Read literally, this is a pretty confusing statement, fuU of stops
and starts, asides, detours, syntax errors, ungrammatical phrasings,
and the like. RS seems to begin three sentences for every one he
finishes , and to develop one idea fur every tive he has. It may be
that hi s mind simply outraces his ability to speak, so that he starts a
new point without realizing that he has not yet finished the
previous one. The effect on the listener, however, is one of
conceptual overload, of being barraged with too many distinct
points. It is a little like listening to the Liszt B-minor sonata for the
fmt time (but only a little like it) and experiencing the sensation of
having hundreds and hundreds of notes rain down on only Lwo little
ears.
We do not need to understand RS's statement in conversational
real time, however we have it on paper and can slow down the pace
to analyze what he says. On its face, much of the statement seem
unrelated to the subject of uncertainty in law, what with its
references to citizensh ip, taxation, voting, driving, OJ. Simpson,
and the differences between criminal and civil cases.235 If we
rephrase the statement to make it responsive to the uri1:,rinal
question, though, it can be seen as a variation of AR' s earlier "nut
to worry" response? 36 It says, in effect, that there is no need to be
concerned about courts getting sdentific analysis wrong because
courts do not resolve issues of cience.237 Courts simply settle
disputes between litigants238 according to rules of procedure and
rules of evidence which decide who wins even when it is not
possible to determine what happened factually in the underlying
lransaclion? 39
The difficulty with this paraphrase, however is that, like AR's
234. RS, Panel Discussion at the 1997 Ward, Kershaw and Minton
Environmental Symposium (Apr. ll. t997) (transcript on tile with author).
235. See id. at p. 253. lines 139-40.
236. AR. Panel Discussion, supra pp. 244-45, at lines 48-59.
237. " fTihe Woburn cw;c .. . was . . . not to settle the policy Lqucstion] of
whether TCE caused cancc:r ...." RS. Panel Discussion, supra p. 253, at lines
129-32.
238. ··[t· ~ to resolve a dispute between human beings ...." /d. at lines 132-33.
239. "It's whether the state . . . proved beyond a reasonable doubt . . . ... /d. at
lines 146 50.
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response, it ducks the original question. That question asked, in
pan, something like "What does a court do when faced with an
unresolved issue of scientific fact, such ao; whether TCE causes
leukemia, on which the imposition or non-imposition of legal
liability depends?" Does it ignore the issue altogether and base its
decision on purely legal rules such as burden of proof, and
presumptions, does it try to understand the issue and revert to legal
rules only if confused or uncertain, does it resolve the issue by
choosing one expert's opinion over another, or what? And most
importantly, why does it follow the course it does? For example, if
a minimal, scientifically credible evidentiary case for causation is a
precondition to liability, must not a court have some method for
determining whether such a case has been made? While it need not
resolve the causation issue for any purpose outside of the litigation
before it, can a court be indifferent to or agnostic about that issue
for purposes of imposing liability?
Seemingly, the audience questioner understands that courts
resolve only legal disputes as opposed to scientific ones, but is
curious about what is done when an issue of scientific fact is so
intertwined with the issue of liability that resolving the scientific
issue cannot be avoided. RS does not answer this question directly,
though he certainly talks around it at considerable length. Like
AR, he assumes the legal world view as a kind of brute fact, and
then points out that within that world the concerns expressed by the
questioner do not arise. Unlike AR's, his is a longer, more garbled,
more emphatic statement of the "court's don't do science."
However, the audience member's question, in a sense, is "How can
they not do science and still do their job when science issues are
involved?" Like one giving directions to a non-native speaker who
does not understand the directions the first time, RS says it again,
louder.
In some settings RS's behavior would be unambiguously
strategic. For example, in the give and take of settlement
negotiation, lawyers often try to overwhelm an adversary with
argument, articulating too many points to be identified, understood,
evaluated or rebutted individually, because they come too rapidly
and too furiously. The strategy is designed to silence a listener and
to have her throw up her hands in exasperation, not persuaded of
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the correctness of the lawyer's arguments, but persuaded that she
will not be able to convince the lawyer within the time frame of the
conversation.240 Think of this as a suffocation strategy, designed to
squeeze the life out of an argument by burying it under an
avalanche of words. This is one of the most common lawyer
241
argumentation strate&ries I have observed over the years, though
when I describe it in these terms most lawyers deny that they use it.
No doubt RS did not set out consciously to suffocate the audience
member's query, but whether he did so out of habit is more
difficult to determine. It may even be that he and AR cooperated in
the venture. I do not mean by this that RS and AR expl icitly
agreed to keep talking until the questioner gave up, but just that,
out of shared habit, they may have tacitly coordinated their efforts
in this way. 242 This seems the best explanation for the needless
piling on of layers of unresponsive, critical comments, delivered in
a highly excited and rapidly paced style, without providing any
opportunity for the questioner to respond to, or discuss the point.
While RS 's statement is the fmal panelist comment for the
moment, it is not the last word on the subject. Another scientist in
the audience, the one who tried to ask a question at the beginning
of AR's response earlier243 and whom I will refer to as MZ, rose
again Lo speak. His state ment follows.

240. While a risky straregy under some circumstllnces. talking a point to death
can be effective, even with bargainers who recognize that it is being used. Such
bargajners often are faced with a version of the "reasonable" bargainer's dilemma.
This occurs when the following conditions are met: 1) settlement is best for both
sides, so the case should settled; 2) the speaker believes the listener is convinced
by the arguments because he or she says nothing to rebut them; 3) the listener is
not convinced, but cannot prove this through more passive strategies, such as
refusing to change position, because there is not enough time in the negotiation for
such strategies to work. Paced with tlus situation, a reasonable person will helieve
that he or she bears a disproportionate responsibility for bringing settlement about,
and does this by making or 11ccepting a more generous than usual offer.
24 1. See, e.g., Condlin. Cases on Both Sides, supra note 78, at 96-125;
Condlin, supra note 75. at 368-416.
242. The classic discussion of tacit coordination is THOMAS SCHELLING,
STRATEGY OF CONFLICT 54 ( 1960).
243. See AR, Panel Discussion, at p. 243-44. lines 11-15.
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MZ:
(01) My father told me that if I wanted to have a happy life
(02) to stay away from physicians and lawyers. I think with
(03) regard to the panel, I agree with many of the things
(04) that were said, espedally the truisms. I also find
(05) some of the remarks a lot of rubbish. Just like there
(06) are all kinds of lawyers, there are all kinds of
(07) scientists. Different lawyers have different
(08) qualifications, scientists have different
(09) qualifications. With regard to uncertainty, it's very
(10) hard for people to deal with uncertainty, but one thing
(11) that's a development in science in the twentieth
(12) century, we' ve attempted to learn how to measme
(1 3) uncertainty, and it's how one measures uncertainty which
( 14) is very much in dispute. Given that people agree on
(15) what uncertainty is, or the level of uncertainty, then I
(1 6) think it's up to the jury or the judge to decide whether
(17) that level is high enough to come to decisions. But l
(1 8) do think that saying scientists do this and scientists
( 19) do that really ignores how complicated issues are. But
(20) one thing is fairly clear, Tthink we have made lots of
(21) attempts, and it's true in this Woburn case as well as
(22) other kinds of similar litigation, to go about how to
(23) measure uncertainty. 244
lt is hard to tell which of MZ's several points is the principal
reason he decides to speak up. He speaks slowly, in an even pitch
and in a calm, measured, and perhaps carefully controlled Lone, not
giving much of a non-verbal indication of how he feels about any
of his comments. Yet his words suggest that he is piqued by, if nol
angry at, the lawyers' descriptions of science. He categorizes
"many of the things . . . [the lawyers] said" as "truisms," or
"rubbish ," 245 but he does not say which statements he objects to in
particular, or give reasons for his objections. In doing this, he may
244. MZ, Panel Discussion at The 1997 Ward, Kershaw & Minton
Environmental Symposium (Apr. 11, 1997) (transcript on file with author).
245. ld. a t p. 257, li nes 03-05.
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simply be trying to strike a balance between registering his protest
on the one hand, which he feels compelled to do, and not getting
bogged down in defending it on the other, which he thinks (with
good reason, after seeing the panelists' responses to the uncertainty
question), might waste valuable question and answer Lime.
246
Looked at less flatteringly, as subsequent events may warrant,
however, MZ may have wanted to criticize the lawyers'
understanding of science without taking responsibility for

240. In his later panel presentation MZ often expressed points in a manner
worthy of lawyers. Consider, for example, his following statement, about the
general competence of courts to understand and use s<.:ienlific evidence accurately.
in which be is conclusory, a little <.:ondes<.:ending, and somewhat contentious. See
infra at lines 21-33. The statement does not invite discussion, or make it seem as
if the issue is an open one in MZ' s mind. Tlris was perhaps the most complicated
and controversial of all of the subjects raised during the conference, and one of the
most important. Yet the way MZ raises it, as more of a set of conclusions to be
defeated than a series of questions to be examined, all but guarantees that the
ensuing discussion would produce more heat than light, and it did.
MZ: There are lots of hired guns out there who make a living being
hired by industry to challenge all kinds of claims based on scientific
evidence. If you have the money you can have access to people. And
4uite frankly, much of these studies are not perfect studies. They're
flawed. Like DO [ar10ther scientist on the third panel] said, sometimes it
comes down to judgment, and if you have the funds you can get people,
in a very matter of fact way, able to destroy studies just because they're
being adversaria.l. In fact, I think that if I was adversarial I could take
either side of any study and make it look so bad in front of a jury that it
would be discredited. It may not be right, but I drink I could do it just
because of d1e expertise I might bring in what goes wrong with studies.
Now, I tlrink if the Woburn study had come to court. and I understand
they had gathered other evidence, I don't believe the court and the jury
would have been able to assess, really, what went on. And that hrings
me to concluding remarks. I think it's a very serious matter that the
courts are unable to assess very complex scientitic evidence. And I
think it's important that the courts have access to experts who are
objective, who can assess what the pros and cons are of any complicated
study, and so advise the judge and jury. r think without this we·re going
to just proceed in this very adversarial situation where people might
want truth or might want justice but l don' t think it"s going to come
about because of the complex nature of many of these studies, which cut
across many disciplines. And I was somewhat amused this morning, in
the second panel about the discussion of uncertainty by the lawyers.
And I think that it might be a very good idea in the law curriculum to
devote some time to discussing uncertainty. There are many kinds of
uncertainty that one is likely ro deal with.
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explaining and defending the substance of his criticisms, thus,
dismissing the lawyers' views summarily rather than actually
contesting them. If the latter is true, his strategy is worthy, one
might even add characteristic, of his vision of a lawyer. He may be
a kindred spirit to the lawyers on the panel without even realizing
it. When one adds the "father's advice" remark to the calculus,247
lawyer bashing made bipartisan by being extended to doctors, this
second interpretation becomes even more plausible. Kindred spirit
or not, however, such a statement does not bode well for the
possibility of extended and mutually informative dialogue between
MZ and the lawyers on the panel about the issue of uncertainty in
law.
MZ' s second point, equally provocative but less developed than
his first, has to do with evaluating the quality of scientific work.
He may suggest, however obliquely, that courts should distinguish
between good and bad science by looking at the qualifications of
the scientists doing the work. 248 The work of qualified scientists
should be taken as reputable, and the work of those not so qualitied
should be examined more skeptically.249 It would be nice to have
MZ elaborate o n this concept of qualifications. Does it refer to
educational background (universities allended, degrees earned,
professors studied with, and the like), the location and prestige of
present employment, academic or otherwise, the number and
substance of scholarly publications, reputation in the field, grants
awarded, prizes earned, projects or studies conducted, membership
in learned societies, something else, or all of the above? H owever
defined, it is likely to be a controversial standard because it shifts
the focus in evaluating scientific testimony from the direct
evidence of the scientific work itself, to the circumstantial evidence
of the reputation of the scientist doing the work. lts appeal depends

247. See MZ, Panel Dis<.:ussion. supra at p. 257.
248. See id.
250. The drawing of lines hetween good and bad work (and between good and
bad workers), for claims whose factual status is still "in the making," is described
by sociologists of science as "boundary work." JASANOFF, supra note l , at 52-51.
It is carried out by recourse to a number of social facr.ors that go into the
production of scientific knowledge, and deri ves its authority from a certitication
process resulting from a multitude of informal, often invisi ble, negotiations among
members of relevant disciplines. See id. at 52-53.
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upon the accuracy of one or the other of two highly debatable
premises. Either that there is a one-for-one relationship between
reputation and quality, or that reputation is an easier issue to
investigate than quality, and is likely to be a good enough proxy for
quality most of the time. Suggesting that a scientist's qualifications
should be dispositive is not a self-interested move on MZ's part.
His work would be reputable under either standard. Yet if he is
serious about defending this standard, he owes it to his audience to
give reasons. He should not, as AR did earlier, try to sneak in an
argument without supporting it explicitly. Again, he may be more
of a lawyer than he suspects.
ln his final point, MZ returns to the topic of uncertainty in law,
indicating perhaps that at least the scientists in the audience have
not lost sight of what started this exchange, and what is foremost in
their minds. He begins by defining the issue more precisely. It is
how one measures uncertainty, not whether it exists, that is
controversial. Twentieth century science has made progress on the
measurement problem, but because the process is "complicated,"
its fi nal shape is still "very much in dispute."250 While making it
clear that he thinks the lawyers ' comments do not describe the
problem accurately,251 he does not say how they fall short, or give
examples of the complications involved in measuring uncertainty
with stories from his own work. As a conseq uence, his manner of
speaking again is hard to distinguish from that of the lawyers he
criticizes, relying as it does on ex cathedra pronouncement rather
than reasoned explanation. MZ has examples he might use from
studies conducted for the Woburn litigation, as the next panel
presentation made clear, and while he may refer obliquely to those
studies in passing at the end of this statement, this reference is not
detailed enough to be recognizable to anyone not already familiar
with his work. 252 If he wants to save the Woburn examples for his
panel presentation, he could at least mention them at this time, and
ask his listeners to wait for the details.253 Yet, he does not do this
250. Supra note 247.
251. See id.
252. See id.
253. See supra note 246. The panel did not disappoint. MZ described at least
one new method for mcusuring the relationship between TCE and leukemia.
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either, contenting himself instead with a one-line dismissal of the
lawyers' one-line argument. If this is an effort to out-lawyer the
lawyers, he is as successful as they are in trying to out-science him.
In the end, it is never clear why MZ spoke up. Perhaps he was
254
upset at RS' s panel remarks about uncertainty in science,
believing them to be too vulgar, simplistic, and misleading to let
pass without criticism. Yet, if so, he was not willing to develop his
own views in enough detail so that they could be subjected to the
same critical review, at least not yet, and given the manner of his
255
In order to
subsequent panel presentation, perhaps not ever.
walk a line between the not fully compatible goals of criticizing
RS 's comments, but not discussing these criticisms, MZ may have
decided to express his objections in as cryptic a fashion as possible,
so as to give those who would disagree with him very little to grab
on to. Thus presented, however, and whether intended or not, his
comments became just another shot across the bow in what turned
into not much more than an extended inter-disciplinary stand-off.
His remarks have one additional, perhaps not surprising, effect.
They breathe new life into RS, as the latter almost jumps for the
microphone at the dose of MZ' s remarks to make the folJowing
additional statement.
RS:
( 159) Well, let me just comment on that, 'cause I think
(160) Rothman 's article256 on epidemiology has, which is
251
(161) quoted in the Supreme Court case in Daubert, makes

developed in the Wnhurn case, in considerable detail, although he did nol claim
that it could be extended to uncertainty measurement problems generally. For a
write-up of the study in which the method was used, sec Lagakos. supra note 118.
254. See RS. Pam:) Discussion, supra pp. 232-33, for RS's initial remarks
aboul uncertainty in science.
255. See supra note 246.
256. This is probably a reference to the amicus brief of Professor Kenneth
Rothman, submitted on behalf of teachers and scholars of epidemiology. in the
Daubert case. See Brief of Professor Kenneth Rothman. et a!., as Amici Curiae in
support of the Petitioners, in Daubert, supra note 181. Professor Rothman's Brief
is not an "article" as RS says, ami il is not referred to in the Supreme Court's
opinion as he also says (the Court does refer to three other amicus briefs, out of
the 22 submitted), but there is no question that Rothman is a " leading
epidemiologist," see KENNETH J. R OTHMAN, MODERN EPIDEMIOLOGY (1986), and
almost certainly is the person RS has in mind.
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(162) a good point. And Rothman says, and you know,
(163) people have said he's one of the leading
(164) epidemiologists, Rothman says, that yes, we can
(165) measure uncertainty and have confidence intervals, and
(166) all sorts of techniques to measure uncenainty in
(167) general, but when it comes to an individual case did A
(168) cause B?, the answer has got to be either one way or
(169) the other. And that is a troubling though t, because in
(170) many contexts you have to come to that answer, the
(171) legal context is others. And it's one thing to measure
(172) it in general, but in an individual case that has to
(173) have an answer, the general measurement may not fit the
(174) individual case. For instance, in law we're taught
(175) early on in evidence that a statistical proof that,
(176) well only one of the fifteen trucks was red , does not
(177) get the defendant a summary j udgment against the fact
(178) that somebody saw the red tmck. That's the diffe rence
(179) between statistical evidence and how you resolve an
(180) individual case. There's a paradigm there that's sort
(181) of ineluctable. [At this point MZ spoke up from the
(182) audience, but since he d id not have a microphone, what
(l83) he said is not audible on the tape.l The law doesn' t
(184) accept, does it, the fact that it's a one in ten chance
(185) that that's the car that hit me, that therefore the
(120) plaintiff always loses. The law just doesn't operate
(187) that way. Maybe a one in ten chance if lmn naked
(188) across the street right now that nothing will happen to
(189) me. But that doesn't prove that nothi ng will, or that
(190) if something does, the person isn't responsible. So a
( 191) statistical estimate, no matter how precise and how
(192) technical, doesn't answer the question that you need
( 193) answered. That's the problem. It doesn't answer the
(194) legal qucsLion.258

257. See Daubert, supra note 181.
258. RS, Panel Discussion at the

1997 Ward, Kershaw &

Minton
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RS again seems a Httle jumbled, both in what he says and in how
he says it, probably another instance of his abili ty to think
overtaking his ability to speak. Once again, he comes tantalizi ngly
close to explaining the legal system's different pcrspecUve on
uncertainty.
For example, he acknowledges thar there are
differences between scientific and legal proof, but then, j ust when
one expects a discussion of why law follows a different path, he
retreat<; to the safe haven of simply describing the content of legal
rules. 259 In the process, he closes down what turns out to be the
conference's last opportunities to discuss the uncertainty topic .
Perhaps this was inevitable. It was late in the session, the audience
seemeu restless and may have been ready for lunch, or perhaps
everyone bad just lost hope that anything new would be said. Even
the best explanation of why law acts as it does might not have
registered at this point. Moreover, RS spoke excitedly, in a rapidfire fashion, and with a great deal of force, and these are qualities
which make scientists suspicious because they remind them of the
"what you argue-how you argue" concern, which they mistake nly
1
think is peculiar to law. " 211C All of this is unfortunate because RS
had a number of potentially interesting things to say.
RS's main point has to do with the difficulties of using
epidemiological evidence about causation as lega l proof. The
problem is that epidemiological evidence is statistical and
probabilistic, whereas law prefers261 evidence that is persona] and
Environmental Symposium (Apr. 11. 1997) (transcript on file wilh author).
259. See id. at p. 2n2, lines 162-94.
260. See l(enerally RS, Panel Di~cu~siun. l·upru pp. 261 -62.
261. Thls is just a preference. Statistical evidence can he admined and relied
ou in many circumstances in law. usually to buttress a testimonial ca.~e. It just
cannot be used to prove a case all by itself, and this sometimes makes the
difference between winning and losing. For articles discussing the usc of
statistical evidence in toxic tort cases, see Ora Fred Harris, '/'oxic Ton Litif.(ation
and the Causation Element: Is TherP. Any Hope nf Reconciliation '!, 40 Sw. L.J.
909 (1989); David Rosenberg, The Causal Connection in Mass £rposure Cases: A
Public Law Vision of the Tort System, 97 H ARV. L. REV. 849 (1984); Glt:n 0.
Robinson, Multiple Causation in Tort /,aw: Reflections 0111he DES Cases. 68 VA.
L. REv. 713 ( 1982); Daniel A. Parber, Toxic Causation, 71 Mll\N. L. REV. 1219
( 1987): Troyen A Brennan, Ill'/ping Courts with Toxic Tom: Some Proposul~
Regarding Alternative Merlznd.~ for Presenting and Assessinl( Scientific: Evidence
in Common Law Courts, 51 U. P llT. L. REv. I (1989): Bcrl Black, A Unified
TheOI)' of Scientific Evidence, 5n tit HWHAM L. REV. 595 ( 1988); E. Donulu Elliott,
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"objective."
Epidemiological evidence is about causation in the
aggregate or general causation; it shows the effects of phenomena
and events on large populations generally. For example, in the
Woburn case, it helps answer the question of whether TCE from
the Grace wells increased the incidence of leukemia in the town of
Woburn. Legal proof, on the other hand, must establish causation
in the individual case by showing the effects of phenomena and
events on particular persons or specific causation. For example, in
the Woburn case, it must answer the question of whether TCE from
the Grace wells caused Brian Anderson (a named plaintiff) to
develop leukemia. Because aggregate patterns admit of individual
exceptions, as RS points out, epidemiological evidence cannot say
anything definitive about specific cases, at least not all by itself.
Thus, because it cannot tell us about specific cases, it cannot, by
itself, sustain a claim in a court of law. Law does not accept the
completely statistical case.263 Whether it should is just one of the

The Future of Toxic Torts: Of Chemophobia. Risk as Compensable Injury and
Hybrid Compensation Systems, 25 Hous. L. REV. 781 ( 1988); Allan Kanner,
Fut11re Trends in Toxic Tort Litigation, 20 RUTGERS L.J. 669 (1989); Note,
Causation in Toxic Torts: Burdens of Proof, Stmulards of Persuasion and
Statistical Evidence, 96 YALE L.J. 376 (1986); Note, Tort Actions for Cancer and
Deterrence, Compensation and Environmental Carcinogenesis, 90 YALE L.J. 840
(198 1). The classic work is the Boston University Symposium of the m.id-l980s.
Set!! Symposium: Probability and Inference in the lAw of Evidence, B.U. L. R HV.
3K I ( 19R6).

262. This is a loaded tenn of course, with aU sorts of meanings, none of which,
arguably, is uislinguishable from the iuea of probabilistic truth. But law tn:ats
some kinds of testimony as objectively true even though such testimony always
bas a pt:rcentage chance of being wrong. I use the tenn here to describe that kino
of testimony. The concept of objective truth is sometimes as difficult for science
to work with as law. See FERRIS, supra note II, at 254 (stating that "the waveparticle duality . .. threatens to make hash of the belief that there is an objective
reality out there."); NEV..'TON, supra note 13, at 166-99 (discussing the "waveparticle duality"). For Niels Bohr, experience is objectively accounted for when
"it can be unambiguously communicated in the common human language." Niels
Bohr, The Unity of Human Knowledge, in ATOMIC PHYSICS AND HUMAN
KNOWLEDGE 9-10 (1963): see also NEWTON, supra note 13, at 215-21 (stating that
"[s]cience is objective to the extent it avoids bias or external agendas, either
hecause individual scientists are free of them or because the public character of
science produces a balance with that effect.").
263. The emphasis here should be on the word completely. Certainly, the
plaintiffs in the Woburn case planned to include epidemiological evidence in the
ovcr.ill package of evidence they hoped to introduce to prove that Grace chemicals
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many unexamined issues lurking in the shadows of this
conversation that never was.
RS makes it clear then, that legal and scientific proof are
different, but this is not news to most of the people in the room.
Just the opposite, it is the usual starting point for conversations
between scientists and lawyers about the difficulties of meshing
science with law. Moving beyond this fact, scientists want to know
why law docs not accept statistical proof, proof about behavior in
the aggregate, or testimony put expressly in probabilistic terms.
Other fields of study rely on such evidence every day, often to
support decisions affecting interests equal to or greater than those
involved in legal decisions? 64 So, it is curious that law does not
use such evidence. The audience member's question about
uncertainty should have been understood in this light. Scientists
want to know why law requires the kinds of evidence iL does, not
just further descriptions of what kinds of evidence it requires. As
AR before him, however, RS takes the legal world view as a given,
and provides only additional information about how the legal game
is played.
RS (and each of the other panelists as well) might say that his
thoughts on uncertainty are complicated, and that the conference
format does not allow him to describe those thoughts in all of their
detail. Yet, this is the third long statement he has made on the
subject, occupying nearly one hundred and twenty-eight lines of
text (roughly the equivalent of a twelve hundred word essay), and
the fourth statement, if one includes his prepared remarks from the
panel presentation (another sixty-five lines of text, and now the
equivalent of a two thousand word essay). While this is not enough
time to give a crash course in the law of evidence, it is enough to
begin to explain why probative evidence is sometimes excluded
caused Brian Anderson·s leukemia. But they did not expect that such evidence, by
itSelf, would he enough to sustain their burden of proof. For articles discussing the
use of statistical evidence in proving toxic torts cases, see supra note 261.
264. For example, scientists !lfe particul!lfly myslified by law's longstanding
reliance on eyewilness testimony. They think that giving eyewitness reports more
credence than statistical probabilities is a serious error, almost impossible to
explain. and yet law continues to privilege eyewitness accounts even in the face of
such knowledge. For discussions of difficulties with eyewitness testimony. see
Wellborn. supra note 227; Blumenthal, supra note 227.

266

RUTGERS COMPUTER

& TECHNOLOGY

LAW JOURNAL

LVoL 25

from trials, how imperfect information is usually all that courts can
get, why legal decisions cannot wait until everything is known, and
how the appellate process acts as a check on certain types of errors.
He has had time, in other words, to describe the central elements of
a full view, the opportunity to tlesh out some parts of that view,
and the chance to tell the audience where to look for more details.
Had he used his time wisely, he could have gotten a quite
complicated story on the table.
fn stead, he has limited his comments, phrased in different ways,
to a simple descriptive point: in effect, that the law of evidence
does not accept statistical proof as legally sufficient by itself. He
makes a lot of other points as well, of course, but this is the one
substantive idea that remains a constant element in all of his
remarks, sometimes more overtly so than at others, and is in pan
responsive to the audience member's question. As he puts it here,
"The law just doesn't operate that way." 265 Statistical evidence
"doesn't answer the legal question."266 This, for RS, is the end of
the story. He does not seem to see the legal rule as just one
approach to fact investigation, and the conference as an opportunity
to reconsider and debate the relative effectiveness of that approach.
There are reasons one could give to explain law's refusal to rely
solely on statistical proof, some historical, some political, 267 and
some having to do with the way in which the American culture
privileges personal rights, requiring that individuals be treated as
distinct persons, not statistical entities, constructs, or types. It
would take a long time to work through a discussion of these
reasons, of course, well beyond what the conference's question and
answer session could provide. So RS ' s fau lt is not that he fails to
articulate a jurisprudence of evidentiary individualism fu11y, so to
speak, but that he does not hear the question about uncertainty in
law as raising jurisprudential issues in the first place, and that he
does not make a non-question begging julisprudential response.
Equally troubling is the fact that RS does not seem interested in
the question of why the legal rules on fact investigation are as they

265. RS, Panel Discussion, supra p. 262. allines 186-87.
266. /d. at lines 193-94.
267. In the sense of being acceptahle to an electorate.
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are. It is hard to find in any of his statements, or those of the other
lawyers as well, any sense of curiosity about why law investigates
facts differently from other disciplines, or any indication that he is
intrigued by the different approaches other disciplines use. Legal
training and legal practice seem to have induced in RS a kind of
unself-critical acceptance of legal methods, and this prevents him
from meeting persons from other disciplinary worlds half way.
Absent an awareness of the different ways of investigating facts , a
curiosity about other methods, an understanding of the barriers to
interdisciplinary communication, and the wish to understand
experiences from as many perspectives as possible, there is little
possibility of true interdisciplinary learning. RS 's comments, more
didactic that inquisitive, more certain than contingent, more
stentorian than conversational, seem destined instead to produce a
kind of interdisciplinary stalemate.
BB then adds what would turn out to be the last comments in the
uncertainty exchange, responding perhaps more to RS than to the
original questioner.
BB:
(54) I would agree that statistics alone is not going to
(55) answer a question. I think you can take something like
(56) cigarettes and lung cancer and, what is it, ninety
(57) percent of cases of lung cancer among cigarette smokers
(58) are caused by cigarettes? I mean it's an awful high
(59) percentage. You get that kind of information, thai
(60) creates a strong inference that the individual case was
(61) caused by the cigarette smoking. On the other hand, if
(62) it's one in ten, the inference is not as strong, and
(63) even with that strung inference you have to have other
(64) information to establish individual causation.268
This statement adds little if anything new to the discussion. BB
supplements RS 's point about the generic insufficiency of
statistical evidence by giving an example of how even a strong
statistical case " is not going to answer I the legal] question. " 269 Yet
268. BB, Panel Discussion at the 1997 Ward, Kershaw and Minton
En vironmental Symposium (Aprilll, 1997) (transcript on file with author).
269. ld. at lines 54-55.
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the example only illustrates RS 's point, it does not explain it. Jt
does not say why an overwhelming statistical case (e.g., that there
is a "ninety percent" chance that X causes Y), is not good enough
for a court. It simply says that it is not. While be may seem to
suggest that statistical evidence is probative in proportion to the
percentage chance of something being true, for example, that a
ninety percent chance is convincing but a ten percent chance is not,
he also points out that even the ninety percent chance requires
270
"other information to establish individual causation."
BB is
trapped in the same descriptive mindset as RS, able to say what
legal rules require, but unable to say why. While his intentions are
no doubt laudable-he probably wants to make RS ' s point
clearer- he does not do anything with the truly hard questions on
the table. After BB finished, and without entertaining any more
questions or comments from the audience (there were a few hands
up), the moderator of the panel ended the session and broke for
lunch.
1 V. WHAT DOES THIS ALL MEAN AND WHAT CAN B E D ONE

ABOUT IT

It is time to determine what, if anything, this extended discussion
of the role of uncertainty in science and law can tell us about the
nature of lawyer-scientist communication in general, and what
implications, if any, it has for the ways in which professionals are
educated. Most of the lessons will be for lawyers, because they
dominate the discussion, though this is a function more of the
excerpts selected for analysis than the nature of conversations at the
conference generally. 271 The first task is to determine whether the

270. !d. at p. 267. lines 63-64.
271. See supra note 247, for an example of scientist remarks from the
conference evidencing many of the same communication patterns as those in the
remarks of the lawyers. For another example, consider the following excerpt
taken from the prepared remarks of an epidemiologist (whom I will refer to as
DO), on the scientist~· panel. In this excerpt DO describes his understanding of
the similarities and differences between scientific and legal concept of causation.
DO's overall presentation was measured, carefully expressed, tightly organized,
not generally contentious, and much less spontaneous or free-fonn than any of the
lawyer presentations. It had the appearance of a carefully structured lecture rather
than extemporaneous remarks. The following excerpt starts about ten minutes into
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DO's presentation, lasts for about four minutes, and is only a part of DO's overall
discussion of causation. It is all that he said, however, on the subject of the
similarities between legal and scientific definitions of causation.
DO: A number of speakers said this morning, including one of our
panelists, something that I agree with very much, which is that the
supposed distinction between legal causation and medical causation
[sic]. It's there, right. People talk aboul the lwo kinds of causation in
different ways, but it's somewhat bogus because what we' re trying to do
in both instances is, in facl, if I can use that, to find out what really
happened. What in fact happened, or is really going on. Now, scientists
use a different word for that, but that's what they ' re trying to do.
They're trying to figure out how does the world work, and what really
happened when somebody ingested this particular chemical, or inhaled
it, or got it on their skin. What, in some metaphysical sense, is going on
underneath that. And that's really what the finders of fact want to know
in a court situation as well. What did really happen? We express it
differently. but it's the same thing. And what sources of information
does a scientist have in order to fonn an opinion about what, in fact.
happened. [DO then continued on to list the kinds of evidence a
scientist would take into account in determining causation.]
DO is wrong to some extent about law. Legal causation is partly an inquiry into
what really happened, but only partly. In law, all inquiry into factual truth must be
carried out consistently with protecting other values, such as efficiency, privacy,
the need to make sure that all sides do their own work, and the like, even if it
means that it is not possible to find out "what really happened." POSNER, supra
note 69, at 205-207. Unlike scientists, judges doubt their ability to discover what
really happened given the short period of time within which they have to work,
and their need to rely on data from parties who tell self-interested stories. DO
presumes that law and science have the same interest here, but that is probably
based on the belief that they should, and that in tum on the belief that discovering
truth is the overriding goal of all work. In many ways this is an unarticulated
version of the scientific method as primum inter pares point all over again. It is
ironic that DO would say this. He began his remarks by pointing out that his
strength as a expert witness (he had testified in court many times), came from the
fact that he knew he was not a lawyer, and therefore he never presumed lo give
lawyers advice about how to present a case. See DO, supra. Yet, here be gives
the legal system advice about how to think about the nature of causation, based on
a controversial and unargued view that law and science are after the same thing
(and that it is science's thing). See DO, supra. I do not suggest that DO is
arrogant in doing this, nothing in his manner suggested that, but just that it is very
difficult, more difficult than most realize. truly to take on the perspective of
another discipline, as opposed to pretend to take it on, or come close to taking it
on.
The title to the present article comes from DO's felicitous description of
scientific inquiry as a process of trying to determine "what in fact happened, or is
really going on." /d.; see alsn the description of doing science by the California
physicist Andrew Strominger, quoted in fERRIS, supra note 11 , at 227 (quoting
Strominger as saying "The important thing in my life isn't any particular belief-
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patterns in the panelists' comments em body a distint:tive Jiscourse
style, or instead reflect j ust idiosyncratic and ad hoc reat:tiuns to
particular situations. At first glance, either conclusion seems
plausible. For example, RS is direct and explicit when he disagrees
with a point, often dismissing it straight out, while AR expresses
disagreement in a more roundabout and euphemistic manner? 72
Are these two form s of a sing le judgmental response, one overtly
evaluative and the other Laeitly so , or are they two different types of
responses altogether , one indifferent to the effects of disagreement
on listener feeling, and the other concerned about expressing
disagreement in an easy-to-hear and supportive manner? This type
of question could be asked many Limes over for most of the
comments in the above excerpts. While there inevitably will be
room for argument, therefore, in my view the differences among
the comments have more to do with appearance than ubstance. Tn
most essential respects, I believe, the lawyers speak in a single
style, characterized by a limited number of recurring features, must
of which are well known to anyone familiar with the standaru
criticisms made of lawyer discourse. A description of the most
prominent of those feature s fo llows.
The most pervasive characteristic, and one puinteu out many
times over in the foregoing discussion, is the comm ents ' insularity.
Seemingly driven by a kind of disciplinary imperialism, the
lawyers looked at the issue under discussion solely from the
perspective of a legal world view, and required the scientists to
enter into that world for conversation to occur. Even though they

l just want to know what works."). Yet, this is hardly a precise or self-evident
expression, and for non-scientists it i:. likely to have little meaning at all. Later in
his prt:sentaLion, DO objects to similarly vague legal language ns not helpful,
suggesting that he values precise description. But it appears that he is also
sometimes willing to sacrifice precision for other values. Just like law. What is
reully going on is no doubt clear to scientists as a shorthand expression embodying
a well-defined, if inexplicit. set of procedures and substantive norms specifying
how science is to be done (in that regard it is similar to IJB's "certain enough"
expression, see supra p. 237, at lines 29-30). but whether the e xpression is useful
in communicating with anyone outs ide of science, including other professionals, is
a more difficult question to answer. This is a more serious issue for law than
science because law speaks to citi zens generall y, not j ust legal professionals.
272. Compare their respective expressions of the "based on a misconception"
objection to the audience member's question about uncertainty.
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were provided with several opportunities to do so, the lawyers did
not answer the question about uncertainty, not because they did not
want to, there is no evidence of bad faith anywhere in their
comments, but because they seemed not to understand what was
being asked. They appeared to assume that the existing regime of
legal mles and procedures was the only conceivable world, and
interpreted the audience member's question as a query into, or a
dispute about, what that world requires, not what it could or should
require. It was as if there was no category in the lawyers' heads
which allowed a question about the legal system's assumptions or
purposes to register. Trapped in a technician's mindset, Lhey could
hear only a question about mechanics, not one about design.
The lawyers also were fairly combative, seeming to see
conversation as a contact sport in which the goal is to silence others
rather than draw them out. They could have examined the question
about uncertainty open-endedly and in detail. This would have
been an appropriate, even ideal, course for a conference on interdisciplinary collaboration. But instead, they made science, not law,
the focus of their responses, and challenged what they took to be
the questioner's understanding of law and the legal system. Rather
than inquire or explain, they attacked, often in long-winded and
theatrical fashion. They criticized scientists for being pretentious,
dishonest, incoherent, or ignorant, even of their own methods.
They ridiculed, caricatured, and dismissed what scientists have to
say generally, filibustering, or referring to arcane source material,
impossible to check, as authority for their views when everything
else failed. They did not allow the questioner to explain or clarify
her question, or even to speak at all until so much time had pa<;sed
that it. no longer seemed possible to know where to begin. Not
belligerent so much as rude, they used their status as panelists as a
form of bully pulpit to lecture the scientists in the audience about
the correct understanding of law. In the process, they silenced the
audience, not by saying something indisputably responsive and
true, but by smothering the question about uncertainty in an
avalanche of words. They talked a potentially interesting interdisciplinary conversation to death before it had taken its second
breath, a strange thing to do, it would seem, at a conference on the
possibilities of inter-disciplinary collaboration.
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Beyond being rhetorically combative, the lawyers also expressed
their views in a somewhat overstated and consistently authoritarian
manner. Rarely, if ever, did they admit ignorance, limitation,
doubt, qualification, or acknowledge that they might learn
something new from the audience, qualities one might expect to
find in a conversation between professionals from different
disciplines. They never admitted to being surprised or caught off
guard, and always knew what they thought about an issue
immediately, often before there was time to think about it, even
when the subject was science not law. They tended to pronounce
more than discuss, making points in an exaggerated or puffed up
fashion, and speaking w ith a higher degree of certainty than they
would have, as RS says of scientists, "with the doors closed."273
They took charge of the conversation, imposing their own views on
how the issue of uncertainty should be understood and discussed,
deciding unilaterally what the scientists needed to know. Such a
style can be distracting, if not offensive, to other professionals,
especially scientists, who are suspicious of lawyer discourse
methods to begin with. At a minimum, it can introduce a great deal
of interpretive baggage into conversation, slowing conversation
down and making it less likely to be productive. Tt is not that I
think the lawyers intended to be offensive, I have no doubt that
they did not, but just that their ordinary way of speaking is readily
interpreted in that way. Indeed, it may be the most natural
interpretation to give their way of speaking. Looking at these
transcripts, it is not hard to get a sense of why scientists do not like
to talk with lawyers about matters of substance.
Lawyer
conversation, it seems, often is hard to make sociable.
No doubt lawyers would give the panelists' comments a more
positive interpretation. They would understand, for example, that
lawyers often do not mean to sound as belligerent or as dogmatic as
they do, and would know the insider codes which enable one to
translate lawyer statements and ways of speaking into more
nuanced messages and more modulated tones.
Yet interdisciplinary communication, by definition, is communication with
outsiders. lt cannot depend on insider codes for its effectiveness

273. RS, Panel Discussion, supra at p. 221, line 28.
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because outsiders do not know the codes. That is one of the
principal reasons they are outsiders. Ordinary language is usually
the only vehicle available for speaking across disciplinary
boundaries, and lawyers must be able to use ordinary language
effectively if they are to be understood by those outside the
profession. Without compromising the integrity or sophistication
of their views, lawyers must be able to express their beliefs,
confusions, curiosities, criticisms, doubts, concerns, and the like, in
straightforward and famiJjar terms.
They must translate
complicated ideas rather than dumb them down, so the ideas can be
tested and not just ratified. lt would be nice if all lawyers could be
trained in other disciplines, at least the one(s) with which they most
commonly work, and sometimes this is feasible. 274 Fully socialized
into two or more professional worlds, lawyers would find fewer
situations in which they would be likely to be confused, to
misinterpret, or to overreact. But this is an impractical remedy
much of the time. Most people do not have the time, money, or
inclination to go both to graduate or medical school, in addition to
law school. Life is short and one's remunerative career must begin.
As a practical matter, therefore, widespread inter-disciplinary
cooperation depends upon lawyers being able to explain
complicated legal concepts and procedures to other professionals in
language the others can understand and evaluate. Judged against
this standard, the lawyers on this panel come up short.
Even if the above excerpts reflect a common discourse style, that
does not mean that the style is used widely by lawyers in practice.
The conference question and answer session may not have
reproduced the conditions of the field, so to speak, so that it would

274. Rut see Robitscher, supra nme 3, at 303. "We have passed the period of
the Universal man and reached the period of the specialist who not only has staked
om a field but a narrow portion of a field for his special domain and whose
methods and vocabulary have become foreign territory to all other disciplines."
Jd. Professor Robit~cher also reports the results of a survey conducted by
Professor William Curran for the Commonwealth Fund, flnding that in doing law
and science related work, "it is better to have two people representing separate
discipl.ines who have the ability to work well with each other," than "one person
combining two disciplines." !d. at 304. Robitscher himself thinks that this
conclusion "underrates the advantages of a combination of disciplines in one
person." /d. at 305.
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be inappropriate to extrapolate from the symposium discussion to
lawyer-scientist communication generally. The format of sitting on
a stage, in front of an audience, speaking into a microphone, and
being videotaped, may have invited speech-making to an extent
greater than would be the case in the more informal settings of the
law office or laboratory. The lawyers may simply have adjusted
their manner to the occasion. On the other hand, my observations
of the panelists' "ptivate" conversations at the conference, that is,
their conversations with single individuals and small groups after
the panel presentations were over, show that in most respects the
275
lawyers behaved the same way in private as they did on stage.
The only major difference was that they usually made shorter
statements in indjvidual conversations than in the above excerpts.
There were no forty to sixty line soliloquies, for example, though
they did tend to speak for longer than others when challenged by a
comment or surprised by a question for which they had no ready
answer. Allowing for these minor differences, in all essentiaJ
respects, the lawyers' private conversations were pretty much the
same as what one sees above.
Perhaps these private conversations, corning as they did in the
wake of the formal panel presentations, suffered from a kind of
carryover effect which caused the panelists to view the
conversations as quasi public, and to behave as if they were still on
stage. Yet, there is nothing about speaking in public, on stage or
otherwise, to a sophisticated audience already up to speed on the
issues under discussion, which encourages overstatement, ridicule,
false certitude, filibuster, or other features likely to discourage
listeners from paying close attention and consideting carefully what
is said. In fact, the opposite qualities would seem to play much
better, even in public. Succinctly stated and properly qualified
claim s, limited in scope, supported by explicitly desctibed
evidence, and offered as suggesti.ons to be tested rather than
conclusions to be ratified, not only encourage others to join in
conversation more readily, but also make o ne look more impressive
as a speaker. This was not a Fourth of July oration to citizens in a

275. I also have found similar patterns in law offi ce work conversation. See
Condlin, supra note 75, at:loX-74.
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public park, and the panelists were not running for elective office.
It was a gathering of professionals, most of whom were
knowledgeable about the topic under discussion, who expected to
participate in an inter-disciplinary conversation about the
relationship between law and science. The lawyers did not come to
the conference to preach to the converted, or at least said that they
<.lid not, and given the audience, any other plan would have been
foolhardy. In this context, it was more sensible for them to want to
appear insightful, open-minded, curious, and respectful , than it was
to appear authoritative or dogmatic.
The patterns also cannot be explained by ignorance,
inexperience, or lack of skill. The panelists are blue-chip law-andscience experts in any sense of the term. Each is among the most
well-known and highly regarded lawyers in the country at
representing plaintiffs,2711 and defendants,277 in science related
litigation. Each is accustomed to working with scientists, has
written extensively about the process in the academic journals, and
bas well thought out views on the issue of uncertainty in law and
science. Many of their articles, in fact, have been cited by courts
and academic commentators as exemplars of the best work in the
field. Moreover, the patterns in their comments-an insular and
legalistic world view, a pervasive combativeness, a dogmatic and
authoritarian manner, and a propensity to fil ibuster and take
unilateral control-are similar to patterns lawyers are criticized for
using in non-science related contexts. 278 This suggests that the
patterns may stem from something more basic in the way lawyers
are selected, trained, and socialized, than from circumstances or
conditions peculiar to the conference itself. For example, the
patterns reflect a set of adversarial skills that are adaptive in many
situations in which lawyers work. While they do not do much to
advance understanding in non-advocacy relationships, these skills
play an important role in the more overtly competitive relationships
of the courtroom or boardroom, where being able to take charge of
a conversation and control its outcome is a useful thing. There is a
276. Panelists AR and RS.
277. Panelist BB.
278. See Socrates' New Clothe~·. supra note 78, at 282 n.128, and articles
refern:<.I to therein.
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reason then for lawyers to learn to behave as these lawyers did in
the above excerpts. When skills of this sort are learned unselfconsciously, however, as they are in most American legal
education, so that they cannot be turned on and off on command, or
even always recognized when on, it is not surprising that they
would surface in situations where they do not belong. While there
is no way to be certain on the basis of the conference data alone,
there are many reasons to believe that the above patterns represent
the way lawyers communicate with scientists generally, and that
they may be the norm rather than the exception.
If lawyers, as a group, converse in ways that are difficult for
scientists to interpret, thereby exacerbating the natural cultural
tension between Jaw and science, the next question is what can and
should be done about it.279 Changing the cultures of law and
science to make each discipline more open to, and respectful of, the
other does not seem to be a realistic possibility.280 These cultures
have not changed substantially in tens, perhaps hundreds, of years,
in part because each, as presently configured, is reasonably well
adapted to the particular objectives of its respective discipline.
There is something workable in the culture of each discipline, in
other words, that is likely to outweigh any countervailing pressure
for change produced by the friction generated when law and
science rub together in the wrong way. This does not mean that
individual lawyers cannot and should not transce nd their cultural
conditioning in particular cases as part of the process of working
with scientists to resolve joint inter-disciplinary problems. They
can and should.2l'! 1 However, it does mean that attempts to fuse the
disciplines of law and science into a single, harmoniouslyfunctioning whole have their greatest chances of success when they
make practitioner behavior, and not disciplinary stmcture, the
object of their reform.
279. See JASANOFF, supra note 1, 218-23 (describing strucrural and
institutional responses to the law-science incompatibility problem).
2HO. q: Areeda, supra note II , at 1039-42 (discussing the conceptual and
analytical difficulties involved in joining different disciplinary bodies of lhought
together). But see KAss, supra note 3, at 9 (arguing lhat "lhe so-called two
cultures can properly be bridged, if at all, only by a philosophical reconstruction of
lhe s<.:ientific side of lhe divide").
281. Scientists should do the same, of course, but my focus here is on lawyers.
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Lawyers282 need better conversational learning techniques, that
much is clear. They need to listen more, pontificate less, draw
others out when they are too inhibited to provide detaiJs on their
own, explain, support and test arguments against direct evidence
rather than assumptions, beliefs, and presuppositions, and generally
be less quick to judge or conclude about the worth of ideas that are
new or surprising until those ideas have been examined fully and
fairly. Technique does not exist in a vacuum, however, it flows
naturally and logically from a conception of how one ought. to
behave, and in this sense is the instrumental side of one's
conception of professional role. So what lawyers really need is a
richer, more multi-faceted conception of their professional role, one
that explains what it means to act as a lawyer in the wide variety of
settings in which lawyers operate outside of the courtroom. Such a
conception of role should help lawyers to function with one foot in
and one foot outside of legal practice, so to speak, able to use
practice technique effectively, without at the same time being
trapped in a static or purely tec hnical conception of their role. It
should help lawyers understand the social, political and moral
dimensions of law practice, how the pursuit of justice overlaps
with, bul also differs from lhe pursuit of truth, and how good
practice technique is a necessary but not sufficient condition of
284
good practice.
Multi-dimensional
Lawyers may resist this suggestion.
282. At least tl1e lawyers iu tl1ese excerpts, and the rest to the extent that they
are like these lawyers.
283. See Condlin, supra note 75, for an extended discussion of tllis topic.
284. There have been famous institutional examples of attempts to educate
judges. lawyers, and scientific experts i n each other's modes of reasoning and
discourse. See, e.g.. REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE (1994)
(describing the principles of epidemiological studies. cancer bioassays. and risk
analysis to federal and state judges); Areeda, supra note II. at 1038 (describing
seminars for judges on disciplines oilier than law organized by the Federal Judkial
Center). What I have in mind here are actions by individual practitioners working
together on particular cases to supplement these institutional efforts. In explaining
law and legal practice to scientists, however, lawyers should take pains to emulate
Niels Bohr and "never express themselve.s more clearly than they think." P AIS,
supra note 200. at 170. They should learn to think out loud, in other words,
honestly and transparently, but with "more caution and humility" than is presently
the case when talking with those in disciplines outside of law. Brink, supra note
II , at 274.
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conceptions of role complicate professional life by making
judgments more difficult, and this makes such conceptions prima
facie suspect in the minds of many. Understandably, lawyers
would prefer to have role obligations clearly defined, even
reducible to a set of routines that, when properly carried out,
guarantee success.285 Lawyers think that only academics prefer
complication and risk, and then mostly in theory.
As a
consequence, the idea of law practice as a political and moral
phenomenon is likely to meet with a collective groan in many
quarters.Z86 While this reaction is understandable, ultimately it
must be overcome. People who become lawyers are sophisticated
enough to understand the difference between performing within a
disciplinary system, and standing outside of thal system to describe
and evaluate it. Working with a bifurcated conception of role, in
other words, they are able to enter law practice sufficiently to be
able to perform identifiably as lawyers, and yet at the same time,
llso remain separate from law practice sufficiently to be able to
explain and criticize how it operates. This is not to say that lawyers
regularly operate in this way, some do and some do not. Nor is it
to say that legal education teaches about law practice from this
perspective. Again this varies, but maintaining the split personality
of perfom1er and critic is something lawyers are capable of
understanding as a concept and putting into practice as a skill. In

285. Ironically, they a.lso like to have others think that legal work is full of
complicated and difficult judgment calls, and something not everyone could do.
T his is another example of the point reputedly made by Lon Fuller aboul law
students, that they "want to explore the universe, and know where they arc every
step of the way." Who wouldn' t? Cf. Robitschcr, supra note 3, ut 307 (describing
the "different temperaments" of lawyers and doctors).
286. There are lots of reasons for lawyers to take such a perspective on their
work. They run a sellers' market. so to speak, in the sense that they have the
power, through law, to impose sanctions on anyone who refuses to communicate
in strictly legal tenns. Alone among the professions, they are both regulated and
regulator. They might feel the natural tendency to speak exclusively in terms of
the system they know best. Having worked hard to become effective within that
system. they could be understandably reluctant to start all over again learning
another. They could believe in the benefit of "bright line" rules, a benefit that
would be lost by the adoption of a more complex, multi-perspectival approach to
thinking about law and legal practice. It is impossible to know how large a role
these and other such factors play in reinforcing the legal-dominant discourse style
seen above.
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fact, such dual-perspective viewpoints are routinely described and
recommended in the literature on the teaching of law practice skill.
It is the central idea behind the "critical reflection" mantra of
clinical legal education.un
The above excerpts illustrate the dangers involved when, for
whatever reason, lawyers or any group of professionals understand
and try to explain a complicated social, political and moral system
principally as a set of disembodied rules, or when they pursue the
development of practice technique (whether analytical or
interpersonal), so single-mindedly that it prevents the development
of critical consciousness. For all of their talent, skill and expertise,
the lawyers in the above excerpts were not able to explain or look
critically at law and legal practice in non-circular tenus, with a
group of inteiJigent and interested scientists, surely not the hardest
audience. Legal education cannot prevent this "reduction to
technique" perspective from taking hold completely, of course, hut
it can weaken its grip somewhat by teaching about law and practice
skill as means to an end, rather than as an end in its own right. 288
The end of law practice is justice. If there is not an argument for
why a particular legal rule, procedure, or practice convention
advances justice, that rule, procedure, or convention is not worthy

2K7. See Condlin, supra note 75, at :l:lK-39 n.3 (describing the "critical
reflection" dimension of clinical legal education). For examples of other rypes of
"practitioners··· thinking in such a dual or critical perspective, see Jon 0 .
Newman, Rethinking Faimess: Perspectives on the Litigation Prnr:ess, 94 YALt-: L.
J. 1643 (J 985)(sining judge analyzing litigation practices and rules from the
perspective of whether they promote fairness); Susan Silbey & Austin Sarat,
Critical Traditions in Law and Society Research, 2 1 L AW & Soc•y R EV. 165, 166
(1987)(prornoting the development of a "sociology of the sociology of law" that
would "reconstitute and reimagine the subject of socio-legal research").
288. Tltis reconuneudation is based. in part, on a belief such as that expressed
by Andrew Delbanco at the end of his review of Roger Shattuck's book Furbidden
Knowledge. when he says:
In the last analysis. Forbidden Knowledge is a re.buke and challenge to
our institutions of education. where no one has solved the perennially
lamented problem of the cultural divide between science and the
humanities. Written by someone who has bridged that gap, th is book
confirms that only if we create humane scientists and sc.ientifically
informed humanists will we stand a chance.
Andrew Delhanco, The Risk of Freedom, N.Y. Rt-:v . Or BOOKS, Sept. 25, 1997, ar
7.
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of respect, and criticisms of it by others should be taken seriously,
rather than dismissed or shouted down.
Many of the objections to legal rules and practices made by
scientists and others in the above conversations and elsewhere, may
be difficult to listen to because they are essentially correct.
Outsiders are often better positioned to identify warts in a system
of thought than those with a stake in the system, and there is no
reason to expect this general principal not to be true for law. 289
Moreover, Lhere is no basis to believe that legal rules and legal
practices will always be sensible. Law, like any system of thought,
is produced by a mixture of forces, some rational and others not, so
that it is reasonable to expect aspects of the system always to be
subject to legitimate criticism. The trick for lawyers is to learn to
welcome such criticism as a whole, while at the same time, find
within it the limited number of worthwhile ideas capable of being
put into effect. This means that lawyers must learn to see critics of
the profession as political associates of sorts, with whom they (the
lawyers) are paired in constantly testing and updating the content
and structure of law.
Since criticism is a difficult and time consuming process,
lawyers also must learn to help others provide it, by listening more
patiently and more generously than they do at the present, by
drawing others out when they do not provide sufficient detail on
their own, and by not silencing critics in the manner of the lawyers
in the above discussion. Conversing with critics shares some of the
features of taking the deposition of someone who answers
questions in a lengthy, self-serving, and argumentative fashion.
One could squeeze the argument out of the answers, of course, by
forcing the person to play by the testimonial rules, but it would be
smarter to hear the answers out in all of their gory detail. Get the
full story in other words, and then go away and think about it,
before deciding what response to make. In a world characterized
by competitive rhetorical performances it is sometimes easy to
mistake silencing others for conversational success, and in some
situations, no doubt, that would be a fair conclusion to draw. But

289. See POSNER, supra note Jl, at 98 (describing how many advances in
disciplinary thought come from outside the discipline).
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when the objective of conversation is shared inquiry and mutual
learning, premature silence is almost always self-defeating.

